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3Abstract
This thesis studies time-inconsistent preferences. The ﬁrst chapter introduces dynamically
inconsistent time discounting into alternating-oﬀers bargaining à la Rubinstein (1982), assuming
players' utilities are linear in their share. For sophisticated players, it provides a characterisation
of equilibrium uniqueness and a full characterisation of equilibrium outcomes. When players
perceive a single period of delay from the present at least as costly as any such delay that takes
place in the future, then equilibrium is unique and has immediate agreement. This property
has a clear interpretation as present bias and is satisﬁed speciﬁcally by any form of hyperbolic
and quasi-hyperbolic discounting. For violations of present bias within a short time horizon,
which have recently been documented empirically, there exist multiple equilibria, where de-
layed agreement arises as an equilibrium outcome. Chapter two generalises the analysis to the
entire class of separable time preferences for which, again, a full characterisation of equilibrium
outcomes is obtained. Here, present bias can be combined with concavity of instantaneous util-
ities in order to be suﬃcient for uniqueness and immediate agreement. Chapter 3 is concerned
with welfare properties of individual dynamic choice when preferences are time-inconsistent and
there is perfect information. Applying the Pareto criterion to the sequence of temporal selves
of the individual, it establishes two welfare properties of the standard solution concept for this
case, which is Strotz-Pollak equilibrium: ﬁrst, for ﬁnite-horizon problems without indiﬀerences,
Hammond's (1976) essential consistency is suﬃcient for choice to be Pareto-optimal. Second, if
the problem satisﬁes a certain history-independence property, then the ineﬃciency of an equi-
librium outcome implies it is Pareto-dominated by another equilibrium outcome, leading to an
existence result for Pareto-eﬃcient equilibrium.
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Introduction
The study of dynamically inconsistent preferences has seen an enormous surge in economics
within the past 15 years. Although in his pioneering analysis of such preferences, Robert
Strotz had already presented anecdotal evidence of procrastination and commitment demand,
suggesting the importance of self-control problems in economic decision making which are at
odds with standard assumptions, it was the work of David Laibson in the mid- to late 1990s
that provided the profession with a simple model of such dynamic inconsistency that since
then has been used to explain a rich set of empirical phenomena: (β, δ)-discounting as a single-
person reinterpretation of a functional form proposed by Edmund Phelps and Robert Pollak
for imperfect intergenerational altruism.
An individual who recognises her dynamic inconsistency can act strategically to prevent
certain future behaviours that she ﬁnds undesirable, e.g. invest in illiquid assets that prevent
excessive consumption in the future. The presence of intertemporally conﬂicting objectives
within the same decision maker raises the question of miscoordination of behaviour across
time. Accordingly, the welfare properties of economic outcomes in the presence of dynamic
inconsistency of preferences, viewed by some as a form of irrationality, deserve particular at-
tention. This is a unifying theme of this work: while chapters 1 and 2 study the nature, in
particular the eﬃciency, of outcomes when two parties with dynamically inconsistent time pref-
erences bargain through time over how to share an economic surplus, chapter 3 investigates
welfare properties of individual choice with time-inconsistent preferences. In the remainder of
this introduction, I will brieﬂy describe this work.
The aforementioned most popular model of self-control, (β, δ)-discounting, generates dy-
namic inconsistency through time preferences in a minimal way: the cost of delaying a future
reward further are governed by parameter δ as in exponential discounting, whereas delaying
immediate gratiﬁcation involves additional impatience, captured through a second parameter
β. While one focus of applied work has been on ﬁrm behaviour in view of such time-inconsistent
consumers, analyses of strategic interaction by several time-inconsistent agents are rare. The
core model of strategic bargaining theory developed by Ingolf Ståhl and Ariel Rubinstein pro-
vides, however, a setting in which time preferences matter: two parties jointly decide over how
and when to divide a given economic surplus. Given the economic importance of bargaining in
determining the terms of decentralised economic exchange and its prevalence in applied work
((re-) negotiation of contracts such as wage bargaining, household decision making, etc.), it
appears especially important for further work with (β, δ)-discounting to have results about the
outcome of bargaining when the parties have such time preferences.
Chapters 1 and 2 take up this question for rather general time preferences, including but not
limited to (β, δ)-discounting; the more general chapter 2 investigates bargaining outcomes for
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the entire class of separable time preferences. The motivation for this is empirical: the success
of the latter most popular model seems to rely on its capturing a very important feature of
actual time preferences at the minimal cost of introducing one additional parameter; experi-
mental work estimating time preferences in greater detail ﬁnds great qualitative heterogeneity
of preferences which (β, δ)-discounting can, of course, not explain. From this point of view, my
analysis can be seen as including various robustness checks.
Few analyses of bargaining with dynamically inconsistent time preferences are available,
and all of them have been unduly restrictive in ruling out history-dependent behaviour. I argue
(in chapter 1) that this assumption rules out whatever novel strategic implications dynamic
inconsistency might have, and subsequently provide charaterisations of equilibrium outcomes
for general strategies. The main ﬁndings can be summarised as follows.
(1) Present bias, which is a property of time preferences, where delaying a reward by one
period from the immediate present is perceived (weakly) more costly than any one-
period delay that takes place in the future, is suﬃcient for uniqueness of equilibrium
(whenever instantaneous utility is concave). This is satisﬁed by all families of discount-
ing typically used in economics: hyperbolic, exponential and (β, δ)-discounting. The
unique equilibrium then displays the familiar properties of being simple (behaviour
is history- and time-independent) and inducing immediate agreement (eﬃciency), with
well-known comparative statics.
(2) For violations of present bias, where some player is more sensitive to a period of
delay within the near future than a period of delay from the immediate present, novel
equilibrium constructions, which do not require stationary equilibrium yield delayed
agreement. Surprisingly, recent experimental designs that studied individual choices
found clear evidence for such time preferences in domains which seem highly relevant
for bargaining (money within short horizons).
Chapter 1 deals with the textbook case of separable time preferences with a representation
where instantaneous utility is linear in the share obtained. It thus focuses on the novel phe-
nomena that arise under dynamic inconsistency of time preferences in a set-up where the role
of non-exponential discounting is most transparent, and it furnishes a simple example as well
as applications and a discussion of empirical evidence on time preferences. In contrast, chap-
ter 2 is more technically oriented and provides a characterisation of equilibrium outcomes for
the entire class of separable time preferences. These have well-known axiomatisations and,
moreover, (β, δ)-discounting has been found most convincing when interpreted in terms of con-
sumption utility (rather than money directly). While the basic mechanisms discovered for
time-inconsistent discounting in chapter 1 are similar in the more general case, the availability
of formulae for the general case seems therefore important.
The ﬁnal chapter, chapter 3, investigates welfare properties of sophisticated individual choice
under general forms of time-inconsistency, in environments with perfect information. Using the
standard solution concept to derive behaviour, which is Strotz-Pollak equilibrium, and ap-
plying an intrapersonal (equivalently, intertemporal) version of the classic Pareto criterion, it
establishes two welfare properties: ﬁrst, it shows that a property called essential consistency,
which restricts the dynamic inconsistency of preferences, guarantees eﬃcient choice (in this
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Pareto sense). While essential consistency appears restrictive indeed, this result is obtained in
a setting with arbitrary forms of history-dependence of welfare and serves to delineate those
preferences which result in severe behavioural miscoordination across time (in the sense of
Pareto-ineﬃciency). Second, if the decision problem satisﬁes a certain history-independence
property, then the ineﬃciency of some equilibrium outcome implies that any outcome that
Pareto-dominates it is also an equilibrium outcome. Thus, under standard technical assump-
tions, this result provides an existence result for eﬃcient equilibrium outcomes. The two
ﬁndings are applied to two inﬂuential analyses of choice under (β, δ)-discounting: procrasti-
nation/preproperation and overconsumption.
CHAPTER 1
Time-Inconsistent Discounting in Alternating-Oﬀers Bargaining
1.1. Introduction
As a mechanism to share economic surplus, bargaining is pervasive in decentralised ex-
change and accordingly fundamental to the economic analysis of contracts. In the absence of
irrevocable commitments, time becomes a signiﬁcant variable of bargaining agreements; parties
may not only agree now or never, but also sooner or later. At the heart of economists' under-
standing of how the bargaining parties' time preferences shape the agreement they will reach
lies the so-called strategic approach to bargaining, which was pioneered by Ståhl [1972] and
ﬁrmly established in economics by the seminal work of Rubinstein [1982]. Building on Ståhl's
disciplined formal description of the bargaining process as one where parties alternate in mak-
ing and answering proposals, and extending it to situations without an exogenous deadline,
Rubinstein [1982] reaches surprisingly sharp conclusions about how two completely informed
and impatient parties share an economic surplus: under seemingly weak assumptions about the
players' preferences, there is a unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium with the properties
that (i) agreement is reached immediately, (ii) a player's bargaining power is her tolerance
of a round's delay, and (iii) the initial proposer enjoys a strategic advantage. Moreover, this
equilibrium has a simplestationarystructure: whenever it is her turn in the respective
role, a player always makes the very same oﬀer and follows the very same acceptance rule, and
in any round the oﬀer by the proposer equals the smallest share the respondent accepts, given
that upon a rejection, roles are reversed and the same property holds true.
Rubinstein derives these results for players whose time preferences satisfy exponential dis-
counting.1 Within the past ﬁfteen years, however, a large body of evidence challenging this
assumption has received attention in economics. In numerous empirical studies, surveyed by
Frederick et al. [2002], psychologists have measured periodic discount rates which are declining
in delay, a ﬁnding termed decreasing impatience or hyperbolic discounting. Based on this ev-
idence, Laibson [1997] introduced a single-parameter extension of exponential discounting, the
(β, δ)-model of quasi-hyperbolic discounting: it emphasises a distinct time preference for in-
tertemporal trade-oﬀs involving the immediate present, a present bias governed by parameter
β, leaving the long-run time preference over prospects which are in the future to satisfy exponen-
tial discounting with parameter δ. Thus this model captures one particular qualitative feature
of hyperbolic discounting. In response to its success in applied work, also economists have
turned to the experimental investigation of time preferences: while in the particular domain
of single-dated monetary rewards, this literature has produced both (i) defence of exponential
discounting, e.g. by Andreoni and Sprenger [2012], and (ii) further qualiﬁcation of its violations
1Although Rubinstein [1982] works directly with preference relations, Fishburn and Rubinstein [1982] show that
the axioms he imposes imply exponential discounting (see also Osborne and Rubinstein [1990, Section 3.3]).
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for short delays, where increasing impatience has been observed, e.g. by Takeuchi [2011], when
the domain of choice is actual consumption, the evidence for present bias remains strong, as
most recently discussed and further conﬁrmed by Augenblick et al. [2013].
In view of this evidence, one is naturally led to wonder whether the aforementioned results,
which form the cornerstone of economists' thinking about bargaining, remain valid once time
preferences take richer forms than exact exponential discounting. More speciﬁcally, when is
there still a unique prediction, and which discount factor matters in this case? This question
is all the more important in view of the increased interest in economic applications using non-
exponential discounting. Or may players' dynamic inconsistency, which results once exponential
discounting is violated, invite multiplicity and non-stationary equilibria? Is there a meaningful
notion of bargaining power more generally?
To address all of these questions, I revisit the Rubinstein [1982] model for general separable
and time-invariant preferences with a linear utility representation; more precisely, at any time
during the bargaining, each player i evaluates a prospective division x = (x1, x2) received after
t periods of delay with utility Ui (x, t) = di (t)xi, where di is a decreasing discount function.
While the linearity of Ui in the share is restrictive, this case has received the greatest attention
in the literature and, moreover, the resulting simpliﬁcation allows to better focus on the role
of non-exponential discounting. Observe that a player's such preferences are time-consistent if
and only if di (t) = δ
t
i for some constant δi ∈ (0, 1), i.e. they satisfy the well-studied case of
exponential discounting. Hence this paper is most of all about time-inconsistent discounting.
I employ the standard equilibrium concept for games played by time-inconsistent players
which is Strotz-Pollak equilibrium (StPoE). It assumes that a player cannot commit to future ac-
tions and, accordingly, requires robustness against one-shot deviations only; as is important for
comparability, it coincides with subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in the case of time-consistent
players. While some departures from exponential discounting have been analysed (see section
1.1.1), all of this work is restricted to stationary equilibrium. However, as I argue in section
1.3, the assumption of stationarity is particularly problematic under time-inconsistency: a sta-
tionary bargaining strategy is incapable of even creating preference reversals for the opponent.
This paper is the ﬁrst to characterise equilibrium for general strategies.
In the space of preferences deﬁned above, patience is a more complex category than under
exponential discounting: e.g. in the context of the (β, δ)-model, for a given utility function,
having inferred δ from choices over long-term prospects does not permit conclusions about how
trade-oﬀs between immediately present and future prospects are resolved, because these are
governed separately by β. Nonetheless, for the present context, a player's discount function
her patiencefor rewards delayed by t + 1 periods, di (t+ 1), can be usefully decomposed
as the product of per-period discount factors, di (t+ 1) =
∏t
τ=0 Pi (τ) = di (t)Pi (t), where
Pi (t) ≡ di (t+ 1) /di (t) measures what I (somewhat inappropriately) call a player i's marginal
patience, her attitude to one additional period of delay for a given delay of t periods.
My ﬁrst main result identiﬁes the following simple condition as suﬃcient for equilibrium
uniqueness whenever it is satisﬁed by both players i: for any t,
Pi (0) ≤ Pi (t) .
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The unique equilibrium then indeed takes the simple stationary form described above, and
attitudes to delay beyond one single period of bargaining turn out to be immaterial. The
suﬃcient property of preferences can be interpreted as a weak form of present bias : it says
that, for any given reward, an additional period's (or marginal) delay is most costly when
it is one from the immediate present. This is satisﬁed by quasi-hyperbolic and hyperbolic
as well as exponential discounting preferences; in fact, the property of a constant marginal
patience deﬁnes exponential discounting, where Pi (t) = δi for all t. Against the background
of the increased interest in applications of the (β, δ)-model, this uniqueness result appears an
important insight. Moreover, since present bias is a restriction on individual preferences, it also
lends itself to empirical testing.
The second main result generalises the analysis to incorporate the possibility that present
bias may fail to hold for some player. I obtain a full characterisation of equilibrium outcomes
for the preferences assumed here. This implies a characterisation of those pairs of preferences
for which equilibrium is uniquegeneralising the suﬃciency of present biasand reveals a
novel form of equilibrium multiplicity and ineﬃcient delay (because players are impatient, any
delayed agreement is Pareto-dominated by the corresponding division with immediate agree-
ment). When a bargaining party's marginal patience falls below Pi (0) within a short horizon
of delays, then the anticipation of future delay creates scope for additional threats by the oppo-
nent, which are more severe than any threat that is based on subsequent immediate agreement
and thus can support delay in a self-enforcing manner via non-stationary strategies. Rather
surprisingly, the underlying property of preferences has recently been documented in several
experimental studies of time preferences (e.g. Attema et al. [2010] and Takeuchi [2011]). A
more general notion of bargaining power which emerges is the minimal marginal patience over
a suﬃciently long horizon from the present.2
1.1.1. Related Literature on Bargaining and Discounting. The literature studying
variations of the Rubinstein-Ståhl model of bargaining is vast. The origin of this literature and
my main inspiration is Rubinstein [1982]. His work extends the alternating-oﬀers bargaining
protocol proposed by Ståhl [1972] to an inﬁnite horizon and a continuous agreement space.
While his analysis dispenses with utility representations, the axioms imposed on the players'
preferences necessarily imply an exponential-discounting representation where, moreover, the
utility function is not too convex.3 For these preferences he characterises those surplus di-
visions that obtain in subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE). Most textbook versions of
the model as well as economists more generally have focused on his example of a linear utility
function for which there exists a unique such equilibrium, which features stationary strategies
and immediate agreement in every round (on as well as oﬀ the equilibrium path).4 It is worth-
wile mentioning, however, that Rubinstein also covers preferences for which there is equilibrium
multiplicity which in fact requires multiplicity of stationary SPNE; under certain conditions,
2The extent of this horizon is the maximal equilibrium delay which depends on the opponent's preferences.
3These properties stem mainly from axioms 4 and 5, respectively. Osborne and Rubinstein [1990, Section 3.3]
provide an illuminating discussion of (essentially) these axioms.
4Kreps [1990, Section 15.3], Fudenberg and Tirole [1991, Section 4.4] and Gibbons [1992, Section 2.1.D] are
such examples of textbook treatments.
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this even yields equilibrium delay. In contrast, the multiplicity and delay exhibited in this
paper do not depend on multiplicity of stationary equilibria.
The theoretical literature since has gone on to study generalisations of this model regarding
the protocol (e.g. Perry and Reny [1993]) or the surplus (e.g. Merlo and Wilson [1995]), but
only recently have alternative time preferences been considered. Ok and Masatlioglu [2007]
axiomatise preferences that imply forms of discounting that are more general than the ones I
consider here in that they allow for particular forms of intertemporal non-transitivity; while
there is separability, discounting emerges as relative to a particular intertemporal compari-
son instead of being absolute as a present-value calculation. The Rubinstein-Ståhl bargaining
protocol serves as an application of this decision theory: proposition 2 claims that when the
players' utility functions are strictly concave, then there is a unique time-consistent StPoE
(p. 230), which is the familiar stationary equilibrium.5 However, they do not deﬁne what they
mean by time-consistent when it is used to qualify StPoE nor provide a proof, only indicating
that the arguments of Shaked and Sutton [1984] apply.6 Moreover, their arguments do not
feature the strict concavity and would equally apply to the linear case dealt with here. My
theorem 1.2 proves that for this case, without a reﬁnement of StPoE, their proposition fails to
hold when allowing for history-dependent strategies.
Noor [2011] generalises the exponential discounting model so the discount function depends
on the size of the reward. This relaxation of separability also induces preference reversals of the
type predicted by hyperbolic discounting and, additionally, can accomodate another empirical
phenomenon called magnitude eﬀect where, for a given delay, smaller rewards appear to be
discounted more heavily than larger rewards. In applying these preferences to bargaining, he
simpliﬁes to linear utility and focuses on stationary equilibrium with immediate agreement; he
ﬁnds the possibility of multiplicity and of a more patient initial proposer obtaining a smaller
share than her opponent. For the kind of equilibria he studies, which involve only attitudes
to delay of a single period, those preferences are indistinguishable from standard exponential
preferences with non-linear utility.7 While theoretically interesting, non-separability poses a
conceptual challenge to the notion of time preference, because discounting then depends on
the domain of choice and its units, and, consequently, a unitary measure of time preference
becomes elusive.8
Akin [2007] studies bilateral bargaining with linear utility and (β, δ)-discounting. His focus
is on naïveté about future preferences and learning from the opponent's rejection. Assuming
stationary equilibrium conditional on beliefs,9 he ﬁnds that delay may arise due to a naïve
player's learning from a sophisticated player who has an incentive to forgo earlier agreements
in exchange for such learning of the opponent and accordingly better later splits. Theorem
1.1 lends additional credibility to this analysis by showing that under sophistication there is
indeed a unique stationary StPoE for such preferences.
5Due to the strict concavity of the utility functions there is a unique such stationary equilibrium.
6They mention that it is possibly a reﬁnement of StPoE (see their footnote 15).
7Without restrictions on the curvature, the latter permit the same kind of multiplicity. In fact, there may also
arise delay out of the multiplicity of stationary equilibria (see e.g. Osborne and Rubinstein [1990, Section 3.9.2]
which actually refers to an example in Rubinstein [1982, pp. 107-108]).
8Frederick et al. [2002] discuss this issue in detail.
9The actual equilibrium concept is necessarily more involved than StPoE due to naïveté and learning.
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In the context of an exogenous probabilistic risk of bargaining breakdown p after every
round, abstracting from any pure time-discounting, one would set δi = 1− p to obtain results
similar to those in Rubinstein [1982] (see Binmore et al. [1986]). Burgos et al. [2002] study risk
preferences which allow for non-separability and time-inconsistency, where their equilibrium
concept permits full commitment to future actions. The authors provide assumptions which
yield a unique stationary equilibrium and concentrate their subsequent analysis on this equi-
librium. Volij [2002] shows that when these preferences are restricted to being time-consistent,
the model becomes equivalent to that of Rubinstein [1982].
In summary, besides the seminal work of Rubinstein [1982], all the papers discussed here
assume stationary strategies in one way or another. As argued elsewhere, e.g. Osborne and Ru-
binstein [1990, p. 39], stationarity of strategies is problematic as an assumption in particular in
bargaining. In the presence of time-inconsistency, there is an additional reason to be interested
in non-stationary strategies, because the restriction to a stationary strategy deprives a player of
the ability to even create, let alone exploit, preference reversals of a time-inconsistent opponent.
1.1.2. Outline. Section 1.2 deﬁnes the bargaining game, including the class of preferences
considered in this paper; its last subsection highlights a stationarity property of the game
and, on this basis, deﬁnes various concepts which subsequent proofs will use heavily. Section
1.3 studies stationary equilibrium and ends by arguing that stationarity, as an assumption
on strategies, is particularly problematic in the analysis of bargaining with time-inconsistent
preferences. This is followed by a section 1.4, pointing out the relationship between equilibrium
delay and time-inconistency as well as laying the ground work for the subsequent analysis
of uniqueness. Section 1.5 presents the ﬁrst main result, which is the suﬃciency of present
bias for equilibrium uniqueness. This is generalised in section 1.6, where a characterisation
of those preferences for which equilibrium is unique as well as a general characterisation of
equilibrium outcomes and payoﬀs are provided. Section 1.7 attempts to illustrate all the main
results by means of a simple example, whereas section 1.8 sketches two applications of these
results to bargaining environments where dynamic inconsistency is explicitly motivated from
the respective environment. Section 1.9 concludes.
1.2. Model and Deﬁnitions
1.2.1. Protocol, Histories and Strategies. Two players I = {1, 2} bargain over how to
share a perfectly divisible surplus of (normalised) size one. In each round t ∈ N, player ρ (t) ∈ I
proposes a split x ∈ {(x1, x2) ∈ R+|x1 + x2 = 1} ≡ X to opponent player 3−ρ (t) (equivalently,
oﬀers the opponent a share x3−ρ(t)), who responds by choosing a ∈ {0, 1} ≡ A, either accepting
the proposal, a = 1, or rejecting it, a = 0. Upon the ﬁrst acceptance, bargaining terminates
with the agreed split x being implemented, and upon rejection players move on to the next
round t+ 1. Bargaining begins in round t = 1 with a proposal by player 1 and has the players
alternate in their roles of proposer and respondent, i. e. ρ (t+ 1) = 3− ρ (t).
Histories of such a game at the beginning of a round t ∈ N are sequences of proposals and
responses: ht−1 = (xs, as)s≤t−1 ∈ (X × A)t−1. Since bargaining concludes following the ﬁrst
accepted proposal, such non-terminal histories are elements of H t−1 ≡ (X × {0})t−1, and a
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terminal history ending in round t is an element of H t−1 × (X × {1}) ≡ Ht; for completeness,
let H0 ≡ {h0}. H∞ denotes the set of non-terminal histories of inﬁnite length.
A (pure) strategy of a player i is a mapping σi such that, for any t ∈ N, ht−1 ∈ H t−1 and
x ∈ X,10
i = ρ (t) ⇒ σi
(
ht−1
) ∈ X
i = ρ (t+ 1) ⇒ σi
(
ht−1, x
) ∈ A.
Let the space of all such functions of player i be denoted by Σi and deﬁne the space of strat-
egy proﬁles Σ ≡ Σ1 × Σ2.11 Any pair of strategies σ = (σ1, σ2) generates either a terminal
history in ∪t∈NHt or an inﬁnite non-terminal history in H∞ in an obvious way: the ﬁrst-round
actions are (σ1 (h
0) , σ2 (h
0, σ1 (h
0))) ≡ h1σ so if σ2 (h0, σ1 (h0)) = 1 then h1σ ∈ H1 and the
game ends after the ﬁrst round, otherwise add the second-round actions to generate a history
(h1σ, σ1 (h
1
σ) , σ2 (h
1
σ, σ1 (h
1
σ))) ≡ h2σ etc. Call a terminal history that is thus obtained htσ if it is
in Ht for t ∈ N; if none exists then call the corresponding inﬁnite non-terminal history h∞σ .
This can in fact be done starting from any h ∈ H t ∪ (H t ×X) in the very same way, in
which case the history obtained is the continuation history of h under σ; if it yields a terminal
history after s more rounds then it is some hsσ ∈ Hs ∪ (A×Hs−1) such that (h, hsσ) ∈ Ht+s,
and otherwise it is an element of H∞ ∪ (A×H∞). Note that for any two histories ht ∈ H t and
hs ∈ Hs with ρ (t) = ρ (s) the sets of possible continuation histories are identical; therefore this
holds true also for (ht, x) and (hs, x) for any x ∈ X, and in this sense the protocol is stationary.
In particular, there exist stationary strategies.
Definition 1.1. A bargaining strategy σi ∈ Σi of player i is a stationary strategy if there
exist xˆ ∈ X and aˆ : X → {0, 1} such that, for any t ∈ ρ−1 (i), ht−1 ∈ H t−1 and (ht, x) ∈ H t×X,
σi
(
ht−1
)
= xˆ
σi
(
ht, x
)
= aˆ (x) .
A stationary strategy does not respond to history; indeed, if σ is a pair of stationary
strategies then, for any non-terminal histories ht ∈ H t and hs ∈ Hs with ρ (t) = ρ (s) the same
continuation history is obtained. When stationary is used to qualify equilibrium, then this is
supposed to mean that every player's strategy is stationary.
Note the normalisations regarding the size of the surplus and the amount of time elapsing
between rounds of bargaining. Unless one is interested in comparative statics involving these,
by deﬁning players' preferences relative to these parameters there is no loss of generality; indeed,
this is how the assumptions on preferences below are to be understood.
Another restriction of the protocol is that proposals are non-wasteful (players' shares add
up to one). This is without loss of generality for the preferences assumed below where players
only care about their own share which they want to maximise and obtain sooner rather than
10The restriction to pure strategies is standard in this model because it assumes away any risk in order to focus
solely on the time dimension, as do the existing axiomatisations of time preferences.
11A player's strategy must specify her action for every contingency, including all those that the play of this
strategy actually rules out. For instance, although a strategy by player 2 may specify acceptance of every
possible ﬁrst-round proposal, it must also specify what she would propose in round 2 following a rejection; see
Rubinstein [1991] on how to interpret strategies in extensive-form games.
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later, and they can always choose to claim the entire cake. Due to their selﬁshness, a proposer
who wants an oﬀer accepted need not waste anything of what the opponent is willing to leave
her, and, by claiming the entire cake, a proposer makes the least acceptable feasible oﬀer
anyways.
In what follows, I will use i to denote a typical element of I, some player, and j = 3 − i
to denote the other player, so {i, j} = I.
1.2.2. Preferences. In every round t ∈ N of bargaining, the domain of the players' pref-
erences is assumed to be (X × Nt) ∪ {D}, where Nt ≡ {t′ ∈ N|t′ ≥ t} and D is (perpetual)
disagreement. Letting T ≡ N0 denote the set of possible delays of agreement, this domain
can be expressed in terms of relative rather than absolute time as (X × T ) ∪ {D} ≡ Z, which
does not depend on t and will be referred to as the set of feasible outcomes (for any t). The
preferences I consider in this paper are described by the following assumption.
Assumption 1. In every round t ∈ N, each player i ∈ I has preferences over feasible
outcomes Z represented by a function Ui : Z → [0, 1], which satisﬁes that
Ui (z) =
di (τ)xi z = (x, τ) ∈ X × T0 z = D ,
where the function di : T → (0, 1] is decreasing with di (0) = 1 and limτ→∞ di (τ) = 0.
When using relative time, the domain of feasible outcomes as well as preferences are inde-
pendent of absolute time. Impatience is captured by a decreasing discount function di: the
more distant future receives less weight by the players. There are, however, no restrictions on
the details of how much less and how this depends on the exact delay considered.
Although the various selves of a player look alike in terms of their preferences over the
outcomes that are feasible when they are called upon to make a decision, corresponding to the
individual's time preferences, dynamic inconsistency arises whenever diﬀerent periods of delay
carry diﬀerent weights in the overall discounting. Deﬁne a function Pi : T → (0,∞), which I
will refer to as a measure of marginal patience, as follows:
Pi (t) ≡ di (t+ 1)
di (t)
.
This function is best interpreted in terms of an indiﬀerence condition: suppose di (t)u =
di (t+ 1) v, so player i is indiﬀerent between receiving u in t periods and waiting one additional
period to receive v instead, where v > u ≥ 0 and these are general (instantaneous) payoﬀs; then
u = Pi (t) v and Pi (t) measures the minimal fraction of v that player i would ﬁnd acceptable
in order not to wait an additional period for obtaining v. A greater Pi (t) means a larger
such fraction and, accordingly, the (t+ 1)-th period of delay is less costly. Just as di (t+ 1) is
interpreted as a measure of patience about a delay of t+ 1 periods, Pi (t) can be interpreted as
measuring the marginal patience at delay t: one util with delay t+ 1 is worth Pi (t) utils with
delay t.
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Given the normalisation di (0) = 1, Pi encodes all information about di because for any
t ∈ T ,
di (t+ 1) =
t∏
τ=0
Pi (τ) .
Now suppose for some t ∈ T and some s ∈ N, Pi (t) 6= Pi (t+ s), and take u and v to be
such that i is indiﬀerent between enjoying u in t + s periods and v > 0 in t + s + 1 periods,
i.e. u = Pi (t+ s) v. After s periods have elapsed, however, i will not be indiﬀerent between
the same consequences, since u 6= Pi (t) v. Constancy of Pi is therefore necessary for time-
consistency. In fact, this is the deﬁning property of exponential discounting which is well-known
to be time-consistent. Therefore, the preferences studied here of a player i are time-consistent
if and only if, for any t ∈ T , Pi (t) = δ with δ ∈ (0, 1), i.e. di (t) = δt.
I now deﬁne a property of preferences relating to this measure of marginal patience which
turns out to be of great interest here.12
Definition 1.2. A player i's preferences satisfy present bias if, for any delay of t ∈ T
periods, Pi (0) ≤ Pi (t).
The signiﬁcance of the property is clear: an individual with present bias considers a one-
period delay most costly when it involves forgoing an immediate payoﬀ. It is worthwhile
pointing out that present bias is equivalent to any ﬁxed delay of t periods being (weakly) more
costly when it occurs from the immediate present than when it is added to an existing delay of
one period: from cross-multiplication,13
(1) Pi (0) ≤ Pi (t)⇔ di (t)
di (0)
≤ di (1 + t)
di (1)
.
As an example, exponential discounting, i. e. di (t) = δ
t for some δ ∈ (0, 1), satisﬁes present bias
in its weakest form: Pi (t) = δ for all t ∈ T ; in other words, marginal patience is independent
of delay and measured by a single parameter. Quasi-hyperbolic discounting, where, for t > 0,
di (t) = βδ
t with β ∈ (0, 1), satisﬁes present bias in a strict sense.
1.2.3. Equilibrium. In this section I introduce two equilibrium concepts for games with
time-inconsistent players which are both adaptations of subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
(SPNE) and discuss them.14 The ﬁrst, Strotz-Pollak equilibrium, is the focus of the remaining
analysis, and the purpose of the secondstrongersolution concept is only to clarify properties
of the former. Underlying all deﬁnitions is the assumption that both protocol and preferences
are common knowledge. This implies that the game has perfect information, and, in the ter-
minology often used for the case of dynamically inconsistent preferences, players are perfectly
12The deﬁnition of present bias in Ok and Masatlioglu [2007, p. 225] is closely related, but somewhat stronger.
Halevy [2008, Deﬁnition 1] introduces a concept identical to what I call here present bias but names the property
diminishing impatience; he is, however, interested in how diﬀerent degrees of mortality risk translate into
properties of discounting under non-linear probability weighting.
13It does not, however, imply the stronger property that, for any {s, t} ⊆ T ,
di (t)
di (0)
≤ di (s+ t)
di (s)
.
14For an introduction to SPNE see e.g. the textbook on game theory by Osborne and Rubinstein [1994, Part
II].
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sophisticated about their own as well as their opponent's future preferences (Hammond [1976]
is an early example of this usage in the context of individual choice).
Below, denote by zh (σ) ∈ Z the continuation outcome of a history h ∈ H t ∪ (H t ×X),
t ∈ N, that obtains under the two parties' playing strategy proﬁle σ. If a terminal continuation
history hσ obtains such that (h, hσ) ∈ Ht+s for some s ∈ T then zh (σ) = (x, s), where x is the
last (accepted) proposal; otherwise zh (σ) = D.
1.2.3.1. Strotz-Pollak Equilibrium. When a player's preferences over certain outcomes may
change with the passage of time, a theory is required for how this intrapersonal conﬂict is
resolved. It has become standard to consider each player i's dated self (i, t) as a distinct
non-cooperative player and derive individual behaviour from SPNE of this auxiliary game; for
the origins of this concept, see Strotz [1955-1956] and in particular Pollak [1968].15 Game-
theoretically, the intrapersonal conﬂict is thus dealt with in exactly the same manner as inter-
personal conﬂict. Speciﬁcally, this means that at any history of round t at which player i is to
move, the self (i, t) of player i takes as given not only the behaviour of the opponent but also
the behaviour of all other selves of player i; in other words, changing (i, t)'s strategy is then a
one-shot deviation. Adapting this idea to the present context results in the deﬁnition below.
Definition 1.3. A strategy proﬁle σ∗ is a Strotz-Pollak equilibrium (StPoE, equilibrium)
if, for any round t ∈ N, history ht−1 ∈ (X × {0})t−1, proposal x ∈ X and response a ∈ {0, 1},
the following holds:
ρ (t) = i ⇒ Ui (zht−1 (σ∗)) ≥ Ui
(
z(ht−1,x) (σ
∗)
)
ρ (t+ 1) = i ⇒ Ui
(
z(ht−1,x) (σ
∗)
) ≥ Ui (z(ht−1,x,a) (σ∗)) .
This deﬁnition is really just an application of SPNE to the auxiliary game where the set
of players is taken to be I × N. The well-known one-shot deviation principle guarantees that
StPoE coincides with SPNE of the basic game played by I whenever players have time-consistent
preferences (e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole [1991, Theorem 4.1], where continuity at inﬁnity holds
because of limt→∞ di (t) = 0). StPoE is the main concept I will use in this work: when referring
to equilibrium I will mean StPoE.
1.2.3.2. Perfect Commitment Equilibrium. At the other extreme lies the assumption that
every self (i, t) can perfectly control i's (future) behaviour, which the following solution concept
is based upon.
Definition 1.4. A strategy proﬁle σ∗ is a Perfect Commitment Equilibrium (PCE) if, for
any t ∈ N, ht−1 ∈ H t−1, x ∈ X, and any σ ∈ Σ such that σj = σ∗j , the following holds:
ρ (t) = i ⇒ Ui (zht−1 (σ∗)) ≥ Ui (zht−1 (σ))
ρ (t+ 1) = i ⇒ Ui
(
z(ht−1,x) (σ
∗)
) ≥ Ui (z(ht−1,x) (σ)) .
This deﬁnition applies SPNE in the standard sense of robustness to commitment devia-
tions, disregarding any commitment problems, whence PCE and SPNE also coincide under
time-consistency of all players. Clearly, the test that a strategy proﬁle has to pass in order to
constitute a PCE is much stronger than that for StPoE.
15Further developments, in particular with regard to existence of StPoE, can be found in Peleg and Yaari [1973]
and Goldman [1980].
1.2. MODEL AND DEFINITIONS 19
Proposition 1.1. Any PCE is a StPoE.
Proof. Let σ∗ be a PCE and restrict σi in deﬁnition 1.4 to coinciding with σ∗i except for the
immediate action which is σ∗i (h
t−1) if ρ (t) = i and σ∗i (h
t−1, x) if ρ (t+ 1) = i, respectively. 
That, for time-inconsistent players, PCE is indeed stronger than StPoE will be demonstrated
by means of the results further below (contrast proposition 1.4 and theorem 1.2). The obser-
vation that the two concepts lie at two opposite extremes in terms of commitment motivates
the following terminology.16
Definition 1.5. Any StPoE which is not a PCE is said to exhibit intrapersonal conﬂict.
In a PCE, conditional on the opponent's strategy, there is no intrapersonal conﬂict in the
sense that, at any point in the game, no player would like to act diﬀerently in the future
than under her PCE strategy. The condition is emphasised because the opponent's strategy
determines the sets of feasible outcomes of a player, and there may be ways to limit a time-
inconsistent player's choice sets such that there is no intrapersonal conﬂict in this sense (see
the discussion in section 1.3).17 It is this property that makes existence of a PCE remarkable;
this turns out to be the case here for stationary equilibria of the type originally discovered in
Rubinstein [1982] (see proposition 1.2).
1.2.4. Stationarity and Deﬁnitions. In payoﬀ-relevant terms, for any two rounds t and
s with respective histories ht−1 ∈ H t−1 and hs−1 ∈ Hs−1 the sets of feasible outcomes are
identically equal to Z. Part of assumption 1 is that each player has a single preference over
Z, and time-inconsistency results from relating it across time. Because of alternating oﬀers,
therefore, the subgames starting after these histories are identical if and only if ρ (t) = ρ (s) = i.
Denote the subgame starting at a history h ∈ H t−1 for t ∈ ρ−1 (i) by Gi. The set of equilib-
rium outcomes of Gi in relative terms as elements of Z will be referred to as Z
∗
i . Proposition
2.2 below will ensure that both Z∗1 and Z
∗
2 are non-empty. Based on this set, I deﬁne the
following payoﬀ extrema, where the restriction to Z∗i ∩ (X × T ), exluding disagreement, will
also be justiﬁed below (see section 1.6): for i ∈ I, deﬁne
Vi = sup
(x,t)∈Z∗i
{Ui (x, t)}
Wi = sup
(x,t)∈Z∗i
{Ui (x, 1 + t)} .
Vi is the lowest upper bound on the equilibrium payoﬀ of player i as the initial proposer in
Gi, and Wi is the lowest upper bound on the equilibrium payoﬀ of player i as the respondent
conditional on rejection, i.e. the supremum continuation equilibrium payoﬀ; informally, it is
player i's best threat when responding. Let the corresponding player-indexed lowercase letters,
i.e. vi and wi, denote the respective inﬁma, and, moreover, for each of these bounds, let an
16Weaker reﬁnements of StPoE have been proposed, all of them departing from the premise that, notwithstand-
ing the presence of commitment problems, the existence of a single individual to whom these selves belong
should imply a conceptualisation that does not treat them as entirely distinct non-cooperative players. In vari-
ous ways, these reﬁnements capture diﬀerent degrees of intrapersonal coordination regarding future beliefs and
behaviour, but there is yet to emerge a consensus on a viable alternative to StPoE. For such proposals, see
Laibson [1994, Chapter 1], Ferreira et al. [1995], Kocherlakota [1996], Asheim [1997] and Plan [2010].
17For a trivial example consider an opponent who is able to dictate an outcome.
1.3. STATIONARY EQUILIBRIUM 20
additional superscript of 0 indicate the restriction to immediate-agreement StPoE outcomes,
e.g.
w0i = inf
(x,0)∈Z∗i
{Ui (x, 1)} .
Note that both W 0i = di (1)V
0
i and w
0
i = di (1) v
0
i .
Moreover, I will introduce another lowest upper bound, the supremum equilibrium delay in
Gi: for each i ∈ I, deﬁne
ti = sup
(x,t)∈Z∗i
{t} .
The signiﬁcance of these functions of Z∗i will become clear from the proofs below but the
idea, going back to Shaked and Sutton [1984], is that while equilibria may in principle display
complex history-dependence, arguments akin to backwards induction may be used to relate and
determine these variables, exploiting the stationarity property of the game which means that,
as of the beginning of any two rounds t and t + 2, the subgames have the same equilibrium
outcomes. This has been eﬀectively applied to the case of exponential discounters, where only
(vi, Vi)i∈I need to be considered because the equalities Wi = di (1)Vi and wi = di (1) vi that
deﬁne a player i's best and worst threats, respectively, do not require further arguments. When
allowing for time-inconsistent discounting preferences, this is not the case, however.
In any event, the game's stationarity property permits stationary strategies, and special
attention will be given to equilibrium in such simple history- as well as time-independent
strategies. The original construction of such equilibrium in this game goes back to Rubinstein
[1982].
Definition 1.6. An equilibrium σ∗ is a Rubinstein equilibrium (RubE) if for each i ∈ I,
σ∗i is a stationary strategy.
1.3. Stationary Equilibrium
The existing literature studying dynamically inconsistent time preferences in the bargaining
protocol of Rubinstein and Ståhl, brieﬂy reviewed in section 1.1.1, has constrained itself to an
analysis of stationary strategies. The game's structure permits such simple strategies that
ignore past play, and this section conﬁrms previous results by establishing the existence and
uniqueness of stationary equilibrium (RubE) also for the preferences considered here. At the
same time, however, I show that the unique RubE actually forms a PCE. Based on this ﬁnding,
I argue that in order to appreciate the implications of dynamically inconsistent time preferences
in bargaining, one should include non-stationary strategies in the analysis.
Proposition 1.2. There exists a unique RubE, which is given by the following strategy
proﬁle σR: for any {i, j} = I, t ∈ ρ−1 (i), h ∈ H t−1 and x ∈ X,
σRi (h) = x
R,i, xR,ii =
1− dj (1)
1− di (1) dj (1)
σRj (h, x) =
1 xj ≥ 1− x
R,i
i
0 xj < 1− xR,ii
.
This equilibrium exhibits no intrapersonal conﬂict.
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Proof. Consider any stationary equilibrium σ. Because both strategies are stationary, it
must induce either (i) agreement in every round or (ii) agreement only every other round or
(iii) disagreement. Disagreement cannot be an equilibrium oucome, however. If it were, then
any responding player, facing a payoﬀ of zero upon rejection, would have to accept any positive
share. Therefore all proposals would have to be such that the respective proposers demands
the entire surplus. However, oﬀering e.g. an equal split instead would constitute a proﬁtable
deviation. Hence σ induces agreement in at least every other round.
Consider therefore a round tˆ ∈ N, with tˆ > 2, where agreement takes place, say on split
xˆ ∈ X, and let i ∈ I propose to j ∈ I \ {i} in that round. Note that, by the stationarity of the
strategies, σi (h) = xˆ and σj (h, xˆ) = 1 for any history h with h ∈ H t−1 for t ∈ ρ−1 (i). In round
tˆ − 1, i is the respondent and, facing any proposal x ∈ X by proposer j, compares xj to the
payoﬀ under rejection of dj (1) xˆj. For σ to constitute a StPoE, it must be that she accepts x
if and only if xi ≥ di (1) xˆi and that j oﬀers her exactly a share of di (1) xˆi.18 Agreement must
take place in every round.
Repeat this backwards-induction step once more to obtain that in round tˆ− 2, i must oﬀer
j a share of dj (1) (1− di (1) xˆi). By stationarity,
1− xˆi ≡ xˆj = dj (1) (1− di (1) xˆi)⇒ xˆ = xR,i.
This concludes the proof that σR is the unique RubE.
Next, I prove that σR is actually a PCE. First, observe that 0 < xR,ji = di (1)x
R,i
i for
any {i, j} = I. Consider any round in which i is the proposer. Given σRj , the set of feasible
outcomes in terms of what i may achieve combines the following three cases: (i) any share in[
0, xR,ii
]
with any even number of periods of delay, including no delay, (ii) share xR,ji with any
odd number of periods of delay and (iii) disagreement D. Because of xR,ii > x
R,j
i > 0 = Ui (D),
mere impatience yields that immediate agreement on xR,i is i's optimal outcome.
Facing a proposal x, respondent j faces the following set of relevant outcomes: (i) immediate
agreement with share xj, (ii) any agreement with a share in
[
0, xR,jj
]
and any odd number of
periods of delay, (iii) agreement with share xR,ij and any positive even number of periods of
delay, (iv) disagreement D. Again, because xR,jj > x
R,i
j > 0 = Uj (D), mere impatience yields
that agreement on xR,j with one period of delay is most preferred among all of the feasible
outcomes that involve delay; consequently, σRj indeed yields the outcome that j ﬁnds optimal
among all feasible outcomes. 
To understand this result, it is instructive to think about the textbook case of a ﬁnite
horizon, which is not covered explicitly here, where backwards induction results in a unique
equilibrium. In each round the proposer oﬀers the opponent the present value of the unique
continuation agreement who accepts it. Hence there is immediate agreement in any round
and only the players' one-period discounting, di (1), enters payoﬀs. The limits of the respective
proposals and acceptance rules as the horizon becomes inﬁnite exist and are independent of who
moves last and of time. The resulting stationary strategies preserve the equilibrium property,
which establishes existence of a stationary equilibrium. Once it is observed that there must be
18In case of indiﬀerence, equilibrium must involve acceptance here because otherwise an optimal proposal for i
would not exist.
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agreement in such an equilibrium, this also yields uniqueness. The proof provided is based on
this idea but avoids explicit consideration of the ﬁnite-horizon case by exploiting stationarity
directly.
The construction of σR is simple and familiar from the literature. And it is hardly surprising
that this construction also provides an equilibrium here: the stationarity property of the game
together with impatience means that at any point in the game, a player's problem eﬀectively
reduces to a two-period problem, where there is no scope for time-inconsistency to play out.
Indeed, as proven, σR is in fact a PCE where each player's strategy creates a situation for the
opponent in which the latter's time-inconsistency is entirely neutralised.
Notwithstanding the appeal of this simple solution, assuming that both players adhere to a
stationary strategy and thus, for any history of play, entirely disregard whatever behaviour they
have observed, seems problematic and lacks a theoretical foundation. Osborne and Rubinstein
[1990, p. 39] make this point very clearly in the context of bargaining by time-consistent players:
assuming that player 1 adheres to a stationary strategy where she always proposes e.g. split(
3
4
, 1
4
)
implies that even after a long history in which player 1 proposed only equal splits instead
(which were rejected), player 2 still expects her to oﬀer her a share of 1
4
next time.
In any case, the context of dynamically inconsistent time preferences provides further reason
to move the analysis beyond stationary strategies: as I show below, constraining a player to
a stationary strategy completely removes her of the opportunity to createand potentially
exploitpreference reversals of a (knowingly) time-inconsistent opponent (consider for instance
the RubE of example section 1.7 for k = 0). To put it somewhat provocatively, this would be
comparable to a study of imperfect competition under the assumption of marginal-cost pricing.
A preference reversal in this game must take the form that, subject to the feasible outcomes
under the opponent's strategy, a player at some stage prefers some delayed outcome over the best
immediate one (which she can implement herself), and yet, later, takes actions that induce
another outcome that is worse than the originally envisaged one. Such reversals may take
complex forms for general strategies of the opponent but are easily examined for a stationary
strategy. Without loss of generality, consider player 2's problem when facing an opponent
player 1 who behaves according to some stationary strategy: assume player 1 always proposes
xˆ ∈ X and follows acceptance rule a1 such that yˆ is the most preferred split for player 2 that
she accepts.19 Since disagreement is worst, at any stage, player 2's favourite feasible outcome
subject to this strategy by player 1 is then
• either (yˆ, 0) or (xˆ, 1) when proposing, and
• either (xˆ, 0) or (yˆ, 1) when responding to player 1's proposal of xˆ.
Note that in order for player 2 to confront a preference reversal, there must be one over such
most preferred feasible outcomes, i.e. while (as a proposer) player 2 prefers (xˆ, 1) over (yˆ, 0),
(as a respondent) she prefers (yˆ, 1) over (xˆ, 0), with at least one preference being strict:
d2 (1) xˆ2
(>)
≥ yˆ2 ∧ d2 (1) yˆ2
(≥)
> xˆ2.
19While there may not exist a minimum of the set {y1 ∈ [0, 1]|a1(y) = 1}, the continuity of preferences implicit
in assumption 1 means that there exist values  > 0 such that the argument provided goes through with the
sole modiﬁcation of player 2's oﬀering player 1 a share of yˆ1 +  instead.
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Yet, this is clearly impossible: by mere impatience, if a player prefers some delayed reward over
an immediate reward, then this preference for the former reward actually intensiﬁes when it
becomes immediate and the latter is delayed instead.
To summarise the preceding discussion, while stationarity of equilibrium may be desirable as
an eventual ﬁnding or appealing as a selection criterion, in the present context, its assumption
renders time inconsistency uninteresting from a strategic point of view.
1.4. Time Inconsistency and Delay
The RubE has the property that it induces immediate agreement in any round. The dynamic
inconsistency that manifests itself only when higher-order discounting enters equilibrium is
strategically immaterial. The next result shows that whenever the payoﬀ bounds are fully
determined by immediate agreement equilibrium, then the RubE is in fact the only equilibrium.
Thus for time-inconsistency to aﬀect equilibrium there must be a delay equilibrium which yields
a payoﬀ extreme across all equilibria.
Lemma 1.1. The RubE is the unique equilibrium if and only if for both players i ∈ I, it is
true that Vi = V
0
i , vi = v
0
i , Wi = W
0
i and wi = w
0
i .
Proof. Necessity is clear by the properties of the RubE. For suﬃciency, ﬁrst observe that
for both i ∈ I, W 0i = di (1)V 0i and w0i = di (1) v0i by deﬁnition, whence Wi = di (1)Vi and
wi = di (1) vi because of the properties hypothesised. Lemmas 1.6 and 1.7, which are proven in
the appendix, show that, for {i, j} = I, Vi = 1− wj and vi = 1−Wj, respectively. Combining
these yields
Vi = 1− dj (1) vj = 1− dj (1) (1− di (1)Vi) ⇒ Vi = xR,ii
vi = 1− dj (1)Vj = 1− dj (1) (1− di (1) vi) ⇒ vi = Vi.
whence payoﬀs are unique and equal to the eﬃcient RubE payoﬀs, implying that the RubE is
the unique equilibrium. 
If it can be assumed that the payoﬀ bounds are fully determined by immediate-agreement
equilibrium, then the approach of Shaked and Sutton [1984] can be applied also to this case.
The reason is that then each proposer's payoﬀ extremes translate immediately into threat payoﬀ
extremes as Wi = di (1)Vi and wi = di (1) vi. Suppose now that, say vi < v
0
i because there
exists a delayed agreement (x, t) ∈ Z∗i , t > 0, which yields i a payoﬀ discretely less than any
of the immediate equilibrium agreements, say v0i −  for some  > 0, so xi = v
0
i−
di(t)
. If i's time
preferences are dynamically inconsistent, it is then not clear, however, whether this delayed
equilibrium agreement also induces a worse threat for i as the respondent in Gj, j = I \ {i},
than the worst subsequent immediate equilibrium agreement, because the comparison is then
w0i = di (1) v
0
i versus di (t+ 1)xi =
di(t+1)
di(t)
(v0i − ).
The general problem in dealing with dynamically inconsistent time preferences, analytically,
is that, despite the stationarity of the game, an additional period of delay to variously delayed
agreements may change preferences over these. Thus, the relationship between an extreme
payoﬀ of a player as the proposer and the analogous one as a respondent is complicated.
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Due to the players' impatience, which is understood to confer a natural strategic advantage
upon the proposer, however, it is indeed true that Vi = V
0
i andWi = W
0
i , yieldingWi = di (1)Vi
(see appendix, where these are proven in lemmas 1.4 and 1.5, respectively). The greatest
equilibrium payoﬀ to a proposer is one where she extracts the maximal rent immediately, and
the best threat a respondent has is based on that. Moreover, also vi = v
0
i (see appendix, lemma
1.7), because a proposer can always please the most threatening respondent immediately,
whence the next result obtains.
Proposition 1.3. The RubE is the unique equilibrium if and only if wi = w
0
i for both
players i ∈ I.
Proof. In this case, for any {i, j} = I, not only vi = 1− dj (1)Vj from combining lemmas
1.7 and 1.5, but also Vj = 1 − di (1) vi, using lemma 1.6. Thus vi = Vi = xR,ii and wi = Wi =
di (1)x
R,i
i for both i ∈ I, determining payoﬀs in any subgame for any player uniquely. Because
of the players' impatience, since the two players' payoﬀs always add up to one, they cannot be
obtained with delay; this yields unique oﬀers in every round, which in turn pins down uniquely
the acceptance rules, both as in the RubE. 
This proposition allows to focus the question of what kind of preferences yield uniqueness
on a particular property of equilibrium, which the next section expoits.
1.5. Present Bias and Uniqueness
Applied work using strategic bargaining, e.g. wage-setting through negotiations by unions
and ﬁrms or intra-household bargaining over how to share common resources, demands reliable
predictions.20 Under equilibrium multiplicity, the resulting ambiguity about the bargaining
outcome feeds through all conclusions obtained from the model. Therefore it is of great interest
to understand when uniqueness obtains in order to gauge whether the assumptions required
for it are reasonable within the context of the application. Ideally, such uniqueness can be
guaranteed from properties of individual preferences which are more readily interpretable as
well as testable.
At the same time, robustness is desirable: since the parametrisations of preferences, tech-
nologies etc. which economic applications employ are only approximations, to have conﬁdence
in the conclusions they should remain themselves approximately true once the approximation
is not exact.
This section therefore investigates the question of which individual preferences yield a unique
equilibrium once players cannot be assumed to satisfy exponential discounting; this class turns
out to be large, including all of the most familiar and empirically best-documented alternatives
to exponential discounting.
Theorem 1.1. If each player's preferences satisfy present bias, then the RubE is the unique
equilibrium.
20For instance, Hall and Milgrom [2008] study the macroeconomic implications of strategic wage bargaining
between workers and ﬁrms, and Chiappori et al. [2002] discuss the impact of various outside factors on house-
hold intra-household bargaining (they rely on a reduced-form structural model of household decision-making,
however).
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Proof. This proof departs from proposition 1.3 and shows that wi = w
0
i indeed follows
from present bias. Consider any player i ∈ I. First note that w0i = di (1) v0i by deﬁnition, so
lemma 1.4 implies that w0i = di (1) vi.
Next, recall that present bias is equivalent to di (1) di (t) ≤ di (t+ 1) for all t ∈ T , which,
starting from w0i = di (1) vi, implies the following inequality:
w0i = di (1) · inf
(x,t)∈Z∗i
{di (t)xi} ≤ inf
(x,t)∈Z∗i
{di (t+ 1)xi} ≡ wi.
Since wi ≤ w0i holds by deﬁnition, this proves equality. 
Present bias ensures that a responding player, by rejecting, cannot obtain a worse payoﬀ
under a continuation equilibrium that has itself delay than under one with subsequent imme-
diate agreement. Due to present bias, as next round's proposer, this player will be at least
as impatient as the current round's respondent about a delayed outcome, so the threat of
subsequent delay cannot confer an additional advantage to the proposing opponent in exploit-
ing a present-biased player's time-inconsistency; in other words, the respondent is weakestin
terms of available threatsunder subsequent immediate agreement, or wi = w
0
i . In light
of the discussion at the end of section 1.3, this theorem can be interpreted as follows: un-
der present bias, it is never worthwhile creating preference reversals for the opponent through
non-stationary strategies and delay, because full advantage of her time-inconsistency is taken
already through immediate agreement in any round by means of stationary strategies.
This uniqueness result may be highly useful for economic applications that feature both a
self-control problem of over-consumption, e.g. to generate demand for commitment savings
products, and bargaining, e.g. intra-household bargaining: it guarantees that there is a unique
prediction, which is moreover simple to compute and has clear as well as familiar comparative
statics properties. Furthermore, if one believes in the essence of present bias identiﬁed here,
but ﬁnds the evidence inconclusive as to which particular functional form it assumes, then my
result is comforting: since the details of such preferences beyond the ﬁrst period of delay do
not matter, the analysis is robust to such mis-speciﬁcation. Care should then, however, be
taken when calibrating or interpreting the model on the basis of empirical estimates of discount
factors: since it is the very short-run discount factors that determine the bargaining split,
imputing values from choices with longer-term trade-oﬀs entails the risk of eﬀectively using the
wrong model.
This section closes with a result which sheds further light on the RubE, and indirectly also
on present bias in the bargaining context: the RubE is the only equilibrium which exhibits no
intrapersonal conﬂict.
Proposition 1.4. The RubE is the unique PCE.
Proof. Recall that every PCE is a StPoE. Proposition 1.3 presents a suﬃcient condition
for the RubE to be the unique StPoE, and proposition 1.2 says that the RubE is a PCE, whence
that condition is in fact suﬃcient for the RubE to be the unique PCE.
Now simply note that a responding player i can always guarantee herself a payoﬀ arbitrarily
close to w0i = di (1) v
0
i (by deﬁnition) by committing to a subsequent proposal with j's share
close enough from above to Wj = 1− vi (by lemma 1.7 in the appendix), whence wi = w0i . 
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Note the following implication of this proposition for preferences where present bias is
violated for at least one player and there is an equilibrium other than the RubE: such equilibrium
necessarily exhibits intrapersonal conﬂict, meaning that some player at some stage would then
prefer to change her own future actions. In fact, lemma 1.1 shows that every equilibrium other
than the RubE must involve delay in some subgame (which may well be oﬀ the equilibrium
path), so this applies in particular to the occurrence of delayed agreement, and this proposition
therefore provides a sense in which any such equilibrium would arise purely from the dynamic
inconsistency of some player's time preferences. The next section further investigates this
possibility.
1.6. General Characterisation Results
Present bias restricts marginal patience at any delay. It is unnecessarily strong as a property
suﬃcient for uniqueness, because the maximal delay in any subgame Gi, i ∈ I, can be bounded
by the following simple rationality argument. Mere impatience guarantees existence of interior
proposals by i which (any rational) respondent j immediately accepts: since the latter's rejec-
tion results in at least one period of delay and she cannot receive more than the entire cake,
j's continuation payoﬀ cannot exceed dj (1). Hence, even if proposer i expected to obtain the
entire surplus, there is a ﬁnite delay after which i would rather make an oﬀer that entices the
most demanding rational respondent to immediately agree. Formally, a rational respondent j
accepts any proposal x such that xj > dj (1), whence the proposer's worst immediate agreement
payoﬀ is no less than 1 − dj (1). Eventually di (t) falls below this number because its limit is
zero, which yields the following bound:
(2) t¯i = max {t ∈ T |di (t) ≥ 1− dj (1)} .
Clearly, ti ≤ t¯i < ∞ and Pi (0) ≤ Pi (t) for all t ≤ t¯i, for both i ∈ I, is a weaker suﬃcient
condition for uniqueness. Note that this argument also establishes that vi > 0, Wi > 0 and
Vi < 1.
Even this simple argument involves both players' preferences, however. From proposition
1.3, the critical relationship between payoﬀ bounds which potentially depends on the details
of a player's preferences beyond the attitude to the ﬁrst period of delay is that between the
worst threat of a player i as a respondent, wi, and i's lowest equilibrium payoﬀ vi as the
initial proposer. While wi ≤ di (1) vi holds, because vi = v0i , the main issue is whether and
when a player's worst continuation payoﬀ, wi, might fall below the present value of the worst
subsequent immediate agreement, w0i . The key to relating wi to vi is the introduction of the
maximal delay ti as an additional unknown: not only will ti be determined by the maximal
threats to the players when proposing, v1 and v2, but, when combined with the argument that
vi is the worst payoﬀ for any given possible delay t ≤ ti, it also generates an equation relating
wi to vi; thus, by expanding the number of unknown characteristics of the set of equilibrium
outcomes by the maximal delays t1 and t2, one can generate two more restrictions each, which
closes the system of equations.
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Deﬁne, for each player i, the minimal marginal patience within the equilibrium horizon ti
of Gi as
δi (ti) = min {Pi (t) |t ∈ T, t ≤ ti} .
This is based on the delay t ≤ ti where an additional period of delay is perceived most costly
because Pi reaches a minimum (by the argument at the beginning of this section, ti < ∞, so
a minimum exists). For a present-biased player i, this is the ﬁrst period and δi (ti) = Pi (0)
irrespective of ti. Also, deﬁne the minimal cost of a delay by t periods in Gi as
ci (t|vi, vj) =
0 t = 0vi
di(t)
+
vj
dj(t−1) t > 0
.
In each round, it is the proposer who has to have an incentive to not make any acceptable
proposal, where the worst acceptable proposal yields the worst immediate payoﬀ, i.e. vi for
both players i ∈ I. If a proposer is willing to wait t periods for a share, she is willing to wait
any t′ < t periods, whence the ﬁrst round before the agreement is the critical round. The idea
of this cost of delay is that it corrsponds to the minimal total surplus that must be available
in order to be able to promise each player suﬃciently much after t periods of delay, when the
players could obtain vi and vj, respectively, as the intermittent proposers. The promises, as
of the initial round of Gi, must at least be
vi
di(t)
and
vj
dj(t−1) , respectively, where the diﬀerent
denominators stem from the fact that i proposes ﬁrst and j second (if at all).
The aforementioned key step in obtaining a general characterisation of uniqueness, payoﬀs
and outcomes is the following lemma.
Lemma 1.2. For any i ∈ I and t ∈ {t′ ∈ T |0 < t′ ≤ ti},
(x, t) ∈ Z∗i ⇔
vi
di (t)
≤ xi ≤ 1− vj
dj (t− 1) .
Moreover, wi = δi(ti)vi and ti = max {t ∈ T |ci(t|vi, vj) ≤ 1}.
Proof. Consider Gi and take any t ∈ {t′ ∈ T |0 < t′ ≤ ti}. If (x, t) ∈ Z∗i , then the ﬁrst
inequality follows straight from the fact that di (t)xi ≥ vi by deﬁnition of vi and the fact that i
makes the initial proposal; since (x, t) ∈ Z∗i necessitates (x, t− 1) ∈ Z∗j , the second inequality
follows from the same argument.
Now take any (x, t) ∈ Z where x satisﬁes the two inequalities and construct strategies as
follows:21 at any round t′ < t, the respective proposer, say i′, oﬀers the respondent, say j′, a
zero share, and upon rejection of a positive oﬀer the respondent obtains his best payoﬀ Wj′ ,
which satisﬁes Wj′ = 1 − vi′ by lemma 1.7. Upon rejection of a zero share, if t′ + 1 < t the
same holds true, with roles reversed, and if t′ + 1 = t, then the proposer, say k ∈ I, proposes
x; upon a rejection by the respondent, say l, of a proposal x′ this player's continuation payoﬀ
is dl (1) vl if x
′
l ≥ xl , and it is Wl = 1 − vk if x′l < xl. The inequalities ensure that at every
on-path stage the respective proposer has no strict incentive to deviate; since the respective
respondent's threats are deﬁned via equilibrium payoﬀs in terms of v1 and v2, there is nothing
to check except for the on-path round-t history of Gi, where the inequalities must imply that
21While the formulation assumes that the payoﬀ extremes are indeed obtained in some equilibrium, this actually
follows from the continuity of payoﬀs together with the compactness of action spaces.
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the respective respondent l's continuation payoﬀ dl (1) vl does not exceed xl; obviously, they
do, however, imply the stronger property that xl ≥ vl.
This yields that, for any t ∈ T with t ≤ ti (now also allowing t = 0),
inf {di (t)xi |∃x ∈ X, (x, t) ∈ Z∗i } = di (t) · inf {xi |∃x ∈ X, (x, t) ∈ Z∗i }︸ ︷︷ ︸
=
vi
di(t)
= vi
⇒ wi ≡ inf {di (1 + t)xi |(x, t) ∈ Z∗i }
= inf
{
di (1 + t) · vi
di (t)
∣∣∣∣ t ∈ T, t ≤ ti}
= δi (ti) vi.
Finally, ti = max {t ∈ T |ci(t|vi, vj) ≤ 1} is an immediate consequence of the ﬁrst part. 
Note that while wi is determined by vi at the cost of introducing the maximal delay ti as
an additional unknown, the maximal threats to the proposers, v1 and v2, in turn pin down ti;
one can easily verify that |t1− t2| ∈ {0, 1}, as it must be the case because of alternating oﬀers.
Once (vi, ti)i∈I is known, the sets of equilibrium outcomes, (Z∗i )i∈I , can be characterised. To
obtain the payoﬀ bounds more readily, the familiar approach of Shaked and Sutton [1984], on
which lemmas 1.3-1.7 in the appendix are based, can now be employed: these lemmas establish
the relationships which allow the following backwards induction on vi:
vi = 1− dj (1)
1− δi (ti) vi︸ ︷︷ ︸
=wi

︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Wj
⇔ vi = 1− dj (1)
1− δi (ti) dj (1) .
This expression for vi is reminiscient to that in the RubE except that player i's worst equilibrium
payoﬀ may be lower than i's RubE payoﬀ if ti > 0 and i violates present bias within the
equilibrium horizon.
Summarising this section's results so far, (vi, ti)i∈I must be a solution to the following system
of four equations in four unknowns (v˜i, t˜i)i∈I :
v˜1 =
1− d2 (1)
1− δ1
(
t˜1
)
d2 (1)
(3)
t˜1 = max {t ∈ T |c1 (t|v˜1, v˜2) ≤ 1}(4)
v˜2 =
1− d1 (1)
1− δ2
(
t˜2
)
d1 (1)
(5)
t˜2 = max {t ∈ T |c2 (t|v˜2, v˜1) ≤ 1} .(6)
Existence of a solution to this system is guaranteed because the RubE payoﬀs together with
zero delays, i.e. (v˜i, t˜i)i∈I = (x
R,i
i , 0)i∈I constitute one indeed, as is easily veriﬁed.
This observation suggests the following theorem, characterising those pairs of players' pref-
erences which yield a unique equilibrium, and whose proof illuminates the signiﬁcance of a
solution to the above system of equations as a pair of self-enforcing payoﬀ-delay outcomes, of
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which the RubE version (xR,ii , 0)i∈I is a special case. The necessity part of the theorem rules
out any other solution.
Theorem 1.2. The RubE is the unique equilibrium if and only if the system of equations
3-6 has
(
v˜i, t˜i
)
i∈I =
(
xR,ii , 0
)
i∈I
as the unique solution.
Proof. Because both (vi, ti) i∈I and
(
xR,ii , 0
)
i∈I
solve this system, if there is a unique
solution then they coincide, whence suﬃciency follows.
For necessity, ﬁrst note that any solution
(
v˜i, t˜i
)
i∈I other than
(
xR,ii , 0
)
i∈I
has t˜i > 0 as
well as δi
(
t˜i
)
< δi (0) for some i ∈ I. Take such a solution
(
v˜i, t˜i
)
i∈I , and, without loss of
generality, let δ1
(
t˜1
)
= δ1
(
tˆ1
)
< δ1 (0) for tˆ1 with 0 < tˆ1 ≤ t˜1; similarly, let tˆ2 ≤ t˜2 be such that
δ2
(
t˜2
)
= δ2
(
tˆ2
)
. Now consider the outcomes
(
x, tˆ1
)
, with x1 = v˜1/d1
(
tˆ1
)
, and
(
y, tˆ2
)
, with
y2 = v˜2/d2
(
tˆ2
)
; these will be shown to be self-enforcing along the lines of the proof of the ﬁrst
part of lemma 1.2. The proof considers G1 and delay tˆ1 even only, and establishes
(
x, tˆ1
)
as an
equilibrium outcome if both
(
x, tˆ1
)
and
(
y, tˆ2
)
can be used as threats; the other cases follow
from a similar argument.
For each t < tˆ1, the respective proposer, say i, oﬀers the respective respondent, say j, a
share of zero, and upon a rejection of a positive oﬀer, when roles are reversed in the subsequent
round, j oﬀers i a share equal to the present value of a continuation with
(
x, tˆ1
)
if i = 1, and(
y, tˆ2
)
if i = 2; if these are indeed anticipated as continuation values, then the respondent is
indiﬀerent, so specify acceptance. Note that, for each i ∈ I, this present value equals δi
(
tˆi
)
v˜i,
whence proposer i in t could obtain at most v˜i by deviating, ensuring no strict incentive to
deviate from a zero oﬀer. After tˆ1− 1 such rounds, proposing player 1 oﬀers player 2 a share of
x2, which is the lowest share this player accepts, because the two outcomes
(
x, tˆ1
)
and
(
y, tˆ2
)
are speciﬁed as continuation outcomes as follows: ﬁrst, upon rejection of a proposal x′ with
x′2 ≥ x2, the game continues with
(
y, tˆ2
)
, which player 2 does not prefer over x2 because
x2 = 1− v˜1
d1
(
tˆ1
) ≥ δ2 (tˆ2) v˜2.
Second, upon rejection of an oﬀer x′2 < x2, the game continues with player 2's oﬀering a share
of δ1
(
tˆ1
)
v˜1, which is accepted at indiﬀerence because another rejection is followed by
(
x, tˆ1
)
;
player 2 does not prefer acceptance of any such oﬀer x′2 over rejection because
1− δ1
(
tˆ1
)
v˜1 ≥ x2 = 1− v˜1
d1
(
tˆ1
) .
Clearly, player 1 cannot do better than indeed proposing x which is accepted, establishing(
x, tˆ1
)
as equilibrium outcome, given that
(
y, tˆ2
)
is an equilibrium outcome. Similar construc-
tions can be made for the remaining three cases (tˆ1 odd, and the two respective cases of G2),
eventually proving that also
(
y, tˆ2
)
is self-conﬁrming as an equilibrium outcome when
(
x, tˆ1
)
is an equilibrium outcome. Thus, this pair of outcomes is self-enforcing. Because tˆ1 > 0, this
proves the necessity part. 
Recall lemma 1.2 in view of the construction in the proof of the above theorem for any
solution (v˜i, t˜i)i∈I which is not the RubE: this construction not only establishes self-enforcing
payoﬀ-delay outcomes but also the associated payoﬀs v˜1 and v˜2; these, as threats, can be used to
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support the respective delays t˜1 and t˜2. This insight is useful for answering the question of which
solution to the system of equations 3-6 is (vi, ti)i∈I in the general case of multiplicity, and thus
for obtaining a characterisation of equilibrium outcomes. Deﬁne t∗1 as the maximum over all t˜1
such that (v˜i, t˜i)i∈I solves equations 3-6, and similarly t∗2; these exist because delay is ﬁnite, as
shown at the outset of this section. Let v∗i be the associated solutions, respectively, to equations
3 and 5; note that v∗1 is then the minimum of all v˜1 such that (v˜i, t˜i)i∈I solves equations 3-6, and
similarly for v∗2. From examination of the functions ci it is, however, clear that (v
∗
i , t
∗
i )i∈I solves
equations 3-6, and by the initial argument of this paragraph, (vi, ti)i∈I = (v∗i , t
∗
i )i∈I . Thus the
following characterisation is obtained, where U∗i and U
∗
j , {i, j} = I, are the sets of equilibrium
payoﬀs as of the initial round of subgame Gi.
Theorem 1.3. The set of equilibria satisﬁes the following properties: (vi, ti) i∈I = (v∗i , t
∗
i ) i∈I ,
and, for {i, j} = I,
Z∗i =
{
(x, 0)
∣∣v∗i ≤ xi ≤ 1− δj (t∗j) v∗j }
∪
{
(x, t) ∈ X × T \ {0}
∣∣∣∣t ≤ t∗i , v∗idi (t) ≤ xi ≤ 1− v
∗
j
dj (t− 1)
}
U∗i =
[
v∗i , 1− δj
(
t∗j
)
v∗j
]
U∗j =
[
δj
(
t∗j
)
v∗j , dj (1) (1− δi (t∗i ) v∗i )
]
.
Proof. For (vi, ti) i∈I = (v∗i , t
∗
i ) i∈I see the argument in the paragraph preceding the theo-
rem's statement. The sets of equilibrium outcomes and player payoﬀs follow from lemma 1.2
together with the relationships established in lemmas 1.3-1.7 in the appendix. 
Note that, in general, the multiplicity obtained here does not even rely on the existence
of stationary equilibrium, because if both t∗1 > 0 and t
∗
2 > 0 then all outcomes and payoﬀs
are spanned without the RubE; indeed, the RubE is just a special instance of the general
property that any solution to system 3-6 has, which is that of self-enforcing outcomes. This
shows how certain forms of time-inconsistency invite non-stationary strategies, creating a role
for them to exploit preference reversals and permitting equilibrium constructions reminiscient
of those for repeated games, but despite the absence of the latter's punishment mechanisms
from bargaining (the work of Busch and Wen [1995] and their discussion elucidate the relation-
ship between repeated games and inﬁnite-horizon alternating-oﬀers bargaining). This stands
in marked contrast to the available constructions for delayed agreement in extensions of the
protocol of Rubinstein [1982], all of which involve stationary equilibrium.22
What kind of preferences permit delayed agreement then? Since equilibrium delay neces-
sitates that at least one player violates present bias, these are rather unfamiliar, of course, to
most economists. Qualitatively, the property of a player's time preferences that is conducive
to delay is a sharp relative drop in the discount function and thus in marginal patience at a
positive but small delay. Rather surprisingly, this feature is in line with the results of several
recent experimental studies of time preferences in the domain of single monetary rewards for
a majority of participants, e.g. by Attema et al. [2010] and Takeuchi [2011]. What appears
to distinguish the designs of such studies is that they study time preferences for very short
22For an example, see Muthoo [1990]; Avery and Zemsky [1994] provide a synthesis.
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horizons, down to days, which coincidentally is the more relevant case for bargaining as well.
Nonetheless, at present, it seems premature to have much conﬁdence in the reliability of these
ﬁndings. However, in section 1.8, I sketch two speciﬁc bargaining environments where such
preferences may arise naturally in reduced form.
I close this section with a remark on bargaining power. With exponential discounting, the
notion of a player's bargaining power that the literature has adopted is her attitude to one period
of delay; assuming linear utility, if a player's (exponential) discount factor is δ, then against
any given opponent, her payoﬀ is monotonically increasing in δ. With dynamic inconsistency of
time preferences, diﬀerent periods of delay are evaluated diﬀerently, i.e. marginal patience is not
constant, however, so the question arises of what deﬁnes bargaining power in the context of the
more general preferences analysed here. The characterisation suggests a generalisation, which
is weaker, however, because the possibility of delay has to be accounted for: it is the minimal
marginal patience within the equilibrium horizon. As can be seen in theorem 1.3, a greater
δi (t
∗
i ) means that, no matter whether i is proposer or respondent, the minimal equilibrium
payoﬀ increases.
The next section serves to illustrate the main results by means of an example. At the
same time, I wrote this section with the aim of providing the essence of the entire paper in
the simplest form possible. And in its last subsection, it adds two observations to the general
section within the context of the example: the worst equilibrium payoﬀ of the initial proposer
may decrease when that player's discount function is increased. And, when considering all
equilibria, it is possible that a player receives a greater payoﬀ as initial respondent than as
initial proposer against the same opponent.
1.7. An Example
Consider two players, Od and Eve, labelled i ∈ {1, 2} with i = 1 for Od and i = 2 for Eve,
who bargain over how to split a dollar. They alternate in making and answering proposals
which are elements of X = {(x1, x2) ∈ [0, 1]2|x1 + x2 = 1} until one is accepted. The ﬁrst
proposal is made by Od in round (period) 1. In any potential round t ∈ N, a player cares
only about the relative delay and the size of her share in a prospective agreement. Speciﬁcally,
assume that in any period, the players' preferences over delayed agreements (x, t) ∈ X × T ,
T = N0, have the following representations, where (α, β) ∈ (0, 1)2 and k ∈ {0, 1}:
U1 (x, t) = α
tx1
U2|k (x, t) =

x2 t = 0
βx2 t = 1
kβx2 t ∈ T \ {0, 1}
.
Eve's preferences are extreme, but in ways which diﬀer strongly over a short horizon of two
rounds of delay for the two possible values of k; the illustration of how this contrast translates
into possible equilibrium behaviour should serve as a caricature for the general points of this
paper.
Assume that both players' preferences are common knowledgein particular, both players
fully understand Eve's time preferencesand that players cannot commit to future actions,
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i.e. use Strotz-Pollak equilibrium (equilibrium in what follows). It is straightforward to show
that this game has a unique stationary equilibrium, which is independent of k (of higher-
order discounting, generally) and which I will refer to as Rubinstein equilibrium (RubE): Od
always oﬀers Eve a share of x∗2 and Eve always oﬀers Od a share of y
∗
1, with each oﬀer equal
to the smallest share the respective respondent is willing to accept when anticipating that the
subsequent oﬀer is accepted, i.e.
x∗2 = βy
∗
2
y∗1 = αx
∗
1.
These two equations have a unique solution: these oﬀers are
x∗2 = 1−
1− β
1− αβ
y∗1 = 1−
1− α
1− αβ .
Most textbooks' proofs that this particular equilibrium is the only one in the case where
Eve is also time-consistent, i.e. where instead U2 (x, t) = β
tx2, owe to Shaked and Sutton
[1984]. Their insight is that, despite the history-dependence that any particular equilibrium
may display, one may still use backwards induction on the payoﬀ extremataken over all
equilibriafor each player. This is true because the worst payoﬀ to a proposer occurs when
her opponent anticipates her own best subsequent proposer payoﬀ, and vice versa. After two
rounds of backwards induction from the maximal proposer payoﬀ of a player, the resulting pay-
oﬀ must then again equal this maximal payoﬀ, and similarly for the minimal payoﬀ, because
the subgames are formally identical. The resulting system of four equations for these equilib-
rium payoﬀ extrema has a unique solution revealing payoﬀ uniqueness and eﬃciency, whence
equilibrium uniqueness follows.
When studying dynamically inconsistent time preferences, it is, however, not clear how to
use backwards induction: unless equilibrium delay can be ruled out, a player's rankings of
equilibrium outcomes of the subgame where she makes the ﬁrst proposal may disagree when
comparing her two perspectives of (i) the actual initial proposer who evaluates equilibrium out-
comes and (ii) the respondent, who evaluates continuation equilibrium outcomes to determine
her threat point, because from the latter perspective all equilibrium outcomes are delayed by
one additional period of time. Hence, the relationship between a player i's extreme proposer
payoﬀs and analogously extreme respondent payoﬀs is more complicated: the latter need not
simply equal the former multiplied by di (1).
Adding the necessary distinction is my ﬁrst innovation over Shaked and Sutton [1984]. It
turns out that, while the two perspectives of a player, generally, agree on what is bestdue
to the players' impatience and the resulting natural advantage of a proposer this is the best
immediate agreementthe challenging part is the relationship between a player i's worst threat
as a respondent (the lowest continuation equilibrium payoﬀ) and i's lowest equilibrium payoﬀ
as a proposer; it depends on the particular type of dynamic inconsistency, as illustrated below
by contrasting k = 1 and k = 0.
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Present Bias. Consider the case of k = 1. Eve is then indiﬀerent to the timing of agree-
ments that occur in the future but is impatient about postponing agreement from the immediate
present; intuitively, Eve's preferences display a form of present bias.23 Her dynamic inconsis-
tency implies the following: whereas Eve is indiﬀerent about receiving the entire surplus after
one or two more rounds because both such prospects have a present value of β, once she ﬁnds
herself in the next round she will be more impatient and prefer the earlier agreement because
it is immediate; the comparison is then 1 > β.
In order for this dynamic inconsistency to matter for equilibrium, there must be a delay at
some stage, possibly only oﬀ the equilibrium path. Clearly, not both players can beneﬁt over
the eﬃcient RubE from a delayed agreement, and we might reasonably suspect that Eve will
lose if her inconsistency is made to bear on the equilibrium outcome. Now suppose v2 is her
worst payoﬀ among all those that may obtain in an equilibrium of the subgame that begins
with her proposal and, moreover, suppose it is obtained in an agreement on x which has some
delay t > 0, i.e. v2 = βx2. This cannot be less than her worst immediate-agreement payoﬀ
because she can always choose to satisfy Od's most severe threat immediately: there is an
immediate agreement x′ with x′2 = v2, where 1− v2 = x′1 = αV1 and V1 is Od's best subsequent
proposer payoﬀ. Since, when responding, Eve further discounts only subsequent immediate
agreements, her weakest threat against Od is βx′2 = βv2, whence V1 = 1− βv2. Combining the
two equations, we ﬁnd that
v2 =
1− α
1− αβ = y
∗
2.
Because Eve is most impatient about immediate agreement, she cannot be made to lose further
from delay; this could only make her stronger as the respondent. But the same argument goes
through for Od, and, letting v1 denote his analogous worst proposer payoﬀ, implies
v1 =
1− β
1− αβ = 1− βy
∗
2 = V1 = x
∗
1.
Then also v2 = V2 holds true, from which uniqueness and the characterisation as the above
RubE follow.
As theorem 1.1 shows, this argument establishes uniqueness whenever both players' prefer-
ences satisfy present bias, which requires that marginal patience is minimal for a delay from
the immediate present, i.e. each player i has Pi (t) ≡ di (t+ 1) /di (t) minimal at t = 0; this is
true e.g. for (β, δ)-discounting, where
Pi (t) =
βδ t = 0δ t > 0 .
Eve's preferences in this example are a limiting case of such preferences where δ = 1. Present
bias ensures that a responding player i's worst threat is her worst subsequent immediate agree-
ment, which is worth di (1) vi, and this allows to exploit the stationarity of the game via the
backwards-induction argument of Shaked and Sutton [1984] for establishing uniqueness.
Violation of Present Bias. If k = 0, then Eve also discounts the ﬁrst round of delay with a
factor β. But she is now willing to accept even the smallest oﬀer in return for not experiencing
23This case corresponds to the limiting case of quasi-hyperbolic discounting (β, δ)-preferences, where δ = 1.
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a delay of more than one round. Note the diﬀerent nature of her time-inconsistency compared
with the previous case: while she is indiﬀerent between receiving the entire dollar with a delay
of two rounds and receiving nothing with a delay of one round, at the beginning of the next
round she will prefer receiving the entire dollar with one further round's delay over any (at
this stage) immediate share less than β > 0; she will be more patient once the sooner option is
immediate.
Now suppose α = 90
99
and β = 99
100
, so the RubE has Eve expecting an oﬀer of x∗2 =
90
100
in the
initial round. Yet, Od opens bargaining with a bold move, claiming the entire dollar, and Eve
accepts. The following (non-stationary) strategies indeed implement this extreme immediate
agreement as an equilibrium outcome:
• Round 1: Od demands the entire dollar and Eve accepts any proposal (immediate
agreement on (1, 0)). Upon rejection, bargaining progresses to
• Round 2: Eve demands the entire dollar and Od accepts a proposal x if and only if
x1 ≥ α = 1011 (rejection). Upon rejection, bargaining continues through
• Round 3:
 if, in the previous round, Eve did not demand the entire dollar, then play continues
as from round 1 (immediate agreement on (1, 0)),
 otherwise, play continues with the stationary equilibrium (immediate agreement
on x∗).
At round-3 histories there is nothing to check: x∗ is an equilibrium outcome, and the other
continuation strategies' equilibrium property needs to be checked as of round 1. Given this
history-dependent continuation, in round 2, Od is willing to accept only proposals x such
that x1 ≥ α = 1011 , and Eve prefers continuation agreement x∗, which has a present value of
βx∗2 =
891
1000
, over any such proposal because this would yield at most 1− α = 1
11
. Anticipating
this further delay, which ensues in case she rejects, Eve is willing to agree to any division, which
Od then exploits by demanding the entire dollar in round 1.
The novel phenomenon in this case is how the anticipation of a delayexploiting the sharp
drop to zero in Eve's patience about a further delay from one period in the future relative to her
patience about such a delay from the immediate present which is β = 99
100
creates the extreme
split in favour of Od as a threat vis-à-vis the RubE, which is powerful enough to rationalise
itself as an equilibrium outcome, thus resulting in multiplicity. This cannot happen under
present bias, where, starting from any payoﬀ less than the RubE payoﬀ, two steps of backwards
induction which involve only the single-period discount factors result in an increase towards
the RubE payoﬀ; it can therefore not rationalise itself as in this example. Indeed, repetition of
this step leads to convergence towards the RubE payoﬀ.
Also note Eve's intra-personal conﬂict: as a best reply against Od's strategy, from the point
of view of the initial round, Eve would like to reject and subsequently oﬀer a share of α for
a present value of β (1− α) = 9
100
. However, once round 2 comes around, Eve will not be as
generous but instead prefer forcing a rejection. Restricting Od to a stationary strategy would
deprive him of the ability to exploit Eve's such preference reversal. While this equilibrium
demonstrates multiplicity, it features delay only oﬀ the equilibrium path; however, to observe
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delay on the equilibrium path, simply consider the variant where Eve makes the ﬁrst proposal
and modify strategies accordingly.
The key to characterising the set of equilibrium outcomes beyond present bias is the general
insight that a player i's worst equilibrium payoﬀ vi in the (sub-) game starting with i's proposal,
denoted Gi, is constant across all possible equilibrium delays; this is proven in lemma 1.2.
Intuitively, whenever there is delayed agreement, say on split x with delay t, in equilibrium,
the maximal threats must be severe enough to deter players from making too generous an oﬀer
when proposing. Since the incentives to do so are strongest for a proposer when the envisaged
agreement on x lies furthest ahead in the future, it is suﬃcient to deter the player(s) from
doing so in the earliest round of proposing; for player i in Gi, this can be done up to the point
of indiﬀerence between yielding to the maximal threat, giving vi, and obtaining the delayed
outcome with a present value of di (t)xi. If ti <∞ is the maximal equilibrium delay in Gi and
Z∗i is the set of equilibrium outcomes of Gi, then the worst threat of player i when responding
(considering all continuation equilibrium payoﬀs), denoted wi, is therefore the following function
of vi and ti:
(7) wi ≡ inf
(x,t)∈Z∗i
{di (t+ 1)xi} = inf
t≤ti
{
di (t+ 1) · vi
di (t)
}
= min
t≤ti
{Pi (t)} · vi.
This reveals the minimal marginal patience over a horizon equal to the maximal equilibrium
delay as the determinant of a player's worst threat and a generalised notion of bargaining power.
The reasoning just given introduces the unknown ti. By the previous argument, however,
ti is obtained from tracing the set of outcomes that can be implemented via the most severe
threats to the proposers, which yield v1 and v2, respectively: if ti > 0, then it is the maxi-
mal delay t > 0 such that the cost of the threats does not exceed the available surplus, i.e.
(vi/di (t)) + (vj/dj (t− 1)) ≤ 1. Building on these results, a system of equations is obtained
which theorem 1.2 studies to establish uniqueness of a solution to this system as both neces-
sary and suﬃcient for uniqueness of equilibrium. Theorem 1.3 further generalises this result,
producing a characterisation of equilibrium outcomes and payoﬀs when the system of equations
may have multiple solutions.
Illustration of Theorem 1.3. The case of k = 1 is straightforward because of present bias,
so I focus on the novel phenomenon of multiplicity and delay due to Eve's particular dynamic
inconsistency.
For Od, it is certainly true that w1 = αv1 irrespective of the maximal delay t1; two rounds
of backwards induction then yield that v1 = 1− β (1− αv1), i.e. v1 = x∗1. If the maximal delay
when Eve proposes were zero then w2 = βv2, and the RubE would be the unique equilibrium.
If this maximal delay were positive, however, then Eve's worst threat would equal w2 = 0,
whence there is an equilibrium in which proposer Od achieves the maximal feasible payoﬀ of 1
and two steps of backwards induction yield Eve's minimal proposer payoﬀ v2 = 1− α. Indeed,
the residual proposer advantage ensures she cannot obtain anything less than 1 − α, so the
maximal delay that Eve may experience as a proposer cannot exceed one period. It equals one
if and only if, given one round's delay, the resulting most severe threats v1 = x
∗
1 and v2 = 1−α
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are suﬃcient to induce this delay, i.e. (1− α)/β ≤ 1− x∗1 or, equivalently,
1
1 + α
≤ β.
Note that, as a function of α and β, v2 in general has a discontinuity at the point where
(1 + α)−1 = β because for (1 + α)−1 > β, v2 = y∗2 ≡ (1− α) / (1− αβ) but once β crosses the
threshold of (1 + α)−1 it becomes v2 = 1 − α. Hence, increasing β in fact can decrease Eve's
worst payoﬀ through the appearance of delay equilibria which exploit her then reduced minimal
marginal patience.
For the sake of completeness, consider also the subgame where Od makes the ﬁrst move and
proposes. The maximal equilibrium delay is at most two rounds and depends on parameters: it
is positive if and only if v1/α ≤ 1− v2, since v1 = x∗1 necessitates that v2 < y∗2 and hence delay
in the subgame where Eve is the initial proposer; in this case v2 = 1 − α, and the inequality
becomes equivalent to
1 + α
1 + α + α2
≤ β.
This indeed implies existence of equilibrium delay when Eve moves ﬁrst as the proposer; the
maximal delay in Od's game then equals two if and only if the even stronger condition
v1/α
2 ≤ 1− (v2/β) holds, and otherwise one. Note, however, that any delay that may occur in
equilibrium when Od is the initial proposer is based on the concurring multiplicity and delay
which arise from Eve's time-inconsistency.
Observe that if Od had preferences identical to those of Eve, then the RubE is dispensable
for the construction of equilibrium multiplicity and delay; let α ≥ 2
3
and modify the strategies
described above as follows for round 3, adding also a descriptions of rounds 4 and 5 for the
novel cases:
• Round 3:
 if, in the previous round, Eve did not demand the entire dollar, then play continues
as from round 1, leading to immediate agreement on (1, 0),
 otherwise, Od proposes (1− α, α) and Eve accepts a proposal x if and only if
x2 ≥ α. Upon rejection here, bargaining goes on in round 4 where play continues
as from round 1, but with roles reversed.
By symmetry, this describes an equilibrium, where the condition that α ≥ 2
3
ensures the delay
in round 2, because Eve then does not prefer giving away at least α in order to obtain an
immediate share of 1 − α over forcing a rejection with an extreme demand that has present
value of α 1
2
.
Finally, consider the following comparative statics: if Eve is made more patient in the sense
of a greater β, her worst payoﬀ may decrease because of the appearance of delay equilibrium;
at the same time, her best payoﬀ, which arises in the stationary equilibrium, increases since
it involves only her attitude to the ﬁrst period of delay, which is β. A limiting exercise where
both α and β approach unity, but β approaches this limit suﬃciently faster than α has x∗2 =
1 − x∗1 → 1, and the sets of players' equilibrium payoﬀs then converge to the sets of feasible
payoﬀs (which are all individually rational) since the non-stationary equilibrium constructed
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here remains intact and features the opposite extreme split.24 It is also clear from this exercise
that, depending on which equilibrium is played, it may be that Od would prefer to be respondent
initially rather than proposer.
1.8. Foundations of Time-Inconsistency and Delay
This section investigates instances of bargaining in which time-inconsistent preferences may
arise from the speciﬁc environment. The previous results can be readily applied to study how
such environmental aspects may inform bargaining outcomes. First, and based on a recent theo-
retical literature that relates time-inconsistent discounting to non-linear probability weighthing
in the presence of exogenous risk, I translate the basic bargaining game into an environment
with a constant exogenous probability of bargaining breakdown. This is straightforward but
also permits to investigate what shapes of probability weighting functions may cause delay.
Second, I consider yet another foundation for time-inconsistent preferences which is imperfect
altruismor, more generally, misaligned incentivesacross diﬀerent generations of delegates
to a bargaining problem. Two communities bargain over how to share a common resource: each
round they nominate a new delegate to the bargaining table where a delegate is biased toward
agreements that take place within the horizon of her lifetime.
1.8.1. Breakdown Risk and Non-linear Probability Weighting. One motive for im-
patience in the sense of discounting future payoﬀs is uncertainty, such as mortality risk. Most
recently, dynamically inconsistent discounting has been derived from violations of expected
utilityspeciﬁcally, the independence axiomin an environment with non-consumption risk;
see e.g. Halevy [2008] and Saito [2011b]. This literature seeks to simultaneously explain ev-
idence on risk preferences such as the Allais paradox and evidence on time preferences such
as decreasing impatience (in the terminology of this paper, this is decreasing marginal pa-
tience). In a manner analogous to how Binmore et al. [1986] translate the basic Rubinstein
[1982] model into one where bargaining takes place under the shadow of a constant breakdown
risk for expected-utility maximisers, I sketch here how the results of this paper can be used to
study such a model where the bargaining parties violate expected utility. Building on Halevy
[2008], suppose that, after each round, there is a constant probability of 1 − r ∈ (0, 1) that
bargaining breaks down, leaving players without any surplus, and that a player i's preferences
over splits x ∈ X with delay t ∈ T have the following representation, whichfor the sake of
simplicityinvolves breakdown risk as the sole source of discounting:
(8) Ui (x, t) = gi
(
rt
)
xi.
The function gi : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] is continuous and increasing from gi (0) = 0 to gi (1) = 1; it is a
so-called probability-weighting function, and such a decision-maker i is time-consistent if and
only if gi is the identity so i maximises expected (linear) utility. Redeﬁning, for a given survival
rate r, gi (r
t) ≡ di (t), all previous results can be applied. In particular, one can import theories
of risk preferences suggesting non-linear probability weighting such as rank-dependent expected
24To be precise, the payoﬀ pair which corresponds to Eve's obtaining the entire dollar is never an equilibrium
payoﬀ and thus not contained in the limit; it is, however, the only payoﬀ pair with this property.
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utility (Quiggin [1982]) or cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman [1992]) into the
basic bargaining model and study their implications.25
A qualitative feature of probability weighting that appears widely accepted as empirically
valid in the context of cumulative prospect theory is the overweighting of small and under-
weighting of large probabilities; graphically speaking, the probability weighting function has an
inverse-s shape, e.g. as the following single-parameter weighting function proposed by Tversky
and Kahneman [1992] with γ ∈ (0, 1]:
gi (pi) =
piγ
(piγ + (1− pi)γ) 1γ
.
If a player i' preferences have a representation as in equation 8, then they satisfy present bias
(set di (t) = gi (r
t)), as can easily veriﬁed, whence theorem 1.1 implies that the RubE, where
di (1) = gi (r), is the unique equilibrium. Since increasing γ means less underweighting of large
probabilities, and more overweighting of small ones, the eﬀect of this parameter on a party's
bargaining power depends on the size of the breakdown risk.
The behaviour of the probability weighting function near the extreme points of zero proba-
bility and certainty is, however, diﬃcult to assess. Kahneman and Tversky [1979, pp. 282-283]
point out that the function is unlikely to be well-behaved there, and that it is both conceivable
that there exist discontinuities at the extremes and that small diﬀerences are ignored. Proposed
parametric forms, however, preserve smoothness with increasing steepness as probabilities ap-
proach 0 or 1. While a rigorous analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper, theorem
1.2 suggests that the following properties of gi may permit delay while retaining the qualitative
property of an inverse s-hape in most of the interior: ﬁrst, probability underweighting of large
probabilities only up to a probability strictly less than one when combined with a suﬃciently
large survival rate, and, second, suﬃcient steepness for (strongly) overweighted small probabil-
ities in the presence of a very low survival rate; both would cause present bias to fail within a
short horizon.
1.8.2. Imperfect Altruism in Intergenerational Bargaining. Suppose that several
communities have access to a single productive resource. They decide over how to share it
by means of bargaining. As long as these usage rights have not been settled, some surplus
is forgone due to ineﬃcient usage. Upon failure to agree, the communities nominate a new
delegate to engage in the bargaining on their behalf. I now sketch a simple version of this
general problem.
Let there be two communities i ∈ I, each of which has a population of two members in any
period t ∈ T : an old member (i, o) and a young member (i, y). Each member lives for two
periods, where in the ﬁrst half of her life a member is called young, and in the second half it is
called old, and each young member reproduces so that its synchronous old member is replaced
by a young one following disappearance. Assume that the surplus forgone until agreement is
constant and preferences over delayed rewards feature imperfect altruism: at any point in time,
for any split x ∈ X of the resource with a delay of t ∈ T rounds, where community i's share is
25Of course, these theories are much richer than what the simple preferences I am using here can capture. For
instance, in terms of cumulative prospect theory, I assume here that every agreement is perceived as a gain.
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equal to xi,
Ui,o (x, t) =
xi t = 0γiδtixi t ∈ T \ {0}
Ui,y (x, t) =
δtixi t ∈ {0, 1}γiδtixi t ∈ T \ {0, 1} .
The two parameters δi and γi are both assumed to lie in the interior of the unit interval. These
preferences are supposed to capture that each member is imperfectly altruistic: while they do
care somewhat about what happens to their community in their afterlife, they do so to an
extent that is less than they care about their own lived future. Note that an old member's
preferences are quasi-hyperbolic and satisfy present bias while a young member's preferences
violate present bias because it still looks forward to a second period of lifetime.
Assume that in each round t, a new member of each community is nominated to join the
bargaining table and contrast two diﬀerent generational delegation schemes of community i,
where each is given a potential rationale:
• i always sends the young member to the bargaining table because the young ones have
less to lose which makes them strongercall such a community Yi, or
• i always sends the old member to the bargaining table, the rationale for this being that
the old ones have more to lose which makes them wisercall such a community Oi.
There are four possible games which may arise under such generational discrimination in del-
egation by each community: the set of player pairs is ×i∈I {Yi, Oi}. Note that each of these
cases forms a stationary game which ﬁts into the general class of games analysed in this paper,
because the preferences over feasible outcomes of the two delegates engaged in bargaining are
identical in any round.
To focus on one single community's fate against a given opponent depending on her dele-
gation scheme, I will let community j's preferences be general and contrast Yi with Oi. In any
case, there is a unique RubE: against a given community j's scheme, in this RubE, community
Yi's payoﬀ exceeds that of community Oi because γi < 1, which implies a greater proposer
payoﬀ (and therefore also respondent payoﬀ):
1− dj (1)
1− δidj (1) >
1− dj (1)
1− γiδidj (1) .
This underlies the rationale which posits that the young ones are stronger in bargaining.
While Oi is present biased and the RubE payoﬀs the worst possible equilibrium payoﬀs, Yi
violates present bias, giving rise to the possibility of delay. Instead of providing a full analysis
of the respective system of equations 3-6, I propose a simple equilibrium construction similar
to that in the ﬁrst example of section 1.7. Let σ∗ be the RubE with Yi's respondent payoﬀ
equal to xˆi = δi
(
1−dj(1)
1−δidj(1)
)
and consider the following strategies for the (sub-) game in which j
is the initial proposer:
• Round 1: j oﬀers Yi a share of γiδ2i xˆi which equals the smallest share which Yi accepts;
if, however, Yi were to reject, the game moves into
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• Round 2: Yi demands the entire resource while the smallest share that j accepts is
dj (1) (1− γiδ2i xˆi); upon a rejection, bargaining continues in
• Round 3:
 if in the previous round Yi oﬀered j nothing then the players follow strategies σ
∗
so there is immediate agreement with Yi's share equal to xˆi;
 otherwise, players continue as from round 1.
The crucial stage to check for optimal behaviour is when Yi makes a proposal in round 2. Given
j's strategy, comparing the two available agreements' respective values, these strategies indeed
form an equilibrium if and only if
δixˆi ≥ 1− dj (1)
(
1− γiδ2i xˆi
)⇔ xˆi ≥ 1− dj (1)
δi (1− γiδidj (1)) .
This is satisﬁed if both Yi and j are rather patient about a delay of one period, and community
Yi is suﬃciently impatient about a delay of two periods. Now call this equilibrium σˆ and repeat
the construction where σˆ is used instead of σ∗ and xˆi is replaced by x˜i = γiδ2i xˆi. This will result
in an equilibrium if and only if
x˜i ≥ 1− dj (1)
δi (1− γiδidj (1)) ⇔ 1 ≥
1− δidj (1)
γiδ4i (1− γiδidj (1))
.
This construction may be further repeated and, depending on parameters, yield an equilibrium
or not; for any given γi ∈ (0, 1), there will be large enough values of δi and dj (1), so an
equilibrium obtains.
An old community Oi may be considered wise, because when the game is played by (O1, O2),
the RubE, which is eﬃcient, is the unique equilibrium whereas the presence of a young com-
munity may cause delay and thus ineﬃciency.
1.9. Conclusion
This paper provides the ﬁrst analysis of Rubinstein's (1982) seminal bargaining model
for dynamically inconsistent time preferences without the restrictive assumption of station-
ary strategies. It produces a characterisation of equilibrium outcomes for separable linear time
preferences, theorem 1.3, from which all other results could be derived. Reﬂecting both the
genesis of this work and my anticipation of how the various implications would be received, I
presented it as two main results. The ﬁrst main result, theorem 1.1, establishes that if both
players are most impatient about the ﬁrst period of delay (in relative time), then equilibrium is
unique and in stationary strategies. The suﬃcient property has a clear interpretation as a form
of present bias, and all time preferences commonly used in applications satisfy it, in particu-
lar quasi-hyperbolic, hyperbolic and exponential discounting preferences. Applied researchers
interested in models which feature such preferences and involve strategic bargaining may rely
on this result: it disposes of the need to argue in favour of selecting the simple stationary
equilibrium and thus of the uncertainty previously surrounding predictions based on it. More-
over, once present bias is accepted as a property of preferences, the details of time preferences
beyond the ﬁrst period of delay from the immediate present are irrelevant to equilibrium; since
1.9. CONCLUSION 41
the empirical evidence is inconclusive about such detail, this robustness is also useful for further
work.
In contrast, the second main implication of the general characterisation may, at this stage
at least, be mostly of theoretical interest: if some player is more patient about the ﬁrst round's
delay than a period's delay from the near future, then, in general, there may be multiplicity
and ineﬃcient delay, both based on such a player's preference reversals. The nature of these
equilibria is novel, since their construction does not rely on the presence of stationary equilib-
rium. In fact, when there exist delay equilibria, the sets of equilibrium outcomes and payoﬀs
may be generated entirely without stationary equilibrium.
The most recent experimental evidence on time preferences has indeed documented such
violations of present bias which are most conducive to the existence of such delay equilibria.26
What makes this evidence particularly relevant for the bargaining context is that these ﬁndings
have been for short-horizon trade-oﬀs on the domain of money rewards; sharing a monetary
surplus is the classic bargaining example. It is still early to conﬁdently judge the general validity
of this qualitative property, but should it receive conﬁrmation, this paper will constitute a ﬁrst
theoretical investigation of such preferences, and the equilibrium delay obtained may deserve
wider interest.
In any event, this paper provides a ﬁrst step towards the study of psychologically richer
preferences in the basic strategic model of bargaining; the short section 1.8 was designed to
hint at this, e.g. suggesting how, in the presence of exogenous breakdown risk, the implications
of rank-dependent expected utility and even cumulative prospect theory may be investigated.
More generally, the adaptation of the approach of Shaked and Sutton [1984] and its extension by
ideas similar to those developed by Abreu [1988] for repeated games, which allowed me to obtain
a full characterisation of equilibrium outcomes, may be useful in further theoretical research on
bargaining with non-standard time preferences, or even for the study of other stochastic games
with time-inconsistent discounting.
Several extensions of the present analysis beyond such applications are easily envisaged:
since the quasi-hyperbolic (β, δ)-model is particularly popular in applied modelling, one may
explore how robust the uniqueness and basic properties of equilibrium in the game studied
here are to variations of the bargaining protocol. As I argued in section 1.5, it is the fact that
such strict present bias causes a player's weakest delay attitude to fully enter the immediate
agreement equilibrium that drives its uniqueness; section 1.3 might suggest, however, that it
is the particular simplicity of such equilibrium under the alternating-oﬀers protocol that may
prevent preference reversals from playing a role for equilibrium.
Moreover, the assumption of full sophistication seems extreme from an empirical point of
view. One may therefore ask how predictions change when players are assumed naïve, at least
partially.27 This introduces the potential of learning (and teaching) through delay, which may
take diﬀerent forms for present-biased and non-present-biased players.28
26For a list of studies which ﬁnd such increasing impatience, see the survey of Attema [2012].
27O'Donoghue and Rabin [2001] develop such a concept in the context of the quasi-hyperbolic (β, δ)-model.
28Akin [2007] studies this aspect for the quasi-hyperbolic (β, δ)-model.
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Finally, it has been argued that Strotz-Pollak equilibrium goes too far in its assumption of
fully non-cooperative selves and should be reﬁned. In particular, in view of proposition 1.4, it is
therefore an interesting question whether for plausible such reﬁnements the multiplicity result
disappears. In other words, what kind or how much of intrapersonal coordination is necessary
to restore uniqueness more generally?
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Appendix
Lemma 1.3. For {i, j} = I and any (x, t) ∈ Z∗j , if yj = dj (1 + t)xj then (y, 0) ∈ Z∗i .
Proof. Consider Gi. Since next round's subgame Gi has equilibrium outcome (x, t) ∈ Z∗j ,
this may be imposed as the continuation outcome following any rejection in the ﬁrst round of
Gi. In this case, it is optimal for j to accept i's initial proposal if and only if it leaves her a
share of at least dj (1 + t)xj. Given this, proposal y is optimal for i, since 1 − dj (1 + t)xj >
di (1 + t)xi. 
This is a fundamental backwards-induction type lemma: for any equilibrium agreement of
Gj, one can construct an immediate-agreement equilibrium of Gi which is based on i's oﬀering
j exactly the present value of the former agreement including the additional rejection period's
delay which j accepts, being indiﬀerent. In fact, this is the essence of the strategic advantage
of being the initial proposer.
Lemma 1.4. For both i ∈ I, Vi = V 0i .
Proof. From their deﬁnitions, clearly, Vi ≥ V 0i . Suppose Vi > V 0i . This implies that there
exists a (x, t) ∈ Z∗i with t > 0 such that di (t)xi > V 0i . Therefore xi > V 0i , and t must be odd
so (x, 0) ∈ Z∗j , j = 3− i. But then, by lemma 1.3, y ∈ Z∗i for yi = 1− dj (1)xj, and therefore
V 0i ≥ 1− dj (1)xj > xi, a contradiction. 
No equilibrium with delay yields the proposer a greater payoﬀ than her favourite immediate-
agreement equilibrium. Stationarity rules this out for any even number of periods of delay,
because this would be an immediate agreement as well. And backwards induction would lead
to a contradiction if it were the case with an odd number of delay periods.
Lemma 1.5. For both i ∈ I, Wi = W 0i .
Proof. First note that Wi ≥ W 0i = di (1)V 0i . Suppose now that Wi > W 0i . Then there
exists an outcome (x, t) ∈ Z∗i such that di (1 + t)xi > di (1)V 0i , implying that xi > V 0i and thus
that t is odd, or (x, 0) ∈ Z∗j . By lemma 1.3, (y, 0) ∈ Z∗i for yi = 1−dj (1)xj > 1−xj = xi > V 0i ,
a contradiction. 
Given the fact that a proposer's greatest equilibrium payoﬀ is achieved in an immediate-
agreement equilibrium, and that a proposer is able to extract some surplus from the respondent
arising from the latter's impatience, any equilibrium with delay must in fact yield a payoﬀ that
is strictly lower. Due to impatience, a respondent's most preferred continuation equilibrium
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therefore has the best immediate equilibrium agreement. Combining lemmas 1.4 and 1.5, a
relationship similar to that in the time-consistent case of exponential discounting between
a player's best threat as a respondent and her greatest equilibrium payoﬀ as a proposer is
obtained: Wi = di (1)Vi.
Lemma 1.6. For {i, j} = I, Vi = 1− wj.
Proof. Consider Gi. In any equilibrium of this subgame, in any round where i proposes, in
particular in the initial round, respondent j rejects any proposed split x with xj < wj because
she prefers any continuation equilibrium outcome to (x, 0). Therefore, in no equilibrium which
has agreement in a round in which i proposes can she obtain a share greater than 1− wj, and
in particular V 0i ≤ 1− wj, which, by lemma 1.4 is the same as Vi ≤ 1− wj.
Now suppose Vi < 1 − wj ⇔ wj < 1 − Vi. Then there exists an outcome (x, t) ∈ Z∗j
with dj (1 + t)xj < 1 − Vi. By lemma 1.3, (y, 0) ∈ Z∗i for yi = 1 − dj (1 + t)xj > Vi, a
contradiction. 
The respondent's least preferred continuation equilibrium agreement yields immediately
the proposer's best immediate equilibrium agreement, and by the previous lemma this is the
proposer's best equilibrium agreement overall.
Lemma 1.7. For {i, j} = I, vi = v0i = 1−Wj.
Proof. Consider Gi. In any equilibrium of this subgame, in any round where i proposes, in
particular in the initial round, respondent j accepts any proposed split x with xj > Wj because
she prefers (x, 0) to any continuation equilibrium outcome. Therefore, in no equilibrium of this
subgame will i achieve a payoﬀ of less than 1−Wj, so vi ≥ 1−Wj.
Now suppose v0i > 1 −Wj ⇔ Wj > 1 − v0i . Then there exists a continuation equilibrium
outcome (x, t) ∈ Z∗j with dj (1 + t)xj > 1 − v0i . By lemma 1.3, (y, 0) ∈ Z∗i for yi = 1 −
dj (1 + t)xj < v
0
i , a contradiction.
Hence, we have shown that vi ≥ 1 − Wj ≥ v0i . Since v0i ≥ vi holds by deﬁnition, this
establishes the claim. 
The respondent's most preferred continuation equilibrium determines the proposer's worst
immediate equilibrium agreement. However, since the proposer may always oﬀer a share that
matches the respondent's favourite continuation equilibrium outcome's present value, her lowest
equilibrium payoﬀ cannot fall below the worst immediate equilibrium agreement.
CHAPTER 2
A Characterisation of Equilibrium Outcomes in Alternating-Oﬀers
Bargaining for Separable Time Preferences
2.1. Introduction
The Rubinstein-Ståhl model of bargaining (Ståhl [1972] and Rubinstein [1982]) forms the
core of modern non-cooperative bargaining theory. This model posits an explicit dynamic
bargaining protocol of alternating oﬀers by two parties about how to split a ﬁxed economic
surplus and derives predictions about bargaining from the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
of the extensive-form game that results after specifying the parties' preferences over possible
agreements. The central aspect in determining these outcomes is the parties' relative attitudes
to delay, their time preferences.
In view of recent empirical evidence, which casts doubt on the classic assumption of expo-
nential discounting,1 and the successful introduction of alternative decision models,2 this paper
provides a characterisation of equilibrium outcomes for general separable time preferences, as
axiomatised by Fishburn and Rubinstein [1982] and Ok and Masatlioglu [2007]. Since bargain-
ing is pervasive in economic modelling, it thus ﬁlls a gap in the literature that has become
important with the surge of interest in applied work with non-exponential discounting.
In dealing with players' dynamic inconsistency, I assume common knowledge and thus full
sophistication about preferences, and I employ the standard solution concept of Strotz-Pollak
equilibrium (StPoE, and in what follows simply equilibrium), which is here equivalent to
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium for time-consistent players. There always exists a stationary
such equilibrium (strategies are history- and time-independent) with immediate agreement in
every round, which I call Rubinstein equilibrium (RubE). The two underlying agreements (one
per player/round) form a pair which is self-enforcing when viewed as threats, and equilibrium
is unique if and only if this pair is the only ﬁxed-point of an equation system which describes
such pairs of self-enforcing threats. For the case of multiple ﬁxed-points, there is one involving
the most severe threats, and it characterises the set of equilibrium outcomes and payoﬀs.
A main contribution of this paper is of a technical nature. Despite the stationarity of the
game, the otherwise very eﬀective backwards-induction type reasoning proposed by Shaked
and Sutton [1984] cannot be employed as such because of the players' time-inconsistency. I
develop an approach of proof to the characterisation results that is similar to that of Abreu
[1988] for repeated games, where the strategy spaces considered are greatly simpliﬁed. For each
1See the surveys of Frederick et al. [2002] and Attema [2012]. A very recent contribution, which qualiﬁes
experimental results where exponential discounting could not be rejected, such as those of Andreoni and Sprenger
[2012], is Augenblick et al. [2013].
2Again, Frederick et al. [2002] survey several such models, the most prominent being the (β, δ)-model with early
applications in Laibson [1997] and O'Donoghue and Rabin [1999]. Recent such alternative models, which also
nest or limit to exponential discounting are for instance Takeuchi [2011] and Pan et al. [2013].
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pair of maximal threat payoﬀs as respondent, one for each player, this permits a description
of all sustainable outcomes. The aforementioned ﬁxed-point condition then requires that the
maximal threats are self-enforcing. This approach seems promising for a characterisation of
equilibrium outcomes in many other settings that satisfy a form of stationarity.
Related Literature. The work of Rubinstein [1982] was highly seminal and marks the begin-
ning of a vast literature on non-cooperative bargaining theory. While the subsequent literature
tended to focus on the case of linear instantaneous utility, which I analysed in chapter 1, the
original model allowed for representations with non-linear (but not too convex) utility func-
tions and provided an example of multiplicity and delay, even for dynamically consistent time
preferences; see Rubinstein [1982, pp. 107-8]. Osborne and Rubinstein [1990, p. 48] point out
that uniqueness of a certain ﬁxed point (see deﬁnition 2.2) characterises equilibrium unique-
ness for any separable time preferences which satisfy time-consistent exponential discounting.
My innovation over existing proofs allows to generalise this ﬁxed-point condition in order to
accomodate also any other separable time preferences.
According to my knowledge, there are only two papers which analyse bargaining for dy-
namically inconsistent time preferences: both Ok and Masatlioglu [2007] and Noor [2011] do
restrict their respective analyses to stationary strategies, however. My results show that for
some preferences this does not do full justice to their behavioural implications for bargaining
and also characterise those preferences for which this simpliﬁcation indeed yields the same
prediction(s).
2.2. Game
Protocol, Histories and Strategies. The bargaining protocol is identical to that considered in
Rubinstein [1982]. Two players i ∈ {1, 2} ≡ I bargain over which split x ∈ X of a ﬁxed surplus
to implement, where X ≡ {(x1, x2) |0 ≤ x1 = 1− x2 ≤ 1}. In each of potentially inﬁnitely
many rounds t ∈ N, a player ρ (t) proposes a split x ∈ X to the other who then responds by
either accepting, a = 1, or rejecting, a = 0. Upon acceptance, bargaining ends, with x being
implemented; upon rejection, one period of time elapses until the next round, t + 1, where
roles are reversed, so player ρ (t+ 1) = 3− ρ (t) is the proposer and ρ (t) responds. The initial
proposer is player ρ (1) = 1.
As long as bargaining continues, action sets in each round are X for the proposer and
{0, 1} for the respondent. These generate possible histories of play in the obvious way, with
h0 denoting the history as of round 1. Letting H ≡ (X × {0}) with convention H0 = {h0},
a non-terminal history at the beginning of bargaining round t ∈ N is some h ∈ H t−1. Call
(X × N)∪{D} the set of dated outcomes, which are equivalence classes of terminal histories:
(x, t) ∈ X×N denotes any history where there is agreement on split x in round t, and outcome
D, which I call disagreement, captures any inﬁnite history.
A player i's strategy σi maps the non-terminal histories at which i makes a choice to an
available action: for instance, letting h ∈ H t−1 be the history at the beginning of round t,
if i = ρ (t), then σi (h) ∈ X; otherwise, σi is deﬁned for each such proposal from X and
σi (h, x) ∈ {0, 1} (alternatively, σi (h, ·) : X → {0, 1}). Say σi is stationary, i.e. history- as well
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as time-independent, if, whenever i is called upon to propose, she makes the same proposal,
and, whenever i is called upon to respond, she follows the same acceptance rule.3
Preferences. At the most basic level, it is assumed that players care intrinsically only about
the size and the timing of their own share in any agreement, and not about how it is reached,
or how disagreement obtains; in other words, each player only cares about dated outcomes as
deﬁned above. Switching to the language of the decision theory of time preferences, think of
the share of the surplus in an agreement as a reward and of its round as a calendar date. An
individual having dynamically inconsistent time preferences means that her preference between
two dated future rewards may change depending on the date at which she gets to make the
choice.
As a consequence, I take as the primitive of a player i's preferences a sequence of dated
preference orderings {(i,t)}t∈N, where each element (i,t) is deﬁned on the set of feasible out-
comes at t, which is Zt ≡ (X × Nt) ∪ {D} for Nt ≡ {t′ ∈ N|t′ ≥ t}.4 Now let T ≡ N0 denote
the possible delay of an agreement. I assume that, at any date t, (i,t) has a separable utility
representation
U(i,t) (z) =
di (s)ui (xi) z = (x, t+ s) ∈ X × Nt0 z = D ,
where di : T → [0, 1] is continuous and decreasing, with di (0) = 1 and limt→∞ di (t) = 0, and
ui : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is continuous and increasing, with ui (1) = 1.5 The image of [0, 1] under ui
will be denoted Ui ≡ [ui (0) , 1].
Observe that this representation involves time only in relative terms, as delay from t, but
not t itself. In terms of feasible delayed agreements, the domain at any round t is identically
equal to (X × T ) ∪ {D} ≡ Z, which I will refer to as the set of outcomes. This simpliﬁcation
is used in the following assumption that summarises the description of preferences.
Assumption 2. For each player i ∈ I, there exist a continuous decreasing function di :
T → [0, 1] with di (0) = 1 and limt→∞ di (t) = 0, and a continuous increasing function ui :
[0, 1] → [0, 1] with ui (1) = 1, such that, at any round t ∈ N, preferences (i,t) over feasible
outcomes Z are represented by
(9) Ui (z) =
di (s)ui (xi) z = (x, s) ∈ X × T0 z = D .
Equilibrium. In this paper, I assume there is perfect information and, in particular, that
the players' preferences are common knowledge.6 The equilibrium concept I use is that of
Strotz-Pollak equilibrium which incorporates the assumption that players cannot commit to
3Formally, for any two rounds t and t′ such that ρ (t) = ρ (t′) = ρ, any two histories h ∈ (X × {0})t−1 and
h′ ∈ (X × {0})t′−1, if i = ρ, then σi (h) = σi (h′), and if i 6= ρ, then σi (h, ·) = σi (h′, ·).
4Interestingly, Rubinstein mentions such a generalisation in several remarks of his original bargaining article,
see Rubinstein [1982, remarks on pages 101 and 103].
5An axiomatisation of such separable time preferences for discrete time is provided in Fishburn and Rubinstein
[1982]. Due to the discreteness of time in this model, continuity of di is without loss of generality; axiomatisations
for continuous time with this property are available in Fishburn and Rubinstein [1982] and Ok and Masatlioglu
[2007].
6In the context of a single decision maker who perfectly anticipates his future preferences, this has been termed
sophistication; see e.g. Hammond [1976].
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future behaviour; given common knowledge of strategies, every action of a player has to be
optimal taking as given not only the opponent's strategy but also that player's own continuation
strategy.7 In case such an equilibrium satisﬁes the stronger property that at no stage, any player
could gain from perfect commitment (there is no intrapersonal conﬂict), then I call it Perfect-
Commitment equilibrium. To simplify the formal statement, deﬁne, for any history h ∈ H t−1
at the beginning of a round t ∈ N, zh (σ) ∈ Z as the outcome (in relative time) that obtains
under strategy proﬁle σ, and similarly, z(h,x) (σ) for any proposal x ∈ X.
Definition 2.1. A strategy proﬁle σ∗ is a Strotz-Pollak equilibrium (StPoE, equilibrium)
if, for any round t ∈ N, history h ∈ H t−1, proposal x ∈ X and response a ∈ {0, 1}, the following
holds:
ρ (t) = i ⇒ Ui (zh (σ∗)) ≥ Ui
(
z(h,x) (σ
∗)
)
ρ (t+ 1) = i ⇒ Ui
(
z(h,x) (σ
∗)
) ≥ Ui (z(h,x,a) (σ∗)) .
Such an equilibrium σ∗ is a Perfect-Commitment equilibrium (PCE) if, moreover, for any σ
with σj = σ
∗
j , j = 3− i,
ρ (t) = i ⇒ Ui (zh (σ∗)) ≥ Ui (zh (σ))
ρ (t+ 1) = i ⇒ Ui
(
z(h,x) (σ
∗)
) ≥ Ui (z(h,x) (σ)) .
Analytically, the deﬁning property of StPoE is robustness against one-shot deviations. By the
one-shot deviation principle (e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole [1991, Theorem 4.1], it is therefore
equivalent to subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) when all players' preferences are time-
consistent, because they satisfy continuity at inﬁnity.8 This is important for comparison with
existing results about SPNE for time-consistent exponential discounting, which I may therefore
interpret as results about StPoE.
2.3. Results
This section presents the formal results. First, my focus will be on stationary equilibrium,
which is equilibrium in stationary strategies. The inﬂuential uniqueness result of Rubinstein
[1982] for the case of time-consistent exponential discounting yielded such a stationary equilib-
rium, and existing work studying dynamically inconsistent time preferences in Rubinstein-Ståhl
bargaining has restricted the strategy space to such simple strategies. The second section then
extends the scope of the analysis to the full strategy space.
2.3.1. Stationary Equilibrium. The presentation of my results requires additional no-
tation. First, deﬁne, for each player i ∈ I, a function fi : [0, 1] × T → [0, 1], which associates
with every possible delayed share the minimal immediate share which is worth at least as much:
fi (xi, t) = u
−1
i (max {ui (0) , di (t)ui (xi)}) .
7Strotz-Pollak equilibrium was developed in the context of analyses of single-person decision problems with
time-inconsistent preferences, as pioneered by Strotz [1955-1956] to which Pollak [1968] provided an illuminating
response. For its use in strategic contexts, see for instance Rotemberg [1983] and, recently, Chade et al. [2008].
8The same holds true about PCE, of course, which checks for full-strategy deviations.
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These functions are well-deﬁned and continuous in the ﬁrst argument because for any (x, t) ∈
X × T , di (t)ui (xi) ∈ [0, 1] and thus in the domain of ui, and because each ui is increasing
and continuous, guaranteeing an increasing and continuous inverse function u−1i . For a ﬁxed
delay t ∈ T , each function fi (·, t) is constant at zero on the set of shares
[
0, u−1i (ui (0) /di (t))
]
(possibly equal to the singleton {0}) and increasing on its complement in [0, 1]. Moreover,
t > 0 implies fi (xi, t) ≤ xi where the inequality is strict for any xi > 0 (impatience). Note that
because ui (0) may be positive, the preferences considered here include the case where a player
is impatient also about receiving a share of zero.
Definition 2.2. A Rubinstein pair is any (x∗, y∗) ∈ X ×X such that
y∗1 = f1 (x
∗
1, 1)
x∗2 = f2 (y
∗
2, 1) .
A Rubinstein pair is a pair of surplus divisions with the following property: facing proposal
x∗, player 2 is indiﬀerent between accepting x∗ and rejecting it for agreement on y∗ in the
subsequent round, and, similarly, for player 1 for y∗ and x∗. Note that
y∗1 = f1 (x
∗
1, 1)
= u−11 (max {u1 (0) , d1 (1)u1 (x∗1)})
≤ x∗1.(10)
Similarly, also x∗2 ≤ y∗2.
A Rubinstein pair only depends on the players' attitudes to a single round's delay. Its
deﬁnition can be reformulated as a ﬁxed-point problem, which can be shown to have a solution
on the basis of the properties of the functions (fi)i∈I :
x∗1 = 1− f2 (1− f1 (x∗1, 1) , 1)
y∗2 = 1− f1 (1− f2 (y∗2, 1) , 1) .
Lemma 2.1. A Rubinstein pair exists.
Proof. See (the ﬁrst part of) the proof of Osborne and Rubinstein [1990, Lemma 3.2]. 
The next deﬁnition constructs a pair of stationary strategies from any Rubinstein pair.9
Definition 2.3. For any Rubinstein pair (x∗, y∗), a Rubinstein proﬁle is a strategy proﬁle
σR that satisﬁes the following: for any round t ∈ ρ−1 (1), division x ∈ X, histories h ∈ H t−1
and h′ ∈ H t,
σR1 (h) = x
∗
σR2 (h, x) = I (x2 ≥ x∗2)
σR2 (h
′) = y∗
σR1 (h
′, x) = I (y1 ≥ y∗1) .
In fact, the following is true.
9I denotes the indicator function that evaluates to one if its argument is true and to zero otherwise.
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Proposition 2.1. Every stationary StPoE is a Rubinstein proﬁle.
Proof. Let σ∗ be a stationary StPoE in which player 1 always proposes x∗, player 2 always
proposes y∗, and each player i ∈ I responds to every oﬀer according to some acceptance rule
ai : X → {0, 1}. Consider any t ∈ ρ−1 (1) and h ∈ H t−1, and suppose ﬁrst that a2 (x∗) =
a1 (y
∗) = 0, implying disagreement. By StPoE, a2 must satisfy a2 (x) = 1 for any x with
x2 > 0 and the proposing player 1 self (1, t) can increase her payoﬀ from 0 under σ
∗ (h) = x∗
to u1
(
1
2
)
> 0 by deviating to σ1 (h) =
(
1
2
, 1
2
)
.
Next suppose instead that a2 (x
∗) = 0 and a1 (y∗) = 1, so the continuation outcome under
σ∗ is (y∗, 1). Then, by StPoE, a2 must satisfy a2 (x) = 1 for any x with x2 > f2 (y∗2, 1), whence
x∗2 ≤ f2 (y∗2, 1). Now argue that there exists  > 0 such that the proposing player 1 self (1, t)
can increase her payoﬀ above that of d1 (1)u1 (y
∗
1) under σ
∗ (h) = x∗ by proposing x′ such that
x′2 = f2 (y
∗
2, 1)+ (recall that by impatience f2 (y
∗
2, 1) < 1): if f2 (y
∗
2, 1) = 0 then f2 (y
∗
2, 1) ≤ y∗2 ,
and otherwise f2 (y
∗
2, 1) < y
∗
2, so in any case f2 (y
∗
2, 1) ≤ y∗2, and because of d1 (1) < 1, continuity
of ui establishes the existence of  > 0 such that
u1 (1− f2 (y∗2, 1)− ) > d1 (1)u1 (1− y∗2) .
Apply a symmetric argument to conclude that σ∗ must satisfy a2 (x∗) = a1 (y∗) = 1.
Finally, to prove that (x∗, y∗) must be a Rubinstein pair, note that x∗2 < f2 (y
∗
2, 1) would
contradict the optimality of a2 (x
∗) = 1, and x∗2 > f2 (y
∗
2, 1) would contradict the optimality
of 1's proposing x∗, and in either case violate StPoE, whence x∗2 = f2 (y
∗
2, 1). A symmetric
argument establishes y∗1 = f1 (x
∗
1, 1), meaning (x
∗, y∗) is a Rubinstein pair, and σ∗ is therefore
a Rubinstein proﬁle. 
Observe the implication that any stationary StPoE σ has immediate agreement in every
round: since it is based on some Rubinstein pair (x∗, y∗), the outcome in any round t ∈ N, as
element of Z, is then (x∗, 0) if ρ (t) = 1, and it is (y∗, 0) if ρ (t) = 2.
The next result shows that in a Rubinstein proﬁle, despite all possible forms that time-
inconsistency may take under assumption 2, no player would want to change either their own
action or their continuation behaviour at any point in the game, i.e. any Rubinstein proﬁle is a
PCE. By the mere impatience of the players, the particular structure of such a strategy proﬁle,
with agreement in every round and indiﬀerence of the respective respondent, eﬀectively reduces
the game to a sequence of two-period problems of either agreement now or agreement the next
round. This, however, means that only the attitudes to a single period of delay matter and
time-inconsistency cannot play a strategic role.
Proposition 2.2. Every Rubinstein proﬁle is a PCE.
Proof. Take any Rubinstein proﬁle σR based on some Rubinstein pair (x∗, y∗), and con-
sider any t ∈ T odd and history h ∈ H t−1, so it is player 1's round-t self's turn to propose.
By adhering to σR1 , she obtains U1 (x
∗, 0) = u1 (x∗1). Any other strategy's payoﬀ is at most
max {d1 (1)u1 (y∗1) , d1 (2)u1 (x∗1)} because it results either in agreement in at least one more
round where player 2 proposes y∗ and player 1 accepts, or in agreement in at least two more
rounds in a round where player 1 proposes some x with x2 ≥ x∗2 which player 2 accepts, or
in disagreement. The latter two outcomes are obviously no better than (x∗, 0); because by
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inequality 10, neither is the ﬁrst, since
d1 (1)u1 (y
∗
1) ≤ u1 (y∗1) ≤ u1 (x∗1) .
Next, consider any x ∈ X and history (h, x) with h as before, so it is player 2's round-t self's
turn to respond. Suppose ﬁrst that x2 ≥ x∗2, so any strategy σ2 such that σ2 (h, x) = 1, and
in particular σR2 , yields a payoﬀ of u2 (x2) ≥ u2 (x∗2). Any other strategy σ2 leads to a payoﬀ
of at most max {d2 (1)u2 (y∗2) , d2 (2)u2 (x∗2)} because either there is agreement in a later round
where 2 proposes some y with y2 ≤ y∗2, or there is agreement in a later round where 1 proposes
x∗, or there is disagreement. The latter two are obviously no better than u2 (x∗2); moreover,
neither is the ﬁrst because
u2 (x
∗
2) = u2 (f2 (y
∗, 1)) ≥ d2 (1)u2 (y∗2) .
Second, suppose that x2 < x
∗
2, so σ
R
2 yields a payoﬀ of d2 (1)u2 (y
∗
2). Because x
∗
2 =
f2 (y
∗, 1) > 0, it follows that d2 (1)u2 (y∗2) = u2 (x
∗
2). Therefore, any alternative strategy σ2 with
σ2 (h, x) = 1 yields less. Any other strategy yields at most max {d2 (1)u2 (y∗2) , d2 (2)u2 (x∗2)}
which has been shown above not to exceed u2 (x
∗).
A symmetric argument establishes that adhering to σR is optimal also for a proposing player
2 as well as a responding player 1. 
Existence of Rubinstein proﬁles follows from lemma 2.1, whence this proposition establishes
existence of StPoE; moreover, in combination with 2.1, it yields a characterisation of stationary
StPoE as Rubinstein proﬁles.
Corollary 2.1. StPoE exists.
Proof. A PCE exists because of lemma 2.1, and every PCE is a StPoE. 
Corollary 2.2. A proﬁle of strategies is a stationary StPoE if and only if it is a Rubinstein
proﬁle.
Proof. Since a Rubinstein proﬁle is deﬁned as a pair of stationary strategies based on a
Rubinstein pair, proposition 2.2 implies that every Rubinstein proﬁle is a stationary StPoE
(suﬃciency). Proposition 2.1 provides the converse (necessity). 
Because of this result, I will use the term Rubinstein equilibrium (RubE) for stationary
StPoE in what follows.
Importantly, the set of stationary-equilibrium outcomes equals the set of Rubinstein pairs,
so uniqueness of stationary equilibrium coincides with uniqueness of a Rubinstein pair. Without
emphasising this in their uniqueness proof, Osborne and Rubinstein [1990, Chapter 3] point out
that the same is true for the time-consistent exponential discounting preferences they assume.
Since Rubinstein pairs are deﬁned only via the players' attitudes to one period of delay, even if
one knew the players' instantaneous-utility functions, stationary equilibrium could not reveal
any dynamic inconsistency of discounting.
In anticipation of a more general analysis, uniqueness of a Rubinstein pair is, of course, nec-
essary for a unique equilibrium. Regarding the players' preferences, this ﬁxed-point uniqueness
constitutes a combined restriction on the curvatures of the two players' utility functions, given
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(di (1))i∈I . A suﬃcient condition in terms of individual preferences is presented in Osborne and
Rubinstein [1990, pp. 35-36] as increasing loss to delay: for each player i ∈ I and every share
xi ∈ [0, 1], the loss to delay xi − fi (xi, 1) is increasing in xi. For a given share, the loss to
delay is the additional compensation that makes a player willing to accept a one-period delay
against the alternative of receiving this share immediately.10
Definition 2.4. A player i's preferences satisfy increasing loss to delay if, for any xi ∈ [0, 1],
xi − fi (xi, 1) is increasing in xi.
The standard assumption of a diﬀerentiable concave ui implies increasing loss to delay
(Osborne and Rubinstein [1990, p. 35]); hence, this is true in particular of a linear utility
function ui, where fi (xi, 1) = di (1)xi, so the loss to one period's delay from the present is
xi(1− di (1)), which is increasing in xi due to impatience.
Lemma 2.2. If both players' preferences satisfy increasing loss to delay, then there exists a
unique Rubinstein pair.
Proof. Since only one-period delays are involved, this is simply reproducing Osborne and
Rubinstein [1990, Lemma 3.2]. 
2.3.2. General Analysis. The previous section has shown that there exist multiple sta-
tionary equilibria whenever there are multiple Rubinstein pairs. All of these equilibria exhibit
immediate agreement (in every round) and are therefore eﬃcient. However, such equilibrium
multiplicity may entail equilibrium with delayed agreement when players use non-stationary
strategies. This point was made by Rubinstein [1982, pp. 107-108] for time-consistent pref-
erences with an example, a version of which I reproduce here: let players have preferences
represented by Ui (x, t) = xi − ct for each player i and note that Ui corresponds to a positive
monotonic transformation of an exponential-discounting representation, satisfying assumption
2.11 The set of associated Rubinstein pairs is {(x, y) ∈ X ×X |x1 − y1 = c}. For c < 1, both
of the pairs (x, y) and (x′, y′) such that (x1, y1) = (c, 0) and (x′1, y
′
1) = (1, 1− c) are Rubinstein
pairs; let the associated RubE be denoted σ and σ′, respectively, each of which is a PCE by
proposition 2.2, and consider the following strategy proﬁle:
• Round 1: player 1 demands the entire surplus, and player 2 accepts a proposal if and
only if her share is at least 1− c, so there is a rejection and the game continues with
• Round 2:
 if the previous oﬀer to player 2 was positive then players continue with σ, resulting
in immediate agreement on y = (0, 1), and
10In his original paper, Rubinstein [1982, A-5 on p. 101] assumes only non-decreasingness of the loss to delay,
which implies only that the set of Rubinstein pairs is characterised by a closed interval.
11Without uncertainty, positive monotonic transformations do not change preferences: assumption 2 then also
covers preferences with discrete costs of delay; simply take the natural logarithm of the following representation
(11) Ui (x, t) = exp (−ci (t))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=di(t)
exp (uˆi (xi))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=ui(xi)
,
where ci : T → R+ is a continuous function that increases from ci (0) = 0 towards inﬁnity as t → ∞. The
special case of time-consistent exponential discounting has ci (t) = ct for some c > 0.
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 otherwise they continue with σ′, yielding y′ = (1− c, c) without any (further)
delay.
For 1− 2c ≥ c⇔ 1
3
≥ c this is a PCE with delay.
Many existing constructions of non-stationary equilibrium, in particular equilibrium with
delayed agreement, in variations of the bargaining protocol of Rubinstein [1982] follow exactly
this pattern (e.g. Van Damme et al. [1990]), andin any casenecessitate the existence of
a stationary equilibrium, as shown by the canonical treatment of Avery and Zemsky [1994].
Chapter 1 already proved the point that this need not be the case when time preferences are
dynamically inconsistent. Here, I provide a characterisation of equilibrium outcomes for the
more general time preferences of assumption 2, which, in particular, has to handle the above
possibility of multiplicity of stationary equilibrium, and in this case can be used to check when
multiplicity of such immediate-agreement equilibrium permits delay.
Preliminaries. The structure of the bargaining game satisﬁes a stationarity property: after
any two histories to any two rounds which start with a proposal by the same player i ∈ I, the
respective subgames are identical; denote this subgame by Gi (when referring to subgame, I
will mean G1 or G2).
12 The respective sets of equilibrium outcomes, as subsets of Z, therefore
coincide, and I will use Z∗i to refer to this. An important role in the analysis will be assigned to
the following bounds on equilibrium payoﬀs: Vi and vi will denote the supremum and inﬁmum,
respectively, of Ui on Z
∗
i . These are the tightest possible bounds on i's equilibrium payoﬀs as
the initial proposer.
For any outcome z ∈ Z, let z+ denote the outcome that is z after another round's delay;
since this is payoﬀ-relevant only for agreements (x, t), if z = (x, t) then z+ = (x, 1 + t). In a
similar manner, let Z+,∗i ≡ {z+ ∈ Z |z ∈ Z∗i }, so Wi and wi, as the supremum and inﬁmum,
respectively, of Ui on Z
+,∗
i , are the tightest possible bounds on i's rejection utility, i.e. on the
continuation equilibrium payoﬀs that i may obtain when rejecting a proposal as the respondent;
I will refer to these also as best and worst threat points, respectively.
A superscript of zero on any of the above payoﬀ bounds will mean it is derived from the
restriction of Z∗i or Z
+,∗
i , respectively, to immediate-agreement equilibrium outcomes, so for
instance w0i ≡ sup
{
Ui (x, 1)
∣∣(x, 0) ∈ Z∗j }.
While the idea of studying such payoﬀ bounds is familiar from Shaked and Sutton [1984],
another characteristic of Z∗i plays a key role in my characterisation, namely the supremum
delay of such an equilibrium agreement: ti ≡ sup {t ∈ T |∃x ∈ X, (x, t) ∈ Z∗i }.
I also introduce further notation to deal with the possibility of non-linear ui and positive
ui (0). Let f
U
i associate with any rejection utility U the minimal share a responding player i
may accept, i.e. :
fUi (U) = u
−1
i (max {ui (0) , U}) .
Note that a player i's maximal possible rejection utility is di (1): given a rejection, the earliest
best agreement delivers a share of one, hence utility ui (1) = 1, in the round immediately
succeding the rejection.
12There are many other subgames, starting with the respondent's decision of whether to accept or reject a given
proposal x ∈ X.
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Finally, I make a few conventions in order not to keep notational track of histories and
rounds up to the subgame I am analysing. Let Gi be a subgame starting in round t after
history hˆ. I will abuse notation and identify ρ (t) with ρ (1), and hˆ with h0. For any history
h ∈ ∪t∈TH t in that subgame, zh (σ) will denote the outcome in Z that obtains in Gρ(t+1) when
players follow the prescriptions of σ from h onwards, and z+h (σ) will be the outcome that is
zh (σ) delayed by one more round (e.g. if σ prescribes behaviour such that, after history h at
the beginning of round t + 1 in Gi, agreement is reached on split x after s more rounds, then
zh (σ) = (x, s) and z
+
h (σ) = (x, s+ 1)).
The following proposition summarises intermediate results proven in the appendix, which
do not hinge on properties of preferences beyond mere impatience. In this sense, under the
general assumption 2, it captures the essence of the bargaining protocol which places the burden
of choice over delay onto the respondent.
Proposition 2.3. For {i, j} = I, Vi = 1 − fUj (wj) = V 0i , vi = 1 − fUj (Wj) = v0i ,
Wi = di (1)Vi, w
0
i = di (1) vi and ti <∞.
Proof. See appendix. 
Relative to time-consistent exponential discounting, the only potential diﬀerence is the
possibility of wi < di (1) vi = w
0
i . Although the lowest equilibrium payoﬀ that i may experience
in Gi is achieved by the worst immediate equilibrium agreement (vi = v
0
i ), because i can always
please the most demanding respondent immediately, the additional round's delay that i faces as
respondent relative to Z∗i (comparing preferences over Z
∗
i and Z
+,∗
i ) may change her ranking of
outcomes such that there is a worse subsequent equilibrium outcome which has delay in Z∗i . This
possibility arises from time-inconsistency and then drives a wedge in-between wi and w
0
i that
feeds through all other payoﬀ bounds. If, however, despite their time-inconsistency, preferences
turned out such that this can be ruled out, so wi = w
0
i , then there would be no diﬀerence to an
analysis of the game for a corresponding time-consistent representation di (1)
t ui (xi) instead.
Characterisation. The next lemma achieves a simpliﬁcation of the space of equilibria to
consider for a characterisation of (Z∗i )i∈I . Every such simple equilibrium implements an
outcome (x, t) by always relying on the most extreme threat points (W1,W2) that the two players
may entertain as respondents. Roughly speaking, it has the following structure, corresponding
to properties 1-5 in the deﬁnition below: as long as both players have been complying with
the strategies and the agreement round has not been reached, a proposer i claims the entire
surplus and a respondent j accepts only those oﬀers that yield her at least her threat point Wj
(property 1). Because the maximal threat points need not correspond to an actual equilibrium
payoﬀ, property 3 is added. In the agreement round, the split to implement is proposed, and
the respondent accepts any split that is at least as good as that (property 2); upon rejection
of any such split, the respondent is punished with her least preferred continuation StPoE,
and upon rejection of other splits, a proposer's least preferred continuation StPoE is played
(proposition 2.3 shows that it is possible to do so with a continuation StPoE most preferred
by the respondent); ideally, property 4 would specify respective payoﬀs Wρ(s+1) and vρ(s), but
the non-existence problem has to be dealt with which complicates it. Property 5 means this
construction yields the desired outcome.
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The following deﬁnition formalises this, using the following notation. For i ∈ I, ei ∈ X will
denote x ∈ X such that xi = 1. Deﬁne h1i,E ≡ h0 and, for any t ∈ N\{1}, hti,E =
(
h0, (x
s, 0)t−1s=1
)
with xs ∈ {e1, e2}, x1 = ei and xs+1 6= xs.
Definition 2.5. For any i ∈ I and Gi, and any (x, t) ∈ X × T , a StPoE σ is a simple
implementation of (x, t) in Gi if it satisﬁes properties 1 through 5 below.
(1) if h = hsi,E for s < t, then
• σρ(s) (h) = eρ(s) and,
• for any y ∈ X, σρ(s+1) (h, y) = I
(
yρ(s+1) ≥ fUρ(s+1)
(
Wρ(s+1)
))
(2) if h = hti,E, then
• σρ(t) (h) = x and,
• for any y ∈ X, σρ(t+1) (h, y) = I
(
yρ(t+1) ≥ xρ(t+1)
)
(3) if h =
(
hsi,E, y, 0
) 6= hs+1i,E for s < t and 0 < yρ(s+1) < fUρ(s+1) (Wρ(s+1)) then
Uρ(s+1)
(
z+h (σ)
)
> uρ(s+1)
(
yρ(s+1)
)
(4) if h =
(
hti,E, y, 0
)
then
• if yρ(t+1) ≥ xρ(t+1) then
Uρ(t+1)
(
z+h (σ)
) ≤ uρ(t+1) (xρ(t+1))
• if yρ(t+1) < xρ(t+1) then
Uρ(t+1)
(
z+h (σ)
)
> uρ(t+1)
(
yρ(t+1)
)
(5) zh0 (σ) = (x, t)
The lemma below provides the main tool for characterising the temporal structure of Z∗i and,
consequently, the conditions which are necessary and suﬃcient for StPoE to be unique. It uses
lemma 2.7, which states that for any {i, j} = I, vi = ui
(
1− fUj (Wj)
)
, and lemma 2.6 which
states that Wρ(s+1) = dρ(s+1) (1)V
0
ρ(s+1), where, for any i ∈ I, V 0i is deﬁned as the supremum
of Ui taken over all immediate agreements in Z
∗
i ; both lemmas are part of proposition 2.3 and
proven in the appendix.
Lemma 2.3. For any i ∈ I, (x, t) ∈ Z∗i if and only if there exists a simple implementation
of (x, t) in Gi.
Proof. Suﬃciency holds by deﬁnition 2.5 (property 5 and equilibrium).
For necessity, take any (x, t) ∈ Z∗i and deﬁne a strategy proﬁle so it satisﬁes properties 1
and 2. It is to be shown that there exist continuation equilibrium outcomes after deviations
from the desired path
(
hti,E, x, 1
)
that ensure these two properties deﬁne optimal behaviour and
do not conﬂict with property 5.
Begin with the ﬁrst part of property 4. If respondent ρ (t+ 1) preferred every continuation
StPoE outcome to immediate agreement on x, then she would never accept it, a contradic-
tion to (x, t) being an StPoE outcome in Gi. Hence, there exists (x
′, t′) ∈ Z∗ρ(t+1) such that
Uρ(t+1) (x
′, 1 + t′) ≤ uρ(t+1)
(
xρ(t+1)
)
.
Moreover, xρ(t+1) ≤ fUρ(t+1)
(
Wρ(t+1)
)
must hold: in any StPoE, respondent ρ (t+ 1) accepts
any proposal y with yρ(t+1) > f
U
ρ(t+1)
(
Wρ(t+1)
)
for the reason that she prefers its immediate
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agreement over any continuation StPoE outcome, meaning that in no equilibrium proposer
ρ (t) could oﬀer x, a contradiction. Hence, for any y with yρ(t+1) < xρ(t+1), it is true that
yρ(t+1) < f
U
ρ(t+1)
(
Wρ(t+1)
)
, so there exists a (x′, t′) ∈ Z∗ρ(t+1) such that Uρ(t+1) (x′, 1 + t′) >
Uρ(t+1) (y, 0). This yields the second part of property 4.
In fact, the very same reasoning applies to ensure existence of a continuation equilibrium
outcome so property 3 can be satisﬁed, so, thus far, we have shown that a strategy proﬁle
can be constructed which satisﬁes properties 1-4 with optimal respondent behaviour on path(
hti,E, x, 1
)
where deviations are followed by some equilibrium play.
Now note that any strategy proﬁle with properties 1 and 2 has property 5 if and only if,
for all s < t, it is true that fUρ(s+1)
(
Wρ(s+1)
)
> 0 which means if, (x, t) cannot be implemented
simply (with extreme proposals and most demanding respondent behaviour), then it cannot
be an equilibrium.13
To show that one can indeed ﬁnd an StPoE among these strategy proﬁles, we only need
to show that (x, t) ∈ Z∗i allows to rule out proﬁtable deviations by respective proposer ρ (s)
after any history h = hsi,E, s ≤ t, due to the choice of continuation equilibrium. The following
arguments demonstrate this by contradiction.
First, consider such a case where s < t and suppose ρ (s) were to deviate to a split y 6= eρ(s).
If yρ(s+1) ≥ fUρ(s+1)
(
Wρ(s+1)
)
then this deviation would result in immediate agreement with
a payoﬀ to ρ (s) of at most uρ(s)
(
1− fUρ(s+1)
(
Wρ(s+1)
))
. In regard of lemma 2.7, this upper
bound on the deviation payoﬀ equals vρ(s) so such a deviation being proﬁtable would require
Uρ(s) (x, t− s) < vρ(s), implying (x, t− s) /∈ Z∗ρ(s) and thus contradicting (x, t) ∈ Z∗i .
Next, consider deviation to some y with yρ(s+1) < f
U
ρ(s+1)
(
Wρ(s+1)
)
. In order to be prof-
itable for any choice of continuation equilibrium, y must satisy that, for any (x′, t′) ∈ Z∗ρ(s+1)
with Uρ(s+1) (x
′, 1 + t′) > uρ(s+1)
(
yρ(s+1)
)
, it is true that Uρ(s) (x
′, 1 + t′) > Uρ(s) (x, t− s). Let
y be such a proposal and consult lemma 2.6 of the appendix which says that Wρ(s+1) =
dρ(s+1) (1)V
0
ρ(s+1). For any  > 0, there exists (x
′, 0) ∈ Z∗ρ(s+1) such that Uρ(s+1) (x′, 1) >
Wρ(s+1) −  (by deﬁnition). Existence of such a deviation y requires Wρ(s+1) > uρ(s+1) (0) ≥ 0,
for  ≤ (1− dρ(s+1) (1))Wρ(s+1), so there exists (x′, 0) ∈ Z∗ρ(s+1) such that:
x′ρ(s+1) > f
U
ρ(s+1)
(
Wρ(s+1)−
dρ(s+1)(1)
)
≥ fUρ(s+1)
(
Wρ(s+1)
)
⇒ uρ(s)
(
x′ρ(s)
)
< uρ(s)
(
1− fUρ(s+1)
(
Wρ(s+1)
))
⇒ Uρ(s) (x, t− s) < vρ(s),
where the last implication follows from lemma 2.7 and itself implies that (x, t− s) /∈ Z∗ρ(s), a
contradiction.
Finally, consider history hti,E and suppose proposer ρ (t) were to deviate by proposing some
split y 6= x: if yρ(t+1) > xρ(t+1) then this deviation is also immediately accepted but yields
the proposer a lower share, which cannot be proﬁtable; and if yρ(t+1) < xρ(t+1) then yρ(t+1) <
fUρ(t+1)
(
Wρ(t+1)
)
must hold, so a similar argument to the one employed in the previous paragraph
13In fact, suppose that fUk (Wk) = 0 for some k ∈ I and let l = 3 − k; by deﬁnition of Wk, this means that a
respondent k accepts any proposal which speciﬁes a positive share for her. Now, because to a proposer l, any
delayed agreement is worth at most dl (1) < 1 (recall the normalisation ul (1) = 1), by continuity, Z
∗
l = {(el, 0)},
which, by a similar argument, in turn implies that Z∗k = {(x, 0)} for x ∈ X such that xl = fl (dl (1)). Note also
that for t = 0, property 2 yields property 5 already.
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applies and ensures there exists a continuation equilibrium outcome that deters this deviation.

This lemma implies the following property of the temporal structure of equilibrium out-
comes: comparing i's lowest equilibrium payoﬀs across delays in Gi (as of the initial round),
they are constant. This yields a connection between vi and wi through the maximal delay ti:
while ti = 0 implies wi = w
0
i = di (1) vi from proposition 2.3, for ti > 0, wi = δi (ti) vi, where
δi : T → (0, 1) with δi (t) ≡ min
{
di(s+1)
di(s)
|s ∈ T, s ≤ t
}
.
Due to the proposer's strategic advantage, wi is irrelevant for the equilibrium outcomes
in Gi, and, moreover, for delayed such agreements, also wj is irrelevant, since there is an
intermittent stage in which j proposes. This results in the following corollary.
Corollary 2.3. For any i ∈ I and any t ∈ T with t ≤ ti, wi = δi (ti) vi, and, moreover,
(x, 0) ∈ Z∗i ⇔ u−1i (vi) ≤ xi ≤ 1− fUj (δj (tj) vj)
(x, t) ∈ Z∗i , t > 0 ⇔ u−1i
(
vi
di (t)
)
≤ xi ≤ 1− u−1j
(
vj
dj (t− 1)
)
Proof. The ﬁrst step is to show that the minimal share for any equilibrium outcome with
delay t equals
(12) min {xi |(x, t) ∈ Z∗i } = u−1i
(
vi
di (t)
)
.
The construction of a simple implementation implies that the minimum is actually reached and
that the incentive problem only needs to be solved for the stages where i proposes, where i
needs to be prevented from making acceptable oﬀers before t is reached (note that there is then
no further issue with opponent j's incentives as the proposer, because it is about the minimal
share for i). This is solved for all rounds if and only if it is solved for the ﬁrst round, where the
relative delay to the given agreement is maximal. There, no proﬁtable deviation proposal exists
up to where i's share in the agreement means a present value of less than 1 − fj (Wj) = vi,
whence the minimal share xi with delay t satisﬁes di (t)ui (xi) = vi.
Recall then the deﬁnition of wi and observe the following, using continuity of ui:
wi ≡ inf {di (1 + t)ui (xi) |(x, t) ∈ Z∗i }
= min {di (1 + t) · inf {ui (xi) |(x, t) ∈ Z∗i } |t ∈ T, t ≤ ti}
= min
{
di (1 + t) · vi
di (t)
|t ∈ T, t ≤ ti
}
= δi (ti) vi.(13)
This pins down Vi because Vi = V
0
i = ui
(
1− fUj (wj)
)
from proposition 2.3, where the payoﬀ
is obtained in some equilibrium because vj is. This gives the characterisation of immediate-
agreement proposals in Z∗i in terms of i's shares given vi, vj and tj.
For any (x, t) ∈ Z∗i with t > 0, it must be that (x, t− 1) ∈ Z∗j , whence the characterisation
follows from applying the same reasoning as at the outset of the proof to Gj. 
While this result characterises (Z∗i )i∈I in terms of (vi)i∈I and (ti)i∈I , in combination with
proposition 2.3, it also yields a system of equations that the payoﬀ bounds must satisfy in
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terms of only two unknowns (ti)i∈I . However, these maximal delays are in turn pinned down
by the payoﬀ bounds (vi)i∈I : as long as the delay is such that one can ﬁnd divisions that do not
violate the minimum necessary for a simple implementation, as in equation 12, such a simple
implementation exists. For instance, in G1, a delay of two periods is an equilibrium if and only
if there exists a division x such that x1 ≥ u−11
(
v1
d1(2)
)
and x2 ≥ u−12
(
v2
d2(1)
)
.
To express this formally, ﬁrst deﬁne a function ci (vi, vj, ·) : T → R+; for each player i,
ci measures the minimal total surplus that is required to be able to promise the proposers
suﬃciently large shares for a delay of t periods in terms of (vi)i∈I :
ci (vi, vj, t) ≡
fˆUi (vi) + fˆUj (dj (1) vj) t = 0fˆUi ( vidi(t))+ fˆUj ( vjdj(t−1)) t > 0 ,
where fˆUi continuously extends f
U
i onto the entire non-negative real line as
fˆUi (U) ≡
fUi (U) U ∈ UiU U > 1 .
Then the following is true.
Corollary 2.4. For any i ∈ I,
ti = max {t ∈ T |ci (vi, vj, t) ≤ 1} .
Proof. Given equation 12, there exists a proposal x ∈ X such that there is a simple
implementation of (x, t) in Gi if and only if ci (vi, vj, t) ≤ 1. 
This closes the system: given (ti)i∈I , all payoﬀ bounds necessarily satisfy a system of
equations which can be reduced to one in only (vi)i∈I , and the latter in turn determine (ti)i∈I
as above. Hence, these bounds (vi, ti)i∈I must be a ﬁxed point of a system of four equations.
This system contains that for Rubinstein pairs (expressed in payoﬀ terms) as a special case,
and uniqueness of the ﬁxed point characterises uniqueness of equilibrium.14
Theorem 2.1. There exists a unique StPoE if and only if there exists a unique solution(
v˜i, t˜i
)
i∈I ∈ ×i∈I (Ui × T ) to the system of four equations which has, for each i ∈ I,
v˜i = ui
(
1− fUj
(
δj (0)uj
(
1− fUi
(
δi
(
t˜i
)
v˜i
))))
(14)
t˜i = max {t ∈ T |ci (v˜i, v˜j, t) ≤ 1}(15)
In this case there is a unique RubE which then is the unique StPoE.
Proof. First note that for t˜1 = t˜2 = 0 the system of equations 14-15 (for each i)in
what follows simply the systemreduces to one that is indeed equivalent to that deﬁning
Rubinstein pairs in terms of utilities. A Rubinstein pair exists by lemma 2.1 and, moreover,
any such pair's associated proposer utilities yield t˜1 = t˜2 = 0 in the two equations 15, whence
the system's set of solutions contains all those utilities obtained from Rubinstein pairs.
14Note that if (x∗, y∗) is a Rubinstein pair as in deﬁnition 2.2, then c1 (u1 (x∗1) , u2 (y
∗
2) , 0) = x
∗
1 + x
∗
2 = 1 and
c2 (u2 (y
∗
2) , u1 (x
∗
1) , 0) = y
∗
1 + y
∗
2 = 1.
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First, consider suﬃciency. If there is a unique solution, then it is indeed equal to (vi, ti)i∈I .
Because, by the above observation, it must correspond to a unique Rubinstein pair which has
eﬃcient payoﬀs, there must be immediate agreement in every round where these payoﬀs yield
unique strategies, the associated RubE.
Moving toward necessity, note that if there is a unique StPoE, there cannot be two diﬀerent
solutions with t˜1 = t˜2 = 0, because this would mean there are two RubE.
To ﬁnish the necessity part of the theorem, I next show that whenever there is a solution
to the system with t˜i > 0 for some i ∈ I, there exists a StPoE that is not a RubE; because
a RubE always exists, this would contradict uniqueness. Suppose then there exists a solution(
v˜1, t˜1, v˜2, t˜2
)
with t˜i > 0 for some i ∈ I. For each i ∈ I let tˆi ≤ t˜i be such that Pi
(
tˆi
)
= δi
(
t˜i
)
.
If tˆ1 = tˆ2 = 0 then t˜1 = t˜2 = 0 so let i be such that tˆi > 0. Consider agreements
(
xˆ, tˆi
)
and
(
yˆ, tˆj
)
, where xˆi = fˆ
U
i
(
v˜i/di
(
tˆi
))
and yˆj = fˆ
U
j
(
v˜j/dj
(
tˆj
))
. It will be shown that both are
StPoE agreements, i.e.
(
xˆ, tˆi
) ∈ Z∗i and (yˆ, tˆj) ∈ Z∗j , by establishing that they are self-enforcing
as a pair: using them as continuation outcomes, one can construct simple implementations of
both.
The key observation is that
(
xˆ, tˆi
)
is weakly preferred by proposer i to satisfying j's demand
when, subsequently, proposer j could push i down to her reservation share under continuation
with
(
xˆ, tˆi
)
after another rejection (in fact, i is indiﬀerent in the initial round):
di
(
tˆi
)
ui (xˆi) ≥ ui
(
1− fUj
(
dj (1)uj
(
1− fUi
(
di
(
1 + tˆi
)
ui (xˆi)
))))
A similar point holds true about
(
yˆ, tˆj
)
for proposer j.
Because tˆi ≤ t˜i it is also true that fˆUi
(
v˜i/di
(
tˆi
))
+ fˆUj
(
v˜j/dj
(
tˆj − 1
)) ≤ 1 and therefore
dj
(
tˆi − 1
)
uj (xˆj) ≥ vj = dj
(
tˆj
)
uj (yˆj). Hence, if both of
(
xˆ, tˆi
)
and
(
yˆ, tˆj
)
are StPoE outcomes,
then they support
(
xˆ, tˆi
)
as StPoE outcome in Gi: for any t < tˆi, following a history h
t
i,E, ρ (t)
proposes eρ(t) and respondent ρ (t+ 1) accepts a proposal x if and only if
xρ(t+1) ≥
fUj
(
dj (1)uj
(
1− fUi
(
di
(
1 + tˆi
)
ui (xˆi)
)))
ρ (t) = i
fUi
(
di (1)ui
(
1− fUj
(
dj
(
1 + tˆj
)
uj (yˆj)
)))
ρ (t) = j
For t = tˆi, following a history h
t
i,E, proposer ρ (t) proposes xˆ and respondent ρ (t+ 1) accepts a
proposal x if and only if xρ(t+1) ≥ xˆρ(t+1). A deviation by proposer i that is rejected is followed
by j's proposing x such that xi = f
U
i
(
di
(
1 + tˆi
)
ui (xˆi)
)
, which is the smallest oﬀer that i then
accepts; if i rejects then a StPoE implementing
(
xˆ, tˆi
)
is played. A deviation by proposer j that
is rejected is followed by i's proposing y such that yj = f
U
j
(
dj
(
1 + tˆj
)
uj (yˆj)
)
, which is the
smallest oﬀer that j then accepts; if j rejects, then a StPoE implementing
(
yˆ, tˆj
)
is played. It
is clear that this construction supports
(
xˆ, tˆi
)
as StPoE outcome in Gi if
(
xˆ, tˆi
)
and
(
yˆ, tˆj
)
are
indeed StPoE outcomes. A similar construction can be devised to then also support
(
yˆ, tˆj
)
as
a StPoE outcome. Thus the two are self-enforcing. The argument is complete and establishes
a StPoE with delay tˆi in Gi, which is clearly not a RubE. 
While the uniqueness condition about the solutions to the system of (four) equations is
not obviously interpretable in any useful way, by lemma 2.1, it requires a unique Rubinstein
pair. For this case, the property that no other solutions exist is equivalent to the players'
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preferences not permitting the construction of a pair of self-enforcing StPoE outcomes with
delay as the proof provides one. Technically, this possibility, illustrated in chapter 1, is the
novel phenomenon that may arise when preferences are time-inconsistent, and that my approach
accomodates through the distinction of respondent threats from analoguous proposer payoﬀs
and the introduction of maximal delays.
A characterisation of StPoE payoﬀs as well as outcomes is straightforward from this theorem
on the basis of previous results. First, note that existence of a solution v˜i to equation 14 for
any t˜i ∈ T follows from the continuity of players' utility functions in a way similar to lemma
2.1. Now, for each i ∈ I, let Bi denote the set of pairs
(
vˆi, tˆi
) ∈ Ui × T such that, for
some pair
(
vˆj, tˆj
) ∈ Uj × T , (vˆi, tˆi, vˆj, tˆj) solves the system of equations 14-15. Let t∗i =
max {t ∈ T |∃u ∈ Ui, (u, t) ∈ Bi}, and let v∗i = min {u ∈ Ui |∃t ∈ T, (u, t) ∈ Bi}. Denote by
U i,∗k the set of StPoE payoﬀs of player k in Gi.
Theorem 2.2. Under assumption 2, (vi, ti)i∈I = (v
∗
i , t
∗
i )i∈I . Moreover, for {i, j} = I, the
set of StPoE payoﬀs in Gi is given by
U i,∗i =
[
v∗i , ui
(
1− fUj
(
δj
(
t∗j
)
v∗j
))]
U i,∗j =
[
uj
(
fUj
(
δj
(
t∗j
)
v∗j
))
, uj
(
fUj
(
dj (1)uj
(
1− fUi (δi (t∗i ) v∗i )
)))]
Proof. Take any i ∈ I and note that by corollary 2.7 t∗i is well-deﬁned. It is easily
veriﬁed that ui
(
1− fUj
(
δj (0)uj
(
1− fUi (δi (t) vi)
)))
is non-increasing in t so in fact v∗i =
min {vi ∈ Ui |(vi, t∗i ) ∈ Bi}. In order to establish that (v∗i , t∗i )i∈I is a solution to the system of
equations 14-15, it needs to be shown that, for {i, j} = I, t∗i = max
{
t ∈ T ∣∣ci (v∗i , v∗j , t) ≤ 1},
but this follows from the fact that ci is non-decreasing in each argument.
Each of (v∗i )i∈I can be shown to be indeed an StPoE payoﬀ following the construction of
StPoE in the proof of theorem 2.1, whence vi ≤ v∗i . On the other hand, the necessity of
equation 14 means that vi ≥ v∗i . Hence we obtain vi = v∗i , and the payoﬀ bounds follow from
the relationships in proposition 2.3.
Connectedness and closedness of the payoﬀ intervalls as well as (ti)i∈I = (t
∗
i )i∈I are imme-
diate consequences of corollary 2.3. 
Discussion. Consider now the question of what an interesting suﬃcient condition for unique-
ness at the level of individual preferences could be. First, it would have to ensure uniqueness of
a Rubinstein pair. As discussed at the end of section 2.3, the standard assumption of concavity
would be suﬃcient to do so. However, there may still be multiplicity if one can ﬁnd other
solutions to the system 14-15: this would be of the form that by increasing t˜i away from zero,
δi
(
t˜i
)
accordingly, i's worst respondent threatdrops suﬃciently to feed through the other
payoﬀ extremes and permit a lower solution for i's worst proposer payoﬀ v˜i that implies threats
to i as the proposer which are consistent with delay t˜i. Given a unique Rubinstein pair, if
increasing t does not lower δi (t), then this cannot happen, and the RubE is indeed the unique
equilibrium.
Hence, one important case of a suﬃcient condition for uniqueness is concavity of ui together
with δi (0) = inf {δi (t) |t ∈ T } for each i ∈ I. The discussion of section 1.2.2 of chapter 1 shows
how this property can be interpreted as present bias (in a weak sense) and is satisﬁed by
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exponential discounting, (β, δ)-discounting and hyperbolic discounting, thus all of the most
familiar time preferences.
Indeed, apart from the extra burden of further notation, chapter 1's insights qualitatively
generalise to any case with a unique Rubinstein pair. In the case of multiple Rubinstein pairs
that, as such, would not permit constructions of equilibrium delay, these interact with the
possibility of delay through time-inconsistency (as described above), so there may still be delay
equilibria.
On the other hand, time preferences which are conducive to delay are, roughly, such that
the two players' δi's start high and then drop sharply at small but positive t, in combination
with fi (·, 1)'s being very small for small shares but then increase very fast; in the terminology
introduced at the end of section 2.3.1, the latter means there is relatively great loss to one
period's delay for small shares turning into relatively small losses for large shares.
What about a meaningful notion of bargaining power in this class of preferences? In the con-
text of general separable time preferences, the components which drive vi are δi and f
U
i . Both a
uniform (weak) increase of fUi and of δi improve i's bargaining outcome in the sense of increas-
ing vi weakly. Once more, this simply combines what has been known for the time-consistent
exponential discounting casesee e.g. Osborne and Rubinstein [1990, Section 3.10.2]with the
insights of chapter 1.
Theorem 2.2, especially together with corollary 2.4, also implies the ﬁrst characterisation
of equilibrium outcomes for general separable time preferences with exponential discounting,
without restrictions on the loss to delay and thus also covering preferences with very convex
ui in their representation. Applications with such non-standard ui's may arise from the reduced
form of certain fairness preferences and can then use this result.
Comparative Statics. Finally, I present two comparative statics results which generalise the
discussion at the end of chapter 1's section 1.7. They serve to qualify two familiar results
from the time-consistent exponential-discounting case within the context of general separable
time preferences: ﬁrst, the result that patience pays in bargaining and, second, the result that
being the initial proposer is better than being the initial respondent (see, again, Osborne and
Rubinstein [1990, Section 3.10.2-3]).
For any two players i and i′ with preferences representable as in assumption 2 such that
ui = ui′ , say that i
′ is uniformly more patient than i if, for all t ∈ T \ {0}, di′ (t) > di (t).
Equivalently, there exists a sequence  (t) with  (0) = 0 and, for any t ∈ T \ {0},  (t) ∈
(0,  (t− 1) + di (t− 1)− di (t)), such that, for any t ∈ T , di′ (t) = di (t) +  (t). Call any such
sequence  a uniform patience increase of di. In the bargaining game where i is replaced by
i′ against a given opponent j, denote the resulting StPoE payoﬀ extrema and maximal StPoE
delays according to the following scheme: v′i′ is the minimal proposer payoﬀ of i
′ and v′j is the
minimal proposer payoﬀ of j.
Corollary 2.5. Let {i, j} = I and suppose ti > 0. It is always possible to replace i with a
player i′ who is uniformly more patient than i such that v′j ≤ vj, v′i′ ≤ vi and w′i′ < wi, which
imply [wi,Wi] ⊂ [w′i′ ,W ′i′ ], [vi, Vi] ⊆ [v′i′ , V ′i′ ], [wj,Wj] ⊆
[
w′j,W
′
j
]
, [vj, Vj] ⊆
[
v′j, V
′
j
]
and ti ≤ t′i′
as well as tj ≤ t′j.
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Proof. Deﬁne, for each i ∈ I and t ∈ T , Pi ≡ di(t+1)di(t) . Take tˆ ≤ ti such that Pi
(
tˆ
)
=
δi (ti) and let, for any t ∈ T and any uniform patience increase  of di, P i (t) = di(1+t)+(1+t)di(t)+(t) .
Now choose  as follows:  (1) ∈ (0, 1− di (1)), for t + 1 ∈ T \
{
1, tˆ
}
,  (t+ 1) = P (t)  (t)
and for t + 1 = tˆ, 
(
tˆ
) ∈ (0, P (t)  (t)). Then, of course, P i (0) > Pi (0), but also for any
t + 1 ∈ T \ {1, tˆ}, P i (t) = Pi (t) and P i (tˆ) < Pi (tˆ). Let i′ be a player with ui′ = ui and
di′ (t) = di (t)+ (t) for such a uniform patience increase. Then δi′ (0) > δi (0), implying v
′
j ≤ vj,
and also δi′ (ti) < δi (ti), implying v
′
i′ ≤ vi as well as w′i′ < wi . The remaining implications
follow in a straightforward manner. 
Hence, whenever delay equilibria exist, there is a sense in which players can be made more
patient such that the sets of equilibrium payoﬀs and delays expand.
A second observation is that a player i does not necessarily prefer to be the initial proposer,
or v∗i < ui
(
fUi
(
di (1)ui
(
1− fUj
(
δj
(
t∗j
)
v∗j
))))
; to be clear, the comparison is one of the worst
proposer payoﬀ and the best respondent payoﬀ (this is how not necessarily is used). Since
v∗i = ui
(
1− fUj
(
δj (0)uj
(
1− fUi (δi (t∗i ) v∗i )
)))
, this is equivalent to
(16) 1 < fUj
(
dj (1)uj
(
1− fUi (δi (t∗i ) v∗i )
))
+ fUi
(
di (1)ui
(
1− fUj
(
δj
(
t∗j
)
v∗j
)))
.
Note that the right-hand side is the sum of the players' maximal threat points, in share terms;
the symmetry of this condition immediately reveals that v∗i < W
∗
i , so player i may not prefer
to be the initial proposer if and only if this is true also about player j. To see that this is a
possibility, suppose, without loss of generality, that t∗i > 0 and let both players' one period
discount factors approach one in a symmetric way, meaning that the RubE split converges to
an equal split, and note that the right-hand side of the above inequality, by continuity, limits
to
1− fUi (δi (t∗i ) v∗i ) + 1− fUj
(
δj
(
t∗j
)
v∗j
)
.
Since, as is easily seen from the previous corollary, increasing players' one-period discount
factors can only expand the sets of equilibrium outcomes and payoﬀs, there is still multiplicity
and fUi (δi(t
∗
i )v
∗
i ) < 1/2, whence inequality 16 is satisﬁed in the limit.
Corollary 2.6. Players' preferences are such that inequality 16 is satisﬁed if and only if
for both i ∈ I, v∗i < W ∗i .
Proof. See the argument in the paragraph preceding the statement. 
2.4. Conclusion
Based on a novel analytical approach to inﬁnite-horizon alternating-oﬀers bargaining, this
paper characterised equilibrium outcomes for general separable time preferences without the
restriction to stationary strategies that the small existing literature on this question had im-
posed. Qualitatively, the results combine familiar ﬁndings from the time-consistent exponen-
tial case where players' instantaneous utilities are non-linear in shares with those of chapter 1.
Nonetheless, for applied research that involves bargaining in the context of various non-standard
preferences covered here, the characterisation could be a useful result of reference.
Finally, the analytical approach, which has strong similarities to that of Abreu [1988] for
repeated games promises to be fruitful for analyses also (i) of non-separable time preferences
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in the same environment (see the survey of Frederick et al. [2002] for general evidence and
the work of Noor [2011] for the so-called magnitude eﬀect in particular) or (ii) of dynam-
ically inconsistent time preferences also in other stochastic games satisfying some version of
stationarity.
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Appendix
Lemma 2.4. For {i, j} = I and any z ∈ Z∗i , if yi = fUi (Ui (z0)) then (y, 0) ∈ Z∗j .
Proof. Let σ∗ be an StPoE that induces z in Gi. Consider the following pair of strategies
σ in Gj: j proposes y as in the statement, and i accepts a proposal y
′ if and only if y′i ≥ yi.
Upon rejection both continue play according to σ∗ in Gi.
By construction of y via fUi , i's acceptance rule is optimal. By j's impatience, proposing y
to have it accepted is then also optimal: among all proposals that i accepts j's share is maximal
share in y, and rejection results in z0 but yj = 1− fUi (Ui (z0)) ≥ fUj (Uj (z0)). 
The ﬁrst lemma provides a fundamental insight about the proposer advantage in bargaining:
for any continuation StPoE outcome a respondent may obtain upon rejection, there exists an
equilibrium with immediate agreement in which the proposer extracts all the beneﬁts from
agreeing earlier relative to that continuation outcome. From this result immediately follows
that disagreement is not an equilibrium outcome.
Corollary 2.7. For any i ∈ I, Z∗i ⊆ X × T .
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that for player i, there exists z ∈ Z∗i ∩D and note that this
implies that also z ∈ Z∗j . Let σ∗ denote a StPoE inducing z in Gi. Because fUj (dj (1)) < 1 there
exist proposals which player j accepts irrespective of what continuation outcome she expects;
speciﬁcally, e. g. x ∈ X with xj =
(
1 + fUj (1)
)
/2 is such a proposal. Since Ui (z) = 0 < ui (xi)
such a proposal constitutes a proﬁtable deviation for proposer i in Gi, a contradiction. 
The next lemma shows that no StPoE with delay can yield a proposing player a payoﬀ
greater than all StPoE without delay.
Lemma 2.5. For any i ∈ I, Vi = V 0i .
Proof. Suppose Vi > V
0
i , implying that there exists an StPoE agreement (x, t) ∈ Z∗i with
t > 0 such that, for any (x′, 0) ∈ Z∗i , di (t)ui (xi) > ui (x′i), and in particular ui (xi) > ui (x′i).
Accordingly, it must be that (x, 0) ∈ Z∗j . Applying lemma 2.4, for yj = fj (x, 1), (y, 0) ∈ Z∗i ,
whence V 0i ≥ ui (yi) ≥ ui (xi), a contradiction.
Since Vi ≥ V 0i by deﬁnition, the claim of the lemma is proven. 
In view of lemma 2.5, it is shown below that a player's supremum StPoE payoﬀ when
respondent is simply the once-discounted supremum StPoE payoﬀ when proposer, i. e. Wi =
di (1)Vi. This relationship between a player's supremum StPoE payoﬀs in her two diﬀerent
roles is the same as found under exponential discounting.
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Lemma 2.6. For any i ∈ I, W 0i = di (1)V 0i and Wi = W 0i .
Proof. It is straightforward to obtain the ﬁrst equality:
W 0i = sup
(x,0)∈Z∗i
{di (1)ui (xi)}
= di (1) sup
(x,0)∈Z∗i
{ui (xi)}
= di (1)V
0
i
For the second equality, suppose that Wi < W
0
i , saying that there exists (x, t) ∈ Z∗i with
t > 0 such that, for any (x′, 0) ∈ Z∗i , di (1)ui (x′i) < di (1 + t)ui (xi), and in particular ui (x′i) <
ui (xi). Now, (x, 0) ∈ Z∗j must hold, and a construction similar to the one in the proof of lemma
2.5 can be employed to yield a contradiction. Since W 0i ≤ Wi by deﬁnition, also this part is
thus proven. 
The next result relates the bounds on proposer and respondent StPoE payoﬀs across players,
based on the proposer advantage that is captured by lemma 2.4: the inﬁmum StPoE payoﬀ
of a proposer is simply the payoﬀ resulting from immediate agreement when the respondent
expects her supremum StPoE payoﬀ upon rejection; moreover, this statement holds true also
when interchanging inﬁmum and supremum.
Lemma 2.7. For any {i, j} = I, vi = ui
(
1− fUj (Wj)
)
and Vi = ui
(
1− fUj (wj)
)
.
Proof. From the continuity and the increasingness of uj it follows that
fUj (Wj) = u
−1
j
(
max
{
uj (0) , sup
(x,t)∈Z∗j
{Uj (x, 1 + t)}
})
= sup
(x,t)∈Z∗j
{
u−1j (max {uj (0) , Uj (x, 1 + t)})
}
Therefore, by continuity and increasingness of ui,
ui
(
1− fUj (Wj)
)
= ui
(
inf
(x,t)∈Z∗j
{
1− u−1j (max {uj (0) , Uj (x, 1 + t)})
})
= inf
(x,t)∈Z∗j
{ui (1− fj (xj, 1 + t))}
By a similar argument,
ui
(
1− fUj (wj)
)
= sup
(x,t)∈Z∗j
{ui (1− fj (xj, 1 + t))}
Now, for the ﬁrst equality, note that lemma 2.4 implies that
vi ≤ inf
(x,t)∈Z∗j
{ui (1− fj (xj, 1 + t))} = ui
(
1− fUj (Wj)
)
It remains to show that this inequality cannot be strict. To do so, suppose to the contrary that
there exists an outcome z ∈ Z∗i such that Ui (z) < ui
(
1− fUj (Wj)
)
and let σ∗ be an StPoE of
Gi that induces it. Because f
U
j (Wj) < 1 must hold by impatience (there is at least one round's
delay and uj (1) = 1), the continuity of ui guarantees existence of a proposal x ∈ X such that
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Ui (z) < ui (xi) < ui
(
1− fUj (Wj)
)
which is accepted as xj > f
U
j (Wj) and thus constitutes a
proﬁtable deviation for i from σ∗, a contradiction.
For the second equality, note that lemma 2.4 implies that
Vi ≥ sup
(x,t)∈Z∗j
{ui (1− fj (xj, 1 + t))} = ui
(
1− fUj (wj)
)
And since j rejects any proposal x ∈ X with xj < fUj (wj) it follows that V 0i ≤ ui
(
1− fUj (wj)
)
also, which establishes the claim via lemma 2.5. 
Next, I will establish that there is no StPoE with delay that is worse to the proposer than the
worst StPoE without delay, a result analogous to lemma 2.5 for a proposer's inﬁmum payoﬀs.
Lemma 2.8. For any i ∈ I, vi = v0i .
Proof. By lemma 2.4,
v0i ≤ inf
(x,t)∈Z∗j
{ui (1− fj (xj, 1 + t))}
The proof of lemma 2.7 shows that
inf
(x,t)∈Z∗j
{ui (1− fj (xj, 1 + t))} = vi
Since, by deﬁnition, vi ≤ v0i , the claim follows. 
In general, however, only the ﬁrst of the two properties of lemma 2.6 has an analogous
version for inﬁmum payoﬀs.
Lemma 2.9. For any i ∈ I, w0i = di (1) vi.
Proof. The following is straightforward:
w0i = inf
(x,0)∈Z∗i
{di (1)ui (xi)}
= di (1) · inf
(x,0)∈Z∗i
{di (1)ui (xi)}
= di (1) v
0
i
In view of lemma 2.8 this implies that w0i = di (1) vi. 
CHAPTER 3
A Note on Choice and Welfare in Strotz-Pollak Equilibrium
3.1. Introduction
Strotz-Pollak equilibrium (StPoE) is the standard solution concept for intertemporal deci-
sion problems of individuals who have time-inconsistent preferences and perfectly know them-
selves. Dating back to the pioneering work of Strotz [1955-1956], this solution has been inter-
preted as the outcome of consistent planning. Yet, a recurrent ﬁnding in applications is that
outcomes thus obtained are ineﬃcient according to the welfare criterion of Pareto-optimality
when applied to the sequence of temporal selves of the decision maker; two well-known exam-
ples study the choices of (β, δ)-discounters in a timing problem (O'Donoghue and Rabin [1999,
Proposition 5]) and in a consumption-savings problem (Phelps and Pollak [1968] or Laibson
[1994, Chapter 1]), respectively. Such ineﬃcient solutions represent instances of severe mis-
coordination of behaviour across time, which raises the question of what forms of dynamic
inconsistency of preferences and environments permit or prevent this phenomenon.
This note presents welfare results about StPoE paths in general decision problems with
perfect information. A main challenge in relating welfare rankings to equilibrium in general
is the history-dependence of constraints as well as welfare. Nonetheless, allowing for arbitrary
such history-dependence, the ﬁrst result, proposition 3.1, provides a suﬃcient condition for in-
trapersonal Pareto-optimality of a StPoE path in ﬁnite-horizon problems without indiﬀerence:
a limited form of intertemporal consistency of preferences, called essential consistency in ref-
erence to Hammond [1976] who originally advanced it, ensures this eﬃciency property. This
result is illustrated and discussed with several examples of timing problems of a (β, δ)-discounter
based on O'Donoghue and Rabin [1999].
Restricting the history-dependence inherent in the decision problem, corollary 3.1, relates
welfare and multiplicity of StPoE paths by showing that under these restrictions, whenever a
path supported by a StPoE is not intrapersonally Pareto-optimal, then any path that intraper-
sonally Pareto-dominates it, can also be supported by some StPoE. The welfare-rankability of
multiple StPoE paths features prominently in various examples used to motivate reﬁnements of
StPoEsee Asheim [1997] and Kocherlakota [1996]to which the result presented here adds a
general observation. Together with proposition 3.2, which it is based upon, it also illuminates
the occurrence of this phenomenon for the case of the consumption-savings problem of a (β, δ)-
discounter introduced by Phelps and Pollak [1968] and rigorously analysed by Laibson [1994,
Chapter 1].
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3.2. Decision Problem
This section deﬁnes a general class of decision problems by a single decision-maker (DM)
and the welfare criterion used throughout, and it presents two inﬂuential models from the
literature which provide the running examples of this note.
3.2.1. Stages, Actions and Histories. There is a set of consecutive decision times T =
{t ∈ N0 | t < T}, where T ∈ N0 ∪ {∞}, at each of which a single DM takes an action at out of
some non-empty, but possibly trivial (singleton), subset of a universal action space A.1 For any
t ∈ T , the set of all histories to time t+ 1 is denoted H t+1 and deﬁned inductively from H t via
a mapping At : H
t → A, capturing constraints on actions at time t that evolve as a function
of past choices: H0 ≡ {α}, where α is a parameter of the problem, and, for any t ∈ T ,
H t+1 =
{
(h, a) ∈ H t ×A|a ∈ At (h)
}
.
The set of terminal histories, called paths, is then HT ≡ Ω, and the set of non-terminal
histories, orin what followssimply histories, is ∪t∈TH t ≡ H. It will be notationally
convenient to also deﬁne a function τ : H ∪ Ω → T ∪ T , such that, for any history h ∈ H,
τ (h) = t where h ∈ H t, and, for any ω ∈ Ω, τ (ω) = T .
Generalising the above, for any h ∈ H and any time t ≥ τ (h), deﬁne the set of histories
to time t which are feasible after h, the time-t continuations of h, denoted H th, as follows:
H
τ(h)
h ≡ {h} and, for any t ≥ τ (h),
H t+1h =
{
(h′, a) ∈ H th ×A|a ∈ At (h′)
}
.
Accordingly, the set of paths feasible after h is HTh ≡ Ωh, and the set of histories feasible after
h is ∪t≥τ(h)H th ≡ Hh.
Finally, deﬁne the mapping η : (H ∪ Ω)2 → (H ∪ Ω) to associate with any pairwise com-
bination of histories or paths the longest history such that both are feasible: for any (x, y) ∈
(H ∪ Ω)2,
η (x, y) =
x x = yh x 6= y, {x, y} ⊆ Hh ∪ Ωh, [∀a ∈ Aτ(h) (h) , {x, y} * H(h,a) ∪ Ω(h,a)] .
Note that this is well-deﬁned, because whenever x 6= y, there is a unique history h with the
required property; moreover, η (x, y) = η (y, x). For any two histories h and h′, whenever
η (h, h′) = h, then say h is a subhistory of h′ and h′ is a continuation history of h; and for any
history h and path ω, if η (h, ω) = h, then call h a history along ω.
3.2.2. (Pure) Strategies. A pure strategy of the DM is a function s : H → A with the
property that, for any h ∈ H, s (h) ∈ Aτ(h) (h); let S denote the set of such functions. For any
h ∈ H and any time t ≥ τ (h), deﬁne a mapping ωth : S → H t inductively as follows, where
ω
τ(h)
h (s) ≡ h, and
ωt+1h (s) =
(
ωth (s) , s
(
ωth (s)
))
.
1The possibility of trivial action spaces at various dates allows to capture discrete-time problems where decision
dates are not equidistant in time, or also problems where after some time no decisions are to be made any more,
while there are still welfare eﬀects.
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Then, for any h ∈ H, s ∈ S and date t ≥ τ (h), ωth (s) is the time-t continuation of h which
results from following strategy s. Deﬁne ωtα ≡ ωt, so, in particular, ωT (s) is simply the path
under s.
For any s ∈ S and any h ∈ H, denote the restriction of s to Hh by sh and let Sh denote the
set of functions thus obtained; elements of Sh will be called continuation strategies from h.
3.2.3. Preferences and Welfare Comparisons. At any time t ∈ T , the DM has pref-
erences over Ω which are represented by a function Ut : Ω → R; note that, given domain
Ω, Ut is allowed to vary with the particular history h ∈ H t. Importantly, Ut goes beyond a
representation of preferences in the usual sense: since it is deﬁned for all paths at any time,
two paths {ω, ω′} may be compared even though there is no time-t history upon which both
are actually feasible (formally, there does not exist any h ∈ H t such that {ω, ω′} ⊆ Ωh). Hence
there is no choice experiment, not even under options with full commitment, that could elicit
these preferences. Thus Ut in fact measures the DM's welfare at time t for any path, and
when feasible paths are compared, this implies preferences.
The welfare criterion I use throughout is a mere translation of the standard economic concept
of Pareto eﬃciency into the language of dynamic paths and a single DM.
Definition 3.1. For any two paths {ω, ω′} ⊆ Ω, ω intrapersonally Pareto-dominates (IP-
dominates) ω′ if, for any time t ∈ T , Ut (ω) ≥ Ut (ω′), and for some time t′ ∈ T , Ut′ (ω) >
Ut′ (ω
′). A path ω ∈ Ω is intrapersonally Pareto-optimal (IP-optimal, eﬃcient) if there is no
path ω′ ∈ Ω that IP-dominates ω.
3.2.4. Subproblems and Conventions. Denote any such decision problem by Γ; clearly,
any history h ∈ H deﬁnes a decision problem of its own: by simply replacing h with α and
times t ≥ τ (h) with t − τ (h), it ﬁts all the deﬁnitions above, and I will therefore denote this
subproblem by Γ (h). To simplify some of the notation here and in what follows, I make the
convention that, for any history h ∈ H and any t ∈ T , (h, (as)t−1s=t) = h. Moreover, when writing
a history to some time t in explicit form as (as)
t−1
s=0, I usually omit α; however, (as)
−1
s=0 ≡ α.
3.2.5. Examples. This work focuses attention on two examples, which are among the most
inﬂuential contributions to the analysis of decision making with time-inconsistent preferences.
The ﬁrst one is the model of O'Donoghue and Rabin [1999]: a (β, δ)-discounter chooses when
to engage in a one-time activity before a deadline, where the activity yields immediate and
delayed rewards as well as costs that vary with the timing of the activity. Real-life applications
include the choice of when to prepare a report, visit a doctor for a medical check-up or go on
a vacation.
Example 3.1. Let the deadline be T <∞, set α = 0 and A = {0, 1}, where, for any t ∈ T
and h =
(
α, (as)
t−1
s=0
) ∈ H t, zt (h) ≡ max {as}t−1s=0 and At (h) ≡ {0, 1− zt (h)}. Action a = 1 at
time t, when available, means that the DM performs the activity in period t; At (h) = {0} if
she has performed it in the past, though there still are welfare consequences to consider. The
set of paths can be characterised by the timing of the activity: Ω = T ∪ T , where ω = T is
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interpreted as performing the activity right at the deadline, when it must be done.2 Let there
be two non-negative functions v : Ω→ R+ and c : Ω→ R+, which deﬁne welfare together with
a parameter β such that 0 < β ≤ 1, and distinguish two diﬀerent types of problem.3 First, a
problem with immediate costs (and delayed rewards) is one where:
Ut (ω) =

β (v (ω)− c (ω)) t < ω
βv (ω)− c (ω) t = ω
βv (ω) t > ω
.
The other type of this problem has immediate rewards (and delayed costs) instead:
Ut (ω) =

β (v (ω)− c (ω)) t < ω
v (ω)− βc (ω) t = ω
−βc (ω) t > ω
.
Given how Ω is deﬁned, the reward- and cost-schedules can be written as vectors of length
T + 1, so I will use the notation v = (vt)
T
t=0 and c = (ct)
T
t=0, where vt and ct are the reward-
and cost-values, respectively, when the activity is performed in period t.
The second example is based on the formulation of Plan [2010, Example 4] of the following
problem originally proposed by Phelps and Pollak [1968] and reinterpreted as well as further
analysed by Laibson [1994, Chapter 1]: a (β, δ)-discounter with constant relative risk aversion
facing a constant return on savings chooses a discrete consumption-savings path over an inﬁnite
time-horizon.4
Example 3.2. Let T = ∞, α = W0 > 0 and, for any t ∈ T , At = A = [0, 1]. W0 is the
DM's initial wealth and a ∈ A is the fraction of wealth saved for the future in any period.
With a constant gross interest rate of R ≥ 0 and a given history h = (W0, (as)t−1s=0) to time
t ∈ T , wealth at time t equals Wt = Rt
(∏t−1
s=0 as
)
W0. Preferences, and in fact welfare, are
parameterised by (β, δ, ρ) with 0 < β ≤ 1, 0 < δ < 1 and ρ < 1, where the standard restriction
2For example, ignoring the initial history, if T = 3, then ω = 1 is the path (0, 1, 0) and ω = 3 is the path (0, 0, 0).
See the discussion in O'Donoghue and Rabin [1999, p. 107, in particular footnote 12].
3The assumption about the (β, δ)-discounter that δ = 1 is immaterial; see O'Donoghue and Rabin [1999, footnote
11] which shows that any long-term discounting can be incorporated in v and c.
4See also Barro [1999] for a variant of this problem in continuous time with more general time-varying time
preferences and a neoclassical production technology, Krusell and Smith-Jr. [2003] who investigate stationary
savings rules for more general (instantaneous) utility functions and savings technologies, or Bernheim et al.
[2013] who extend this problem to the case of a credit constraint (a lower bound on assets at any time).
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that δR1−ρ < 1 is imposed:
Ut (W0, (as)
∞
s=0) = ((1− at)Wt)1−ρ + β
∞∑
s=t+1
δs−t
(
(1− as)Rs−t
(
s−1∏
r=t
at
)
Wt
)1−ρ
= W 1−ρt
(1− at)1−ρ + β ∞∑
s=t+1
δs−t
(
(1− as)Rs−t
(
s−1∏
r=t
at
))1−ρ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡U((as)∞s=t)
=
(
Rt
(
t−1∏
s=0
as
)
W0
)1−ρ
U ((as)
∞
s=t) .
Note that this decision problem satisﬁes a history-independence property (see deﬁnition 3.5
below): action sets are constant and history enters welfare in a multiplicative manner, which
means it does not aﬀect the ranking of feasible continuation plans; the latter is always repre-
sented by the function U : [0, 1]T → R as deﬁned above.5
3.3. Choice and Welfare
3.3.1. Strotz-Pollak Equilibrium. Strotz [1955-1956] pioneered the analysis of a time-
inconsistent DM's behaviour in the context of a deterministic continuous-time consumption
problem. He suggested that a DM who correctly anticipates her future preferences, a sophis-
ticated DM, would select the best plan among those that he will actually follow (Strotz
[1955-1956, p. 173]), which Pollak [1968, Section 1] formalised for a discretised version of
the original problem. Early generalisations of this deﬁnition can be found in Peleg and Yaari
[1973, p. 395], Goldman [1979], pointing out the equivalence with (a particular application
of) subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE), and Goldman [1980], where the terminology
of Strotz-Pollak equilibrium that the literature has adopted is introduced. Laibson [1994]
describes the general solution as the SPNE of the intrapersonal game where each temporal
self of the DM is deﬁned to be a distinct non-cooperative player. The same approach has been
applied to decision problems featuring imperfect recall (see Piccione and Rubinstein [1997] and
other contributions to the same (special) journal issue).
Definition 3.2. A strategy sˆ ∈ S is a Strotz-Pollak equilibrium (StPoE) if, for any h ∈ H
and a ∈ Aτ(h) (h),
Uτ(h)
(
ωTh (sˆ)
) ≥ Uτ(h) (ωT(h,a) (sˆ)) .
A path ωˆ ∈ Ω is a Strotz-Pollak solution (StPo-solution) if there exists a StPoE sˆ ∈ S such
that ωT (sˆ) = ωˆ.
StPoE requires that, at any history h, the DM best-responds to correct beliefs about future
behaviour such that this behaviour, at any future history, is a best response to the same beliefs.
The DM cannot commit to future actions but forms beliefs about them which, when shared at
all histories, imply rational behaviour. As is clear from the deﬁnition as well as this description,
5Phelps and Pollak [1968] and Laibson [1994, Chapter 1] formulate this problem with absolute consumption as
the action chosen in any period, subject to the wealth constraint, which is history-dependent.
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if sˆ is a StPoE of Γ (α), then, for any history h ∈ H, sˆh is a StPoE of Γ (h) (the converse holds
true as well, of course).
StPoE is an application of SPNE to the game with the same extensive form, but where
a separate non-cooperative player acts at each decision time (equivalently, at each history,
because only one history can be played to any given decision time). Thus, well-known existence
theorems for SPNE apply, e.g. Harris [1985].6 It shares the notion of credibility inherent in
SPNE, where, ﬁxing beliefs, the DM does not expect to take actions in the future that she
would not ﬁnd optimal once the contingency were to actually occur. Applied to a single DM
with perfect self-knowledge, this could be termed loosely as ruling out that she fool herself.
3.3.2. Essential Consistency and Welfare. Recall example 3.1 with immediate rewards
for T = 2, where β = 1
2
and the reward- and cost-schedules are given by
v = (0, 5, 1)
c = (1, 8, 0) .
This results in the following unique StPoE: since U1 (1) = 5−128 > 121 = U1 (2), the DM in period
1 would engage in the activity. Therefore, it will actually be performed immediately: U0 (0) =
−1
2
1 > −1
2
(5− 8) = U0 (1). Compare now the welfare consequences from this outcome to that
if the DM waited until period 2 instead: U0 (0) = U1 (0) = −12 , whereas U0 (2) = U1 (2) = 12 .
The unique StPo-solution is therefore IP-dominated. The reason the DM does not wait initially,
even though she would strictly prefer doing it in period 2 rather than now, is that she would
otherwise do it next period; at that point, however, she would prefer the (then) immediate
reward over waiting yet another period.
Clearly, these preferences are time-inconsistent, because the DM's preferences as of the
initial period over doing it next period and doing it the period after that reverse once the
next period arrives. In order to make terms precise, I provide a deﬁnition of the benchmark of
time-consistency here.
Definition 3.3. (TC) Preferences are time-consistent if, for any history h ∈ H and any
two paths {ω, ω′} ⊆ Ωh (feasible after h),
Uτ(h) (ω) ≥ Uτ(h) (ω′)⇔ U0 (ω) ≥ U0 (ω′) .
When preferences are time-consistent, there is a single utility functionwithout loss of
generality, it is chosen to be U0that represents the DM's preferences over feasible paths at
any history. Accordingly, if a path is optimal for the DM at the initial date 0, then it remains
optimal for the DM at any history along that path; in particular, if, at the outset of the problem,
the DM has a unique optimal path, then it remains uniquely optimal for the DM at any history
along this path among all the paths feasible at that history.
In the example above, however, the nature of the violation of time-inconsistency is special.
Notice the following intertemporal cycle: at t = 1, the DM prefers doing it in period 1 over
doing it in period 2, whereas at t = 0, the DM prefers doing it in period 2 over doing it in
6See also Goldman [1980] who establishes existence of StPoE in a general class of ﬁnite-horizon problems, where
Peleg and Yaari [1973] had initially raised concerns about non-existence despite well-behaved settings.
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period 0 which is in turn preferred to doing it in period 1. This constitutes a violation of the
following property.7
Definition 3.4. (EC) Preferences are essentially consistent if, for any pair of histories
{h, h′} ⊆ H and triple of paths {ω, ω′, ω′′} ⊆ Ω such that h = η (ω, ω′) = η (ω, ω′′) and
h′ = η (ω′, ω′′) ∈ Hh,
Uτ(h′) (ω
′) > Uτ(h′) (ω′′) ∧ Uτ(h) (ω) > Uτ(h) (ω′) ⇒ Uτ(h) (ω) > Uτ(h) (ω′′) .(17)
I formulate this consistency property in strict terms because I only use it in proposition
3.1 which rules out indiﬀerence. Moreover, it is thus identical to the property advanced by
Hammond [1976], who showedagain for the case of no indiﬀerencethat essential consistency
ensures the coincidence of sophisticated and naïve choices in ﬁnite decision trees (T <∞ and
A ﬁnite). It requires that sophisticated choice from {ω, ω′, ω′′} at history h not change when
an alternative that is not chosen but still available at future history h′ is removed.
Clearly, essential consistency is implied by time-consistency; however, it is indeed weaker:
assuming no indiﬀerence and considering the same paths and histories as in the deﬁnition,
when Uτ(h) (ω) < min
{
Uτ(h) (ω
′) , Uτ(h) (ω′′)
}
, it does not restrict preferences at history h over
{ω′, ω′′}, nor when both Uτ(h) (ω) > Uτ(h) (ω′) and Uτ(h′) (ω′) < Uτ(h′) (ω′′) are true, whereas
time-consistency requires they coincide with those at history h′.
Remark 3.1. If preferences are time-consistent, then they are essentially consistent, but
the converse is not true.
Proof. Suppose TC and consider histories and paths as in the deﬁnition of EC. Under
TC, the antecedent in (17) is equivalent to
U0 (ω
′) > U0 (ω′′) ∧ U0 (ω) > U0 (ω′) ,
which, by transitivity of>, yields U0 (ω) > U0 (ω
′′), and applying TC once more gives Uτ(h) (ω) >
Uτ(h) (ω
′′).
For a counterexample to the converse, consider example 3.1 for T = 2 with immediate costs
and β = 1
2
, where v = (3, 3, 1) and c = (2, 2, 1), so
U0 (0) = −12 < U0 (2) = 0 < U0 (1) = 12
U1 (1) = −12 < U1 (2) = 0
,
so these clearly violate TC. In contrast, EC is satisﬁed becausein the deﬁnition's notationit
must be that ω = 0, whence the antecedent of (17) is vacuous here. 
In ﬁnite-horizon settings without any indiﬀerence essential consistency guarantees that the
StPo-solutionthere is a unique one by backwards inductionis IP-optimal. Alternatively put,
if a StPo-solution is found to be ineﬃcient by the Pareto-criterion, it must be that preferences
violate essential consistency.8 The proof of this result uses the following lemma, which exploits
the structure of StPoE based on backwards induction when the horizon is ﬁnite.
7In the deﬁnition's notation, ω = 0, ω′ = 1 and ω′′ = 2; these are compared as of t = 0 and t = 1.
8While IP-dominance, applied to example 3.1, compares present discounted utilities, O'Donoghue and Rabin
[2001, Section V] demonstrate an even stronger dominance property: there exists another performance period
which yields instantaneous utility at least as great in every period and greater in some period than the unique
StPo-solution (with the above numbers, the respective sequences of instantaneous utilities for periods 0, 1 and
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Lemma 3.1. Let T <∞, suppose ωˆ is a StPo-solution and take any other path ω = (at)T−1t=0 ∈
Ω \ {ωˆ}. Then there exist an integer K with 0 < K ≤ T and a sequence of paths (ωk)Kk=0 with
ω0 = ωˆ and ωK = ω such that, for any k ∈ {0, . . . , K − 1},
η (ωk+1, ω) ∈ Hη(ωk,ω) \ {η (ωk, ω)}
Uτ(η(ωk,ω)) (ωk+1) ≤ Uτ(η(ωk,ω)) (ωk) .
Proof. Let sˆ be a StPoE such that ωˆ = ωT (sˆ) and construct a sequence of paths (ω0, ω1, . . .)
as follows: set h0 ≡ α, and iterate
ωk ≡ ωThk (sˆ)
hk+1 ≡
(
η (ωk, ω) , aτ(η(ωk,ω))
)
until ωk = ω, in which case set K = k. It is easily checked that this sequence satisﬁes
0 < K ≤ T , ω0 = ωˆ and η (ωk+1, ω) ∈ Hη(ωk,ω) \ {η (ωk, ω)}.
Denote, for simplicity, tk ≡ τ (η (ωk, ω)) and suppose now there is a k ∈ {0, . . . , K − 1} such
that Utk (ωk) < Utk (ωk+1). Letting h = η (ωk, ω), this would therefore imply that
Uτ(h)
(
ωTh (sˆ)
)
< Uτ(h)
(
ωT(h,aτ(h))
(sˆ)
)
,
which contradicts that sˆ is a StPoE. 
Proposition 3.1. Let T <∞ and assume preferences exhibit no indiﬀerence in the sense
that, for any time t ∈ T and any two paths {ω, ω′} ⊆ Ωh (feasible after h) with ω 6= ω′, Ut (ω) 6=
Ut (ω
′) holds true. Then there is a unique StPo-solution, and if preferences are essentially
consistent, it is IP-optimal.
Proof. Uniqueness of StPoE in this ﬁnite-horizon problem follows from backwards induc-
tion, since there is no indiﬀerence. Denote this unique StPoE by sˆ and the associated unique
StPo-solution by ωˆ.
Take any path ω 6= ωˆ and consider a sequence (ωk)Kk=0 as in lemma 3.1; because there is no
indiﬀerence, for any k ∈ {0, . . . , K − 1}, Utk (ωk) > Utk (ωk+1). In particular, UtK−1 (ωK−1) >
UtK−1 (ω), and if K = 1, then ωK−1 = ωˆ, whence ω does not IP-dominate ωˆ. If K > 1, since
for any k′ > k, ωk′ ∈ Ωhk , we can apply EC as follows:
UtK−1 (ωK−1) > UtK−1 (ω) ∧ UtK−2 (ωK−2) > UtK−2 (ωK−1)
⇒
UtK−2 (ωK−2) > UtK−2 (ω) .
If K = 2 then ωK−2 = ωˆ, so this means ω does not IP-dominate ωˆ. If K > 2 then apply EC
once more:
UtK−2 (ωK−2) > UtK−2 (ω) ∧ UtK−3 (ωK−3) > UtK−3 (ωK−2)
⇒
UtK−3 (ωK−3) > UtK−3 (ω) .
2 are (0, 0, 0) for the StPo-solution and (0, 0, 1) for performance in period 2 instead). Of course, their criterion
is applicable only in discounted-utility models.
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If K = 3 then ωK−3 = ωˆ, so this means ω does not IP-dominate ωˆ. Since K < ∞, applying
EC K − 1 times, this process will eventually yield Ut0 (ωˆ) > Ut0 (ω), implying that ω does not
IP-dominate ωˆ. This is true for any ω 6= ωˆ, whence ωˆ is IP-optimal. 
Discussion. Essential consistency rules out intertemporal cycles: when later the DM will
be decisive about ω′ versus ω′′ in favour of ω′ and now decides about {ω} versus {ω′, ω′′},
she does not prefer ω′′ to ω and ω to ω′. The proof of proposition 3.1 shows that, for each
alternative path that is not the unique StPo solution, there exists a time t ∈ T at which the
DM prefers the solution to that path; in fact, this t is the ﬁrst time the DM's action deviates
from the alternative path. Considering the generality of the decision problem in terms of the
history-dependence of welfare, this is a remarkable result, despite the strength of essential
consistency.
For an illustration of this eﬃciency result when preferences are time-inconsistent, recall the
special case of example 3.1 used in remark 3.1, where it was established that preferences are
indeed essentially consistent. The unique StPo-solution is to wait until period 2 to perform the
task, and this is IP-optimal: the time-0 DM prefers this path to doing it immediately, and the
same is true at time 1 about doing it immediately then instead.
In a special case of example 3.1, essential consistency is also necessary.
Remark 3.2. In example 3.1 with T = 2, β < 1 and immediate rewards, the unique
StPo-solution is IP-optimal if and only if preferences are essentially consistent.
Proof. Suﬃciency follows from proposition 3.1, so suppose EC were violated. This means
either (i) U1 (1) > U1 (2) and U0 (2) > U0 (0) > U0 (1) or (ii) U1 (2) > U1 (1) and U0 (1) >
U0 (0) > U0 (2). However, (ii) cannot hold with immediate rewards because:
U1 (2) > U1 (1) ⇔ β (v2 − c2) > v1 − βc1
U0 (1) > U0 (2) ⇔ β (v1 − c1) > β (v2 − c2) ,
which implies βv1 > v1, a contradiction (since β < 1 and v1 ≥ 0).
Consider then case (i): the unique StPo-solution is that the activity is performed immedi-
ately. This path is IP-dominated by waiting to do it in period 2 whenever U1 (2) > U1 (0), i.e.
β (v2 − c2) > −βc0; the latter is, however, an implication of U0 (2) > U0 (0) because v0 ≥ 0:
U0 (2) > U0 (0)⇔ β (v2 − c2) > v0 − βc0.

For longer horizons, an essential inconsistency may be irrelevant to the StPo-solution. In-
formally, if one added a new initial period in which the DM prefers doing it immediately over
any other outcome, this would result in an IP-optimal StPo-solution, irrespective of whether in
the subproblem after waiting initially there is an essential inconsistency or not. Hence, essential
consistency certainly needs to be weakened further for a characterisation of IP-optimality in
example 3.1 with immediate rewards when T > 2, or even beyond to cope with both immediate
rewards and immediate costs.
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Signiﬁcantly generalising proposition 3.1 to dealing with indiﬀerence would require ﬁrst a
modiﬁcation of the notion of essential consistency and hardly appears promising.9 Again using
example 3.1 with T = 2 and β < 1, note that whenever at t = 1 the DM is indiﬀerent between
the two remaining feasible paths, she has a strict preference at t = 0 (with immediate costs
for doing it in period 1 and with immediate rewards for doing it in period 2). Depending
on v0 and c0, how this indiﬀerence at t = 1 translates into (expected) choice at t = 1 may
determine behaviour at t = 0 and consequently result in two diﬀerent StPo-solutions where one
IP-dominates the other in a manner orthogonal to essential consistency.
Relatedly, when moving toward an inﬁnite horizon, the assumption of no indiﬀerence be-
comes hardly defensible. Moreover, essential consistency loses its force as sequences constructed
on the basis of the proof of lemma 3.1 become inﬁnite.10 Indeed, the work of Laibson [1994,
Chapter 1, Section 3] shows that this extends to the case of even time-consistent preferences
when payoﬀs are unbounded from below in example 3.2 (time-consistency there means β = 1):
letting ρ > 1, any path can be supported as StPo-solution by the threat that, upon any past
deviation, consumption would take place at a (constant) rate suﬃciently close to one (the
continuation payoﬀ approaches negative inﬁnity). Even with bounded payoﬀs, Plan [2010,
Footnote 12] shows how, with inﬁnite cascades of threats of ever lower savings rates, one can
construct a StPoE such that at every history, adhering to it makes the DM better oﬀ than
the stationary, constant-savings-rate StPoE proposed by Phelps and Pollak [1968] (the latter
features undersaving and is used as the limiting savings rate of the punishment cascade).
3.3.3. History-Independence, Welfare and Multiplicity. The previous section pre-
sented a suﬃciency result for the IP-optimality of a StPo-solution, and its discussion indicated
how this welfare property may fail more generally. Relatedly, an argument used to discard par-
ticular StPo-solutions is that they are IP-dominated by other StPo-solutions : this phenomenon
is shared by most examples that the literature introducing reﬁnements of StPoE has produced,
e.g. Kocherlakota [1996] or Asheim [1997]. While hardly made explicit, the argument seems
to be that it reﬂects an implausible failure of coordination in that the beliefs arrived at are
self-defeating: there is another credible path that IP-dominates the one resulting from those
beliefs, so a planning DM will never coordinate future beliefs on such a strategy.
This section addresses the question of when this form of Pareto-rankable multiplicity obtains
and thus also provides insights into existence of an IP-optimal StPo-solution. In order to be able
to do so, I restrict the history-dependence inherent in the decision problem. Recall that welfare
at any time is deﬁned for all paths, whence also paths that are never altogether feasible are
compared by the welfare criterion (see section 3.2.3). In contrast, for equilibrium choices, only
comparisons of feasible paths matter. Without restrictions on the nature of history-dependence,
welfare comparisons of feasible paths may not provide any information about welfare at other
paths, and it is impossible to uncover implications for equilibrium properties from the welfare
criterion in general. Since, to the best of my knowledge, this work is the ﬁrst investigation
9One conclusion is immediate from lemma 3.1, however, when in the above deﬁnition of essential consistency
(17) is instead formulated with weak preferences: no StPo-solution is strongly IP-dominated (IP-dominance
with strict preference for every time t).
10See also the discussion of essential consistency in inﬁnite trees by Hammond [1976, pp. 170-171].
3.3. CHOICE AND WELFARE 78
of welfare of StPo-solutions beyond particular models, I consider the following rather strong
properties.
Definition 3.5. A decision problem satisﬁes history-independence if, for any time t ∈ T
and any two histories {h, h′} ⊆ H t, (i) At (h) = At (h′) ≡ At, and, (ii), for any two sequences
of continuation play
{
(as)
T−1
s=t , (a
′
s)
T−1
s=t
}
⊆ ×T−1s=t As,
Ut
(
h, (as)
T−1
s=t
)
≥ Ut
(
h, (a′s)
T−1
s=t
)
⇔ Ut
(
h′, (as)
T−1
s=t
)
≥ Ut
(
h′, (a′s)
T−1
s=t
)
.
It satisﬁes history-independence even in a welfare sense if (ii) is replaced by (ii*), for any
continuation play (as)
T−1
s=t ∈ ×T−1s=t As, Ut
(
h, (as)
T−1
s=t
)
= Ut
(
h′, (as)
T−1
s=t
)
.
History-independence of a decision problem means that, after any two histories to a particu-
lar date, the sets of feasible continuations are (i) identical (history-independent constraints) and
(ii) ranked the same way (history-independent preferences).11 It does not imply that welfare is
unaﬀected by past choices, however, which is true only upon replacing (ii) with (ii*); clearly, the
latter is stronger.12 Example 3.2 illustrates this point, since initial wealth in any period (more
precisely, a positive transformation of wealth), which is determined by past savings choices, en-
ters the utility function multiplicatively, whereby it does not aﬀect the rankings of continuation
paths; thus (ii) holds whereas (ii*) is violated. This example also demonstrates that there are
nonetheless important economic decision problems featuring dynamic constraints that (can be
formulated so they) satisfy history-independence (see Plan [2010] for a closely related point).
The essence of history-independence is that, conditional on time, the DM's continuation
behaviour can always ignore the past: any continuation play that is feasible at some history
is feasible after any history, whence, if some continuation play constitutes a StPoE after that
history, because of (ii) in deﬁnition 3.5, this is true after any other history to the same decision
time; this is the content of the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2. Assume the decision problem satisﬁes history-independence. Take a strategy
s ∈ S such that sh is a StPoE of Γ (h) for history h ∈ H and consider any history h′ ∈ H with
τ (h′) = τ (h) = τ . Then any strategy s′ ∈ S such that, for any non-negative integer k ≤ T − τ
and (at)
τ+k−1
t=τ ∈ ×τ+k−1t=τ At,
s′
(
h′, (at)
τ+k−1
t=τ
)
= s
(
h, (at)
τ+k−1
t=τ
)
satisﬁes that s′h′ is a StPoE of Γ (h
′).
Proof. Suppose s′h′ is not a StPoE of Γ (h
′), so there exist a history hˆ′ ∈ Hh′ and an action
a¯ ∈ Aτ(hˆ′) such that
Uτ(hˆ′)
(
ωT(hˆ′,a¯) (s
′)
)
> Uτ(hˆ′)
(
ωT
hˆ′ (s
′)
)
.
11Note that (ii) relies on (i) to be well-deﬁned; although one could deﬁne the history-independence of preferences
independently to hold only when continuation plays are actually feasible under both histories, for the purposes
here, this is unnecessary as (ii) is only considered in problems which satisfy (i) anyways.
12(ii*) implies Ut
(
h, (as)
T−1
s=t
)
= Ut
(
h′, (as)
T−1
s=t
)
and Ut
(
h, (a′s)
T−1
s=t
)
= Ut
(
h′, (a′s)
T−1
s=t
)
from which (ii) fol-
lows.
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Note that, by part (i) of history-independence of a decision problem as in deﬁnition 3.5, hˆ′ =(
h′, (at)
τ+k−1
t=τ
)
for some non-negative integer k ≤ T − τ , and consider hˆ =
(
h, (at)
τ+k−1
t=τ
)
. The
deﬁnition of s′ on Hh′ via s on Hh implies that ωT(hˆ′,a¯) (s
′) and ωT
(hˆ,a¯)
(s) are identical from time
τ onwards, and the same is true about the two paths ωT
hˆ′
(s′) and ωT
hˆ
(s). Therefore, part (ii) of
a decision problem's history-independence yields that
Uτ(hˆ)
(
ωT(hˆ,a¯) (s)
)
> Uτ(hˆ)
(
ωT
hˆ
(s)
)
.
This, however, contradicts the hypothesis that sh is a StPoE of Γ (h). 
Lemma 3.2 allows to establish a multiplicity result about history-independent decision prob-
lems, which is related to the welfare criterion in the discussion that follows, precisely in corollary
3.1 which uses deﬁnition 3.6.
Proposition 3.2. Assume the decision problem satisﬁes history-independence and let ωˆ =
(aˆt)
T−1
t=0 be a StPo-solution; then any other path ω˜ = (a˜t)
T−1
t=0 6= ωˆ such that, for any time t ∈ T ,
(18) Ut (ω˜) ≥ Ut
(
(a˜s)
t−1
s=0 , (aˆs)
T−1
s=t
)
,
is also a StPo-solution.
Proof. Take any StPoE sˆ with ωT (s) = ωˆ and consider the strategy s˜ constructed as
follows: whenever a history h ∈ H satisﬁes ω˜ ∈ Ωh, set s˜ (h) = a˜τ(h); then note that any other
history can be written as h =
(
h′, a¯, (at)
τ(h′)+k
t=τ(h′)+1
)
for some k ∈ Z with 0 ≤ k ≤ T − τ (h′)− 1
and where η (h, ω˜) = h′, in which case set
s˜ (h) = sˆ
(
(aˆt)
τ(h′)−1
t=0 , a¯, (at)
τ(h′)+k
t=τ(h′)+1
)
.
This deﬁnes s˜ for every history h such that ω˜ /∈ Ωh.
It will now be shown that s˜ is a StPoE and thus that ω˜ is indeed a StPo-solution. Consider
ﬁrst any history h with ω˜ /∈ Ωh and note that there exist a history h′ and an action a¯ ∈ Aτ(h′)
such that ω˜ ∈ Ωh′ , ω˜ /∈ Ω(h′,a¯) and h ∈ H(h′,a¯). Since, for h′′ =
(
(aˆt)
τ(h′)−1
t=0 , a¯
)
, sˆh′′ is a StPoE
of Γ (h′′), lemma 3.2 establishes that s˜(h′,a¯) is a StPoE of Γ (h′, a¯); because h ∈ H(h′,a¯), s˜h is
therefore a StPoE of Γ (h).
Now take a history h with ω˜ ∈ Ωh and consider any a ∈ Aτ(h) with a 6= s˜ (h) = a˜τ(h). By
deﬁnition of s˜, at all times t ≥ τ (h), the actions on path ωT(h,a) (s˜) are identical to those on path
ωT(h′,a) (sˆ) when h
′ = (aˆt)
τ(h)−1
t=0 ; using that τ (h
′) = τ (h), since sˆ is a StPoE, Uτ(h)
(
ωT(h′,a) (sˆ)
)
≤
Uτ(h)
(
ωTh′ (sˆ)
)
= Uτ(h) (ωˆ). The history-independence of preferences (property (ii) of deﬁnition
3.5) then yields that Uτ(h)
(
ωT(h,a) (s˜)
)
≤ Uτ(h)
(
h, (aˆt)
T−1
t=τ(h)
)
. Combining this last inequality
with Uτ(h)
(
h, (aˆt)
T−1
t=τ(h)
)
≤ Uτ(h) (ω˜) from the hypothesis of the proposition, one ﬁnally obtains
Uτ(h)
(
ωT(h,a) (s˜)
)
≤ Uτ(h)
(
ωTh (s˜)
)
, completing the proof. 
Discussion. While it may appear that lemma 3.2 should immediately yield that if a path IP-
dominates a StPo-solution, that path must be supportable by a StPoE as wellit could be based
on the very same threatsthis is not true in general. Consider the following simple example
of a history-independent decision problem: T = 2, A0 = A1 = {0, 1}, U0 (a0, a1) = −|a0 − a1|
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and U1 (a0, a1) = 2a0 − a1. At time t = 1, the DM prefers 0 over 1 irrespective of the previous
action, whence she matches this action with a0 = 0 at t = 0. Yet, this unique StPo-solution
(0, 0) is IP-dominated by (1, 1). Note how this example relies on the history-dependence of
welfare in the second period.
However, proposition 3.2 illuminates example 3.2: there is a unique StPoE with the property
that consumption/saving takes place at the same rate irrespective of time and history. This
simple equilibrium was ﬁrst identiﬁed by Phelps and Pollak [1968, Part IV], who also showed
that the resulting path is IP-dominated by other constant-rate paths of consumption/saving.
Because we are comparing constant-rate paths, inequality 18 holds true: to see this, ﬁrst note
that when as = a˜ > 0 for all s ∈ T , then, for any t ∈ T , Wt = (Ra˜)tW0 and (using the
assumption that δR1−ρ < 1)
U ((as)
∞
s=t) = (1− a˜)1−ρ
(
1 + β
∞∑
s=t+1
(
δ (Ra˜)1−ρ
)s−t)
= (1− a˜)1−ρ
(
1 + β
(
−1 +
∞∑
s=0
(
δ (Ra¯)1−ρ
)s))
= (1− a˜)1−ρ
(
1 +
βδ (Ra˜)1−ρ
1− δ (Ra˜)1−ρ
)
≡ V (a˜) .
Next, suppose a constant savings rate of a˜ IP-dominates a constant savings rate of aˆ. Because
it is at least as good as of t = 0 when wealth is the same, this implies that V (a˜) ≥ V (aˆ),
which immediately yields inequality 18 where wealth is also identical in the comparison. Hence
proposition 3.2 establishes that these other paths are StPo-solutions as well, although as such,
they must be supported by more complex strategies involving history-dependence (see Laibson
[1994, Chapter 1]).
Indeed, I conjecture that, more generally, example 3.2 satisﬁes the following regularity
property.
Definition 3.6. A decision problem satisfying history-independence is welfare-regular if,
whenever a path ω = (at)
T−1
t=0 is not IP-optimal, there exists a path ω
′ = (a′t)
T−1
t=0 which IP-
dominates ω and, moreover, is such that, for any time t ∈ T ,
(19) Ut (ω
′) ≥ Ut
(
(a′s)
t−1
s=0 , (as)
T−1
s=t
)
.
Welfare regularity restricts the history-dependence of welfare: if a path ω is not IP-optimal,
then there is some other path ω′ that IP-dominates it, where as long as ω′ has been followed,
the DM would never prefer switching to continuation as under ω over staying on ω′. Observe
the similarity of inequalities (18) and (19), and note that the example given at the outset of
this discussion violates welfare-regularity. Of course, welfare-regularity is weaker than history-
independence in a welfare sense.
Remark 3.3. If a decision problem satisﬁes history-independence even in a welfare sense,
then it is welfare-regular.
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Proof. Simply note that when history-independence is satisﬁed in a welfare sense, in the
above deﬁnition, Ut
(
(a′s)
t−1
s=0 , (as)
T−1
s=t
)
= Ut (ω), whence IP-dominance immediately yields the
inequality. 
Corollary 3.1. Assume the decision problem satisﬁes history independence and is welfare-
regular. Then, if a StPo-solution is not IP-optimal, it is IP-dominated by another StPo-solution.
Proof. Let ωˆ = (aˆt)
T−1
t=0 be a StPo-solution, where a path ω˜ = (a˜t)
T−1
t=0 IP-dominates
ωˆ. Because the decision problem is welfare-regular, it is without loss of generality to choose
ω˜ = (a˜t)
T−1
t=0 such that inequality (18) holds true, whence it is a StPo-solution. 
Based on this corollary, I conjecture that every non-IP-optimal StPo-solution in example 3.2
is in fact IP-dominated by another StPo-solution (so that this is not only true about constant-
rate paths).
In any case, this result immediately implies that if a decision problem satisfying history-
independence which is welfare-regular has a unique StPo-solution, then this solution is IP-
optimal. Moreover, under standard well-behavedness assumptions (e.g. compact action spaces
and continuous utility functions), where IP-dominance of a path comes with the existence of
an IP-optimal path that IP-dominates it, there then exists an IP-optimal StPo-solution.
3.4. Conclusion
This note addresses two important welfare phenomena in decision problems with time-
inconsistent preferences: Pareto-ineﬃciency of StPo-solutions and IP-rankable multiplicity of
such solutions. In a framework that allows for history-dependent welfare, my ﬁrst result delin-
eates the forms of intertemporal conﬂict inherent in preferences that yield ineﬃcient outcomes
in the Pareto-sense by showing that they must violate essential consistency whenever the hori-
zon is ﬁnite and there is no indiﬀerence. Essential consistency is in fact necessary in a simple
version of the timing problem analysed by O'Donoghue and Rabin [1999] where rewards are
immediate and costs are delayed. While the discussion points out the likely obstacles to gener-
alisations of these results even within the framework that this note assumes, because truncation
is a popular approach to selection among multiple StPoE (see e.g. Laibson [1997]), ﬁnite-horizon
results about welfare are also of interest for work on inﬁnite-horizon problems.
The property of essential consistency was proposed by Hammond [1976] for a similar de-
cision environment, where he discovered it to be suﬃcient for the coincidence of naïve and
sophisticated choice. An interesting question is therefore the more general relationship be-
tween Pareto-eﬃciency and this invariance property of choice to various degrees of preference
misprediction.
On the other hand, when some StPo-solution in a decision problem satisfying history-
dependence fails to be IP-optimal, then this comes with IP-rankable multiplicity of StPo-
solutions when the eﬀects of past play on welfare satisfy a certain regularity property. The latter
kind of multiplicity appears to have played a major role for the development of reﬁnements of
StPoE, but whereas the work in this area so far has relied mostly on rather abstract and speciﬁc
examples (of the class described) to promote their own respective approaches, I thus organise
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them into a general insight. Moreover, beyond such abstract examples, my result applies also
to the inﬂuential consumption-savings model of Phelps and Pollak [1968].
Maybe most importantly, however, the last result can be used to establish existence of IP-
optimal StPo-solutions under standard technical assumptions. To the best of my knowledge,
no such result has been available. Of course, its generalisation to a broader class of problems
would be highly desirable for applications.
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